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Preface
The accounting profession was under fire. Throughout the long, hot summer, newspapers were 
filled with new details of a corporate accounting scandal. One of the largest, most respected 
companies in the United States had been caught inflating earnings and assets through blatant 
manipulation of the accounting rules. Thousands of investors and employees had suffered. 
Congressional hearings were called to examine and understand the fraud, and everyone asked, 
“Where were the auditors?” The accounting profession was under immense political pressure 
from reform-minded lawmakers, and the negative publicity surrounding the perceived audit 
failure cast all CPAs in the most unfavorable light.
Sound familiar? The year was 1938.
The corporate accounting scandal was McKesson-Robbins, in which the company inflated assets and 
earnings by $19 million through the reporting of nonexistent inventory and fictitious sales. In the 
wake of the scandal, the auditing profession responded by setting the first formal standards for 
auditing procedures, including guidance on the auditor’s responsibilities for material misstatements 
due to fraud.
In the years since McKesson-Robbins, the business world has been rocked by even bigger corporate 
frauds, and each time the profession has come under criticism—some of which is justified and some 
of which is not. Once again, but in a new century, we have witnessed the quick, spectacular failure of 
some of this country’s largest companies, amid a series of indictments, arrests, and allegations of 
financial fraud. As CPAs, we find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of having to defend our 
work and our credibility. We are now at the beginning of the post-Enron world.
In the summer of ’02, the Sarbanes-Oxley bill was signed into law, and by all accounts, it has the 
potential to dramatically change the auditing profession. I was attending a conference on the day the 
bill passed. The next morning I attended an audit update session. Ignoring his prepared remarks, the 
presenter took questions from the audience on the future of the profession in the wake of the just- 
passed legislation. One of the questions was, “How will we be able to earn back our reputation and 
the trust of the public?”
The answer he gave rang true and helped calm the sense of unease that had permeated the 
conference. As a profession, he said, the way to regain our reputation is the same way we earned it in 
the first place—one auditor, one engagement at a time.
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), is the first major audit 
standard to be released since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. No one ever intended these events 
to converge like this, but they have: a new fraud standard delivered in the midst of endless
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revelations of corporate malfeasance. The timing is fortuitous because this new standard 
provides us with an excellent opportunity to repair some of the recent damage to our 
reputation—one auditor, one engagement at a time.
SAS No. 99 has the potential to significantly improve audit quality, not just in detecting fraud, but in 
detecting all material misstatements and improving the quality of the financial reporting process. 
This is why.
Integrity of the Standard-Setting Process
I have always believed that a high-quality process leads to a high-quality result. Suppose you are 
building a house, and you want it to be beautiful and functional, and stand the test of time. 
Everything, you do—from the drafting of the plans, to the selection of materials, and on through the 
actual construction itself—must be designed to produce that type of quality. Because of that direct 
relationship between process and product, we can judge the quality of a finished product before it is 
in use by looking at the quality of the process. Thinking of buying a home but have questions about 
its quality? Examine the quality of the building process.
As an auditor, I would be skeptical if SAS No. 99 was the product of a hasty process designed solely 
as a response to the criticism the profession has received in the wake of high profile business failures.
For that reason, it is important to recognize that SAS No. 99 is not a knee-jerk reaction to recent 
events. This new standard was four years in the making. It is the product of a thoughtful, thorough, 
and open standard-setting process that constantly seeks to improve audit quality. The new standard 
incorporates:
• Results of academic research on how auditors implemented previous standards on fraud and 
how those standards might be improved.
• Recommendations of the Public Oversight Board’s Panel on Audit Effectiveness, who 
conducted their own detailed study on audit effectiveness.
• Comments from more than 50 groups and individuals representing a wide variety of 
stakeholders in the financial reporting process.
Only a handful of engagement teams have adopted the new standard in advance of its effective date, 
and it is far too early to determine whether the effective implementation of the new standard will 
achieve the desired effect on audit practice. However, because of the care exercised in the 
development of the standard, I feel confident that it is a high-quality standard that will improve the 
ability of auditors to respond effectively to the potential for fraud.
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Audit Smarter
If you are familiar with the previous audit standard on fraud, you know that a cornerstone of that 
standard was a list of “fraud risk factors,” which, though they do not necessarily indicate the 
existence of fraud, often have been observed when frauds have occurred. This list of fraud risk 
factors was intended to help auditors discover indicia of fraud while performing their engagements. 
In practice, this list usually was reduced to a checklist that auditors completed and included in their 
working papers.
The academic research that examined the implementation of the previous standard resulted in two 
key findings:
• Auditors did a good job of identifying indicia of fraud. However, once those indicia were 
identified, they did a relatively poor job of responding appropriately to the perceived risk of fraud.
• Auditors who rely exclusively on checklists to identify fraud risk factors are less effective than 
those who supplement checklists with other procedures.
SAS No. 99 is extremely comprehensive and touches on many elements of the audit process. It can 
not be reduced to a checklist or form. The effective implementation of SAS No. 99 will require 
auditors to audit smarter and think more creatively when they audit. Engagement teams who plan to 
implement the new standard by obtaining an updated version of a generic audit program will be 
doing themselves and their clients an injustice. The effective implementation of SAS No. 99 will 
force you to rethink how you plan and perform your audits.
The New Standard Will Result In Better Audits and Better Client
Service, Not Just in Fraud Detection
Over the years I’ve attended a number of audit training sessions on analytical procedures. One sure­
fire way for the instructor to get a laugh (and make an important point) is to describe some of the 
analytical review comments he or she has read on working papers over the years. “Revenues 
increased because the client sold more.” Or, “Change in account balance from prior year is 
reasonable per discussion with controller.”
What makes these types of comments scary is that they illustrate how an otherwise effective audit 
procedure can be rendered ineffective. And analytical procedures are just one of several areas in 
which the performance of audit procedures is less than optimal. To reduce audit risk to an acceptable 
level, others on the engagement team must revisit the audit area and do additional work, which 
makes the engagement less efficient.
The prescription for improving these procedures (and the quality of the audit) is always the same:
• Understand the client’s business.
• Maintain a healthy professional skepticism and corroborate management’s verbal representations.
x i
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• Have the more experienced team members share their knowledge with everyone else.
• Do a more thorough job of audit planning.
You would be hard-pressed to find an auditor to argue that this list will not result in a more effective 
and efficient audit.
Recognize that SAS No. 99 emphasizes all o f the above. To successfully implement the SAS, you 
will have to address each of the bullet points, which in turn will result in a better audit. For example, 
the new SAS emphasizes the need for professional skepticism throughout the engagement. Not only 
will that attitude help you detect material misstatements caused by fraud, it will help you detect those 
that are not caused by fraud.
Paying More Attention to Fraud Can Improve Client Service
Several years ago I was doing some contract work for a small local firm, and two things happened 
during the audit season that have stayed with me. At the time, I had just finished working on an 
implementation guide for the previous fraud standard, and so I was quite sensitive to issues relating 
to fraud.
The first thing that happened was the firm’s largest client discovered an embezzlement. The client 
called the firm’s engagement partner and read him the riot act. The client was furious—where was 
their CPA while all this was going on! Forget the fact that two years earlier the firm had performed a 
consulting engagement on internal control that had identified several key weaknesses, which had 
been exploited to conceal the theft. The irony is that the firm had never conducted an audit of the 
client. In fact, it had never done a review or a compilation. The client was primarily a tax client. And 
yet the business owners still had the expectation that their CPA was a frontline defense against 
employee theft.
Right or wrong, many clients have the expectation that CPAs in general—and auditors in 
particular—help guard against and detect fraud.
The second thing that happened during that busy season was on an audit engagement that I was 
performing. It was the first time I had done work on that particular client. During the course of the 
engagement I discovered that the client’s bookkeeper had the ability to make adjustments and write 
off accounts receivable without leaving an audit trail. No credit memo, nothing—the accounting 
software just allowed it to happen. Not only did she have that ability, she used it, too, writing off 
thousands of dollars of receivables balances right before the end of the period without the knowledge 
or approval of the business owner.
Before I had done so much work on the topic of fraud, I probably never would have recognized these 
circumstances as indicative of a potential fraud. Because I was sensitized to the fact that fraud could 
occur, however, and because I had read case studies of embezzlements that were concealed through 
the write-off of receivables, I expanded the scope of our procedures in accounts receivable. I also
x ii
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adopted a different mindset toward the client and asked more pointed questions in an effort to 
discover other indicators of possible fraud.
In the end, we did not uncover a fraud. We prepared a list of all the adjustments to accounts 
receivable and presented this to the business owner. We had a frank discussion about the weaknesses 
in his internal control and how that left him vulnerable to fraud.
A week or so later, at the conclusion of the engagement, we presented him with a bill. It was about 
30 percent higher than the previous year. I wouldn’t say he was overjoyed, but he did say that he had 
no problem paying the higher amount. He had heard from his staff how thoroughly we had 
conducted our engagement, and he had appreciated the comments we made to him during our exit 
interview. Perhaps he sensed a different mindset and felt that we were really digging hard to find 
something. I don’t know what he was thinking when he told me that paying the bill was no problem 
and that “this was the best audit we’ve ever gotten.”
Take SAS No. 99 to heart. Use it to change the way you approach the audit, and engage with your 
clients. They’ll notice the difference, and I’m betting that they’ll appreciate it.
Looking Ahead
The release of the new SAS, although important, is only part of a broader initiative to address 
fraudulent financial reporting. Efforts also are required to focus not only on the auditor’s role for 
fraud detection, but that of management, the audit committee, regulators and others in fraud 
prevention and deterrence.
SAS No. 99 is a well-conceived, well-executed document. It is something that all those involved in 
its creation—indeed, our entire profession—should be proud of. But it is only an audit standard and 
cannot, by itself, achieve its objective of improving the likelihood that auditors will detect material 
misstatements caused by fraud. That part is up to us, as we understand and implement the 
requirements of this new standard, one auditor, one engagement at a time.
Michael Ramos 
October 2002
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INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE AND 
ORGANIZATION OF THIS PUBLICATION
Purpose
In its summary of the exposure draft of what would become Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 
No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, 
vol. 1, AU sec. 316), the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) stated that the new SAS will “improve the 
likelihood that auditors will detect material misstatements due to fraud in a financial statement audit.” 
This publication shares that objective. It complements the SAS, providing interpretive observations, 
suggestions, and tools to help you effectively understand and implement the authoritative standard. 
The guidance in this book works on three levels:
1. Explanation. This publication attempts to explain and provide context for the requirements of 
the SAS. For example, the standard requires “brainstorming” among audit team members 
about how a material fraud might be perpetrated and concealed at the client. This publication 
explains in more detail the purpose of that brainstorming session as well as the intent for the 
other requirements listed in the standard for the brainstorming session.
2. Implementation. Once you have a good understanding of what the standard requires, questions 
will arise about how these requirements can be effectively implemented in practice. Chances 
are, your firm has never had a brainstorming session of the type required by SAS No. 99. 
Undoubtedly questions will arise when the time comes to adopt the new SAS, for example, 
“What is the best way to conduct a brainstorming session?” and “What special skills are 
needed to make this session effective?” This publication addresses those kinds of questions.
3. Practice Aids. Finally, knowing what it will take to implement the standard, you will need tools to 
help you do so effectively and efficiently. For example, many firms have developed practice 
niches devoted to specialized industries such as governmental entities, not-for-profit 
organizations, or construction contractors. Included in this publication is an appendix to help you 
adapt the guidance contained in SAS No. 99 to the needs of specialized industries.
How to Use This Publication
First, this publication should be used by your firm’s audit practice leadership to:
• Understand how the new SAS will affect the firm’s audit policies and procedures.
• Develop a comprehensive implementation plan that includes training.
• Assess the long-term needs of the firm (for example, specialized skills, and changes in firm 
culture) and how these needs will be met.
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Also, this publication should be used to supplement the firm’s audit manual. Auditors in the field will 
find the suggestions helpful as a means to:
• Understand the reason for performing certain audit procedures relating to fraud.
• Communicate more effectively with management and with each other about fraud-related 
matters.
• Identify and assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
• Design audit procedures that effectively address the risks of material misstatement due to fraud.
Organization of the Publication
This publication is divided into three parts.
Part 1: Understanding SAS No. 99 and Its Implications
The three chapters in Part One provide you with a detailed understanding of the requirements of SAS 
No. 99 and how these requirements are different from previous guidance. Also included in this 
section is a discussion of the issues you are likely to face as you implement the new standard.
Part 2: Detailed Implementation Guidance
The chapters in this section provide in-depth implementation guidance in those areas that 
practitioners might find most troublesome, including:
• Applying professional skepticism in planning and performing the audit, including the 
evaluation of audit evidence
• Conducting meaningful brainstorming sessions
• Improving the effectiveness of client inquiry
• Linking audit procedures to identified risks
• Performing new audit procedures mandated by the SAS
• Using computer assisted audit techniques to identify indicators of possible material misstatements 
due to fraud.
Appendixes
This section contains an appendix that will help you identify risks of material misstatement due to 
fraud related to specialized industries (Appendix A). Also included is guidance to help you design 
audit procedures for the physical observation of inventory and to assess whether an entity’s choice of 
accounting principles is appropriate (Appendixes B and C).
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PART1
UNDERSTANDING SAS NO. 99 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The first three chapters of this book provide a basic understanding of the requirements of Statement 
on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316). Chapter 1 highlights how the standard differs from 
previous guidance and changes audit practice. Chapter 2 offers an in-depth analysis of each major 
section of the standard and what it requires. Chapter 3 offers suggestions for developing a 
comprehensive implementation plan.
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CHAPTER 1: HOW THE NEW STANDARD 
CHANGES AUDIT PRACTICE
Your Responsibilities for Detecting Fraud
In a generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) audit you must plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatement, including 
material misstatements caused by fraud. Moreover, you have always had that responsibility. 
Unfortunately, many auditors remain confused about this issue.
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), does not change your overall 
responsibility. The new SAS supercedes previous guidance, and the reason it was issued was to 
substantially improve the likelihood that you will detect material misstatements in the financial 
statements caused by fraud.
The Fraud Triangle
As the previous fraud standard did, SAS No. 99 provides a brief discussion of the characteristics of 
fraud. Included in that discussion is a framework that is useful for understanding and evaluating 
indicators of fraud that you may discover during your audit.
Practice Pointer. The fraud triangle framework is an important conceptual underpinning for a 
great deal of SAS No. 99. As you apply the standard on your engagements, you should find 
yourself continually returning to this framework, For example, the framework is particularly 
helpful when:
• Gathering information to assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud
• Analyzing and assessing fraud risk
• Having discussions with engagement team members or the entity’s management about the risk of 
fraud at the audited entity
The “fraud triangle” depicts three conditions that generally are present when fraud occurs.
1. Incentive or pressure. Management or other employees may have an incentive or pressure that 
provides them with a reason to commit fraud.
2. Opportunity. Circumstances may exist at the entity (for example, weak internal controls or 
ineffective board of director oversight) that provide an opportunity for a fraud to be perpetrated.
3. Rationalization or attitude. Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set of ethical values 
that allow them to rationalize committing a dishonest act.
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This overview of the fraud triangle framework was a necessary preliminary to a discussion of the 
changes described in this chapter. A more complete discussion of the fraud triangle and how it is 
used together with some of the other characteristics of fraud is contained in Chapter 2 .
Professional Skepticism
SAS No. 99 places renewed emphasis on professional skepticism. Arguably, maintaining the appropriate 
questioning mindset is the single most important critical success factor for implementing the new SAS. All 
the audit procedures in the world will be less than optimally effective if the auditor does not maintain the 
proper mindset. A skeptical mind can ask the right questions and analyze audit evidence in a way that 
detects material misstatement due to fraud even in the absence of specifically required procedures.
SAS No. 99:
• Requires the audit team to set the proper tone for the audit by having a discussion of the 
importance of professional skepticism in planning the audit.
• Reminds you to maintain a questioning mind during the gathering and evaluation of audit 
evidence throughout the audit.
Chapter 4 provides detailed suggestions to help you understand more thoroughly what is meant by 
professional skepticism and how you can instill this attitude in engagement teams.
The Fraud Risk-Assessment Process
Previous Guidance
Under previous audit guidance, the auditor was required to seek out the presence of certain “fraud 
risk factors.” The auditor analyzed the nature and type of the fraud risk factors and developed an 
understanding of where the entity was vulnerable to material misstatement due to fraud.
After developing this fraud risk assessment, the auditor then developed an audit response, either by 
modifying planned procedures or determining that the existing procedures were adequate to respond 
to the assessed risk.
In practice, there was a tendency among practitioners to reduce the identification of fraud risk factors 
to a simple checklist, which ultimately resulted in a failure to adequately assess fraud risk, design 
appropriate procedures, and detect material misstatements caused by fraud.
The New SAS
Under SAS No. 99, you will gather and consider much more information to assess fraud risks than 
you have in the past. Under SAS No. 82 (the superseded standard), it was assumed that traditional 
audit planning and internal control procedures would be sufficient to identify all the information you
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needed to assess fraud risks. This is not true under the new SAS, which significantly expands the 
information gathering phase beyond the work the auditor traditionally has performed (for example, 
consider fraud risk factors).
Significant changes include:
• A required brainstorming session among the audit team members to discuss the potential for 
material misstatement due to fraud.
• An increased emphasis on inquiry as an audit procedure that increases the likelihood of fraud 
detection.
• Expanded use of analytical procedures to gather information used to identify risks of the 
material misstatement due to fraud.
• The consideration of other information, such as client acceptance and continuance procedures, 
during the information-gathering phase.
The new SAS provides expanded guidance on evaluating this information and identifying the risks 
that may result in a material misstatement due to fraud. Included in this guidance is the presumption 
that improper revenue recognition is a fraud risk in all entities.
The revised guidance also requires you to take into account an evaluation of the entity’s programs 
and controls that address the identified fraud risks.
Finally, the new SAS mandates certain audit responses on every engagement. These responses are 
designed to specifically address the ever-present risk of management override over internal controls. 
Even though you may have performed some or all of these procedures on past audits, you typically 
have not performed them in the context of responding to a risk of management override.
The bottom line—expect to perform more work in every audit under the new SAS in both identifying 
and responding to the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. The remainder of this chapter will 
provide you with an introduction to some of the most significant changes under the new SAS.
Information-Gathering Phase
Audit Team Communications
The new SAS introduces an entirely new audit procedure that must be performed on every 
engagement. As part of planning, members of the engagement team are required to discuss the 
potential for material misstatement of the entity’s financial statements due to fraud.
The new SAS requires certain audit team communications that include the following:
• An exchange of ideas, or “brainstorming,” among the audit team members about the 
susceptibility of the entity’s financial statements to material misstatement due to fraud. More 
specifically, the discussion should include:
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— How and where the entity’s financial statements might be susceptible to material 
misstatement due to fraud.
— How management could perpetrate and conceal fraudulent financial reporting.
— How assets of the entity could be misappropriated by management or employees.
• An emphasis on the importance of maintaining the proper state of mind throughout the audit—that 
is, professional skepticism.
Chapter 2 in this book provide further guidance on the overall objective of the brainstorming session 
as well as suggestions for making these sessions as effective as possible.
Inquiries of Entity Personnel
Fraud specialists report that often, when a fraud is committed, people with knowledge or suspicion of 
the fraud would have “blown the whistle,” if only someone would have asked. Also, the commitment 
and concealment of fraud may be anywhere within the entity, and any employee may have 
knowledge that can help detect the fraud.
For this reason, the new SAS requires you to make expanded inquiries of management and others 
within the entity regarding their knowledge of actual or alleged fraud at the entity. SAS No. 99 also 
requires auditors to make inquiries outside the accounting department and the management group. If 
the entity has an audit committee or internal audit department, the standard mandates certain 
inquiries of each of those groups.
Analytical Procedures
The new SAS reminds you that the results of analytical procedures performed as part of planning the 
audit may identify unusual transactions or events, and unexpected amounts, ratios, and trends. You 
should consider these results in identifying the risks of material misstatement due to fraud.
Additionally, the new SAS requires you to perform analytical procedures related to revenue with the 
objective of identifying unusual or unexpected relationships that may indicate a material 
misstatement due to fraud.
Considering Fraud Risk Factors
During the planning and performance of your audit, you may identify conditions or events that may 
indicate the presence of fraud. These conditions or events are referred to as fraud risk factors. Fraud 
risk factors do not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud; however, they often have been present 
in circumstances where fraud exists.
The concept of fraud risk factors has been carried forward from the previous SAS, and your 
engagement teams should have a solid working definition. For SAS No. 99, the list of risk factors
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have been reviewed and updated. The biggest change is that they have been reorganized along the 
three fraud triangle categories (incentive/pressure, opportunity, and attitude/realization), and they 
have been made more discriminatory.
For example, management that is struggling to maintain debt covenants has an incentive to misstate 
the financial statements to comply with the covenants. A weakness in internal control provides an 
opportunity for an employee to embezzle funds and then conceal the action.
The new standard categorizes the risk factors according to whether they provide opportunity, 
incentive/pressure, or attitude/rationalization to perpetrate fraudulent financial reporting or theft of 
assets. It is hoped that this reorganization will help you understand and analyze the risk factors when 
assessing fraud risks.
Other Information
The new SAS states that you should consider other information that may be helpful in identifying risks 
of material misstatement due to fraud. Information from the following sources should be considered:
• Procedures relating to the acceptance and continuance of clients and engagements
• Reviews or compilation of interim financial statements
Consider Programs and Controls and Assess Fraud Risks
Because fraud prevention, detection, and deterrence are management’s responsibility, the new fraud 
SAS now requires you to determine whether management has designed programs and controls that 
address identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud and whether those programs and 
controls have been placed in operation.
To help you make this evaluation, a document titled “Management Antifraud Programs and 
Controls: Guidance to Help Prevent, Deter, and Detect Fraud,” which is an exhibit to the SAS, 
discusses and provides examples of programs and controls that management can implement to help 
deter, prevent, and detect fraud. Auditors may be able to provide valuable client service by discussing 
many of these best practices programs and controls with management and the audit committees of 
their audit clients.
Developing an Audit Response
One of the biggest changes in the new SAS is in the area of developing appropriate audit responses to 
identified risks. The new standard provides a great deal of detailed guidance in this area that may 
require you to perform significant additional audit procedures on most, if not, all of your 
engagements.
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Responding to the Risk of Management Override
In its conducting its research on audit effectiveness, the Public Oversight Board (POB) analyzed 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions related to fraud to determine some 
of the common characteristics of fraudulent financial reporting. In its analysis, the POB discovered 
that management override of controls was a characteristic of many fraudulent financial reporting 
schemes. As the POB report noted, “opportunity is a necessary feature of fraud, and it explains why 
management is in a unique position to perpetrate it. As the stewards of the entity, management 
possesses the power to manipulate the accounting records and prepare fraudulent financial reports.”
To address the risk of management override, the new SAS provides guidance on how you should 
respond and mandates procedures related to:
• Examining journal entries and other adjustments for evidence of possible material 
misstatement due to fraud.
• Performing a “retrospective review” of accounting estimates for biases that could result in 
material misstatement due to fraud.
• Understanding the business rationale for unusual transactions.
The standard requires that these procedures be performed on every audit.
Documenting the Auditor’s Consideration of Fraud
SAS No. 99 significantly extends the documentation requirements from the previous standard. Audit 
documentation should now include documentation supporting compliance with substantially all the 
major requirements of the Statement.
How Will SAS No. 99 Change Audit Practice?
SAS No. 99 is a comprehensive, far-reaching audit standard. It has the potential to significantly 
change the way we think about and perform audits.
As an analogy, consider the business environment in the 1980s, when the personal computer was first 
introduced and then widely adopted. At that time, it was predicted that with the new technology, 
huge investment companies would reap significant benefits in the form of increased productivity. In 
fact, increases in productivity were quite slow to develop, and by the end of the decade business 
owners were asking, Where’s the benefit?
Through formal and informal study of the situation, analysts concluded that the anticipated benefits 
of the new technology were slow to surface because companies had simply used the technology to 
automate existing processes. The more successful implementations occurred when entities used 
technology as a basis for rethinking their existing practices and designing new ones.
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That same dynamic could be said of the introduction of SAS No. 99. Many firms will undoubtedly 
adopt the new standard the same way they have previous ones—by obtaining an updated audit 
manual and using the most current checklists. For this standard, there is considerable question 
whether that approach will suffice.
The new standard’s requirements and their implications for the conduct of audits raises the following 
issues.
Firm Culture and Auditors’ Mindset
Some of the requirements of the new SAS will require auditors to change their mindset or 
perspective on the audit. These changes may affect firm culture and the relationships firms have with 
their audit clients. The standard reminds auditors that in planning and performing the audit, they must 
set aside their beliefs that management is honest, even though they may have many years of 
experience with management.
With its emphasis on professional skepticism, the new standard places the onus on audit professionals 
to maintain a questioning mind throughout the engagement. Firm leaders will be required to model this 
behavior by setting a proper “tone at the top or engagement culture for the audit team.” All firm 
members must be aware of both the direct and indirect signals they send to each other and to the 
clients, to ensure that these messages convey the proper attitude. In adopting a more skeptical attitude 
toward clients, the relationship between the audit firm and management of the audited entity will 
undoubtedly change. As with any other relationship, this change must be carefully managed.
The new SAS also requires auditors to bring a new perspective to understanding an entity’s business 
and its internal control. In addition to the traditional ways in which auditors understand internal 
control, they now must view it in the context of fraud prevention and detection. Similarly, auditors 
have always been required to gain an understanding of the entity’s business and the industry in which 
it operates in order to plan the audit. Now, that understanding will be broader and deeper. Under SAS 
No. 99, auditors’ understanding of the entity’s business should be sufficient to allow them to identify 
unusual transactions outside the normal course of business.
Finally, the new SAS reminds auditors to maintain a questioning mindset and critically evaluate audit 
evidence.
New Skills
The requirements of the new standard will most likely demand that audit firms develop or acquire 
new skills, including:
• Communication. The emphasis on inquiry, in addition to the brainstorming session, will 
require auditors to enhance their communication and interviewing skills in order to make these 
procedures as effective as possible.
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• Technology. The new standard includes commentary and examples that recognize the impact 
of both the client’s and the auditor’s use of technology on the risks of fraud. Specifically, 
certain of the required or suggested audit procedures (for example, the identification and 
review of unusual journal entries) may benefit from the use of computer-assisted audit 
techniques,1 such as data extraction. Skills and knowledge of technology matters will be of 
great benefit to firms in implementing the new SAS.
• Fraud expertise. Many of the larger accounting firms have formally trained fraud specialists 
on staff. These individuals are resources for audit engagement teams, who use them as they 
would any other in-house specialist. Experience in detecting and investigating fraud may be 
necessary to help auditors:
— Assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud
— Design audit procedures that respond to the assessed risk of fraud
— Determine when a separate fraud investigation engagement is necessary
New Audit Requirements and Their implication
Table 1-1 summarizes the significant changes that SAS No. 99 makes to current guidance as well as 
how these changes are likely to affect practice.
Table 1-1 Changes to Current Guidance
Change Description Implication
Professional skepticism • Emphasize maintaining a 
questioning mind throughout 
the audit.
• Critical evaluation of the audit
evidence.
• Engagement leadership, 
including the individual with 
the final responsibility for the 
audit, must set the proper “tone 
at the top.”
• Relationships with audit clients 
may be altered.
Brainstorming • Brainstorm among audit team 
members about fraud risks at 
the entity.
• Communication and
facilitation skills need to be
enhanced to conduct these 
sessions effectively.
• Importance of engagement 
leadership buy-in on the 
brainstorming session.
You may refer to Chapter 9 for additional guidance on computer-assisted audit techniques.i
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Change Description Implication
Information gathering • Expand the sources used 
to gather information used to 
identify risks of material 
misstatement due to fraud.
• A checklist of fraud risk 
factors (and the “checklist 
mentality”) will not be 
sufficient.
Inquiries • Expand the use of inquiries 
of management and others 
within the organization.
• Interviewing and other 
communication skills need to be
enhanced.
Revenue recognition • Presume that revenue 
recognition is a fraud risk.
• Balance sheet audit focus 
must be supplemented with 
procedures focused on revenue 
recognition.
Internal control • Evaluate entity’s programs 
and controls that address fraud
risks.
• Auditors must supplement 
existing understanding of 
internal control with new 
perspective that considers fraud.
Management override • Require new procedures to • New audit techniques may
of controls address management override. need to be developed to perform 
procedures.
• Computer-assisted audit 
techniques may be necessary.
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CHAPTER 2: CONSIDERING FRAUD IN A 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT
The purpose of this chapter is to take you step by step through Statement on Auditing Standards No. 
99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, 
AU sec. 316). The main topic headings in this publication mirror those in the standard.
Introduction and Overview
In addition to providing a map of this long and comprehensive standard, the introduction makes 
several important points.
Auditor’s Overall Responsibility for Fraud Detection
As described in Chapter 1, an auditor’s overall responsibility in a GAAS audit is to plan and perform 
the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. As pointed out earlier, your responsibility is not to 
detect fraud, per se, but rather to detect material misstatements in the financial statements caused by 
fraud, within the context of reasonable assurance.
Within this definition of responsibility are two key terms.
1. Reasonable assurance. Reasonable assurance is a high threshold for performance; however, it 
stops short of absolute assurance, which is unattainable. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.12) 
discusses reasonable assurance and why this is an appropriate threshold for detecting material 
misstatements caused by fraud.
2. Materiality. Remember that materiality is not solely a quantitative measure. When planning 
and performing your audit to detect material misstatements in the financial statements, you 
should consider the qualitative aspects of materiality, including the potential effect of the 
misstatement on:
— Financial trends 
— Debt covenants 
— Other contractual agreements 
— Regulatory provisions
A thorough consideration of the qualitative aspects of materiality will require engagement teams 
to have a good understanding of the client’s business early in the audit process. For example, to 
determine the magnitude and type of misstatements that might be material, the team should have 
an understanding of the entity’s debt covenants and how close they are to violating those
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covenants. Interpretation No. 4, “Considering the Qualitative Characteristics of Misstatements,” 
of SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 9312.15-. 17), provides definitive guidance on the qualitative aspects 
of materiality.
Practice Pointer. It is important for you to reach an understanding with the client regarding 
your responsibilities for fraud detection. Key issues to discuss are:
• Detection of material misstatements in the financial statements caused by fraud versus the 
detection of fraud, p e r se.
• Reasonable versus absolute assurance.
• Financial statement materiality and what that term means. You also want to discuss with the 
client their expectations about what should be considered material. For an owner-managed 
business this threshold varies from materiality to the owner personally.
• The primary responsibility for fraud prevention and detection rests with management and not 
the auditor.
An Integrated Approach
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.03) describes the auditor’s consideration of fraud as something that should 
be integrated into the overall audit process. It is not something that is somehow added to your 
existing audit process as a separate checklist component. Rather, the guidance provided in SAS No. 
99 should be blended in seamlessly with your current process because assessing fraud risks is an 
ongoing process that is continually updated throughout the completion of the audit.
By Way of Analogy.. .
If you are familiar with the game of basketball, you know that some shots count for two points 
and others— those that are launched a good distance from the basket— are worth three points. 
What you may not realize is that the three-point shot was not always a part of the game. It wasn’t 
until 1980 that the shot was used in both National Basketball Association and college games.
Today, when you watch a game, the three-point shot is an organic part of all aspects of the game. 
Players take three pointers in the normal course of action. Offensive strategies have been 
developed to take advantage of the three-pointer shot; players practice it.
In the early years, this was not the case. The three pointer was used mostly as a comeback tool, 
something you used only at the end of the game when you needed points in a hurry. Teams 
played their “ normal” game and, if they had to, fired off long three pointers.
The objective of SAS No. 99 is to create an environment in which the consideration of fraud is an 
organic part of all elements of the audit process, in the same way the three-point shot has evolved 
in the game of basketball.
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An Iterative Process
SAS No. 99 describes a process in which the auditor:
• Gathers information needed to identify risks of material misstatement due to fraud
• Identifies risks
• Assesses risks after taking into account an evaluation of the entity’s programs and controls
• Responds to the results of the assessment
Because of the way the information has been presented (and because of the way we have been 
trained to think), the tendency is to assume that these steps are performed sequentially and that once 
the final step has been performed, you are done.
In fact, as SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.03) points out, the audit process is nonlinear and iterative. That 
is, the standard is not meant to imply that you should perform the steps in the process in any 
particular order—the sequence of the requirements of the standard and its guidance may be 
implemented differently among audit engagements. Further, the process of gathering, updating, and 
analyzing information does not end when you complete the last step. It continues in a circular 
fashion—the results of audit procedures become information needed to identify risks, and the process 
begins anew (see Illustration 2-1). You do not break out of the cycle until you have gathered 
sufficient evidence to reach your conclusion.
Illustration 2-1 The Fraud Risks Assessment Process
Respond to 
assessed risk
Gather
information
Identify and 
assess risk
Description and Characteristics of Fraud
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.05-12) describes certain characteristics of fraud. This section of the 
standard imposes no requirements on the auditor. Still, it is an important section because the more 
you know about the nature of fraud, the better equipped you will be to identify risks, assess the risks 
of material misstatement in the financial statements due to fraud, and develop an appropriate audit 
response. Additionally, the concepts contained in this section will allow auditors to conduct effective
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brainstorming sessions about fraud risks among themselves and to make meaningful inquiries of 
entity personnel.
Misappropriation of Assets Versus Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Consistent with the previous SAS, the new standard distinguishes between misappropriation of assets 
(employee theft) and fraudulent financial reporting. Table 2-1 summarizes the differences between 
these two types of frauds.
Table 2-1 Misappropriation of Assets Versus Fraudulent Financial Reporting
________ Misappropriation o f Assets______
• Involves the theft of an entity’s assets where 
the effect of the theft causes the financial 
statements to be materially misstated.
• Usually perpetrated by employees but can 
involve management.
• Typically driven by opportunity.
• Often a major concern for the owner- 
manager of a privately held business entity.
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
• Intentional misstatements or omissions of 
amounts or disclosures in financial 
statements designed to deceive users.
• Usually perpetrated by management.
• Typically driven by incentives or pressures.
• A concern for both public and privately 
held entities, including governmental and 
not-for-profit organizations.
Practice Pointer. The scope of SAS No. 99 includes only those misappropriations of assets for 
which the effect of the misappropriation causes the financial statements to be materially 
misstated. You should take steps to ensure that owners of privately held businesses understand 
that the materiality of a defalcation will be considered in relation to the fairness of the financial 
statements, not the personal net worth of the owner.
The Fraud Triangle
As described briefly in Chapter 1 , three conditions are present when fraud occurs.
• Incentive/pressure. Management or other employees may have an incentive or be under 
pressure, which provides a motivation to commit fraud.
• Opportunity. Circumstances exist—for example, the absence of controls, ineffective controls, 
or the ability of management to override controls—that provide an opportunity for fraud to be 
perpetrated.
• Rationalization/attitude. Those involved in a fraud are able to rationalize a fraudulent act as being 
consistent with their personal code of ethics. Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set 
of ethical values that allow them to knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act.
18
Chapter 2: Considering Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Sound Machine is a retailer of high-end consumer electronics. The new owner of the company 
accumulated personal wealth as a salesman in another industry. He used a significant portion of 
his personal assets to buy the company and then borrowed heavily to embark on an ambitious 
expansion plan. The debt agreement contained a number of loan covenants, and the owner 
provided the creditor with a personal guarantee.
On several occasions, the owner was known to give sales personnel “ credit” for a sales 
transaction before some of the accounting “technicalities” had been completed (for example, 
delivery of the product and, signed sales agreement). Because his sales force was paid on a 
commission basis, the occasional early recording of revenue allowed the salesperson to be paid 
his or her commissions earlier. As a former salesperson, the owner was sympathetic to the 
argument that “ the deal was essentially done,” and he wanted to help a salesperson who was in a 
temporary cash flow crunch and needed the commission check. In the owner’s mind, what he 
was doing was granting the employee an “advance,” which was “ paid back” when the sales 
paperwork was finalized.
Over the course of several years, the owner made about a dozen such advances and each one was 
repaid— that is, the sale eventually was finalized. These “advances” were always made known to 
the auditor, who would prepare year-end adjustments to make any corrections to the financial 
statements. The procedure for authorizing such an advance was simple: The owner presented 
unsigned contracts to the bookkeeper and told her to recognize a sale before all the paperwork 
was final and to prepare a commission check for the salesperson.
Meanwhile, the company’s expansion plans were not proceeding as expected. The cash flow 
generated from the new stores was insufficient to meet the debt payments, and the company was 
in danger of violating its loan covenants.
At the end of one reporting period, the owner had a number of sales transactions that he himself 
had been working on. None of them was completed, technically speaking, but based on his 
experience, he was certain that they would close soon, after the end of the reporting period. The 
transactions’ status was similar to what he had used to justify employee advances over the years. 
Fearing that the company’s lack of sufficient profitability would put it in default on its loan, the 
owner went to the bookkeeper, gave her the unsigned contracts, and told her— as he had on 
several previous occasions— to record the sales in advance of receiving the final paperwork even 
though he knew the sales should not be recorded under GAAP. He further lead the bookkeeper to 
believe that he had already told the auditor of these “advances” and therefore, she should not say 
anything to them.
In Example 2-1, the small business owner has committed a financial reporting fraud. All three 
elements of the fraud triangle were present.
• Incentive/pressure. The company was in danger of defaulting on its loan agreement, which the 
owner had personally guaranteed.
• Opportunity. The company had certain controls in place to prevent the advance recording of 
revenues. The owner was able to override these controls by simply telling the bookkeeper to 
record the sales in the absence of all required documentation.
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• Rationalization/attitude. The owner had done similar things in the past, as a way to help his 
employees. In his mind, he was receiving an “advance” from the lender in the same way his 
salespeople received advances from him.
Eliminate one of these three characteristics, and the risk of material misstatement in the financial 
statements due to fraud diminishes. For example, the owner of Sound Machine always had the 
opportunity to override controls, book revenues in advance, and rationalize the act. It was not until the 
company was in danger of defaulting on its loan—providing an incentive—that the fraud occurred.
Other Characteristics of Fraud
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.05-12) describes two other characteristics of fraud that are helpful during 
your audit.
• Commitment-conversion-concealment. Frauds can be thought of as a three-step process.
— The fraud is committed. In Example 2-1, the company records revenue prematurely.
— The benefits to the fraud are realized. In the example, the company avoids defaulting on its 
loan, and the owner is not required to perform on his personal guarantee.
— The fraud is concealed. In the example, the documentation for the sale is unsigned or 
incomplete. Under scrutiny of an audit, the owner or other company personnel may 
attempt to conceal the fraud by altering documents in a way to make it appear that the sale 
was finalized during the reporting period.
As an auditor, it is unlikely that you will observe someone committing a fraud or recognize 
that management or employees have realized a benefit of the fraud. When financial statements 
are materially misstated as a result of a misappropriation of assets, what you are most likely to 
observe are attempts to conceal the fraud.
• A simple plan. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.06) states that “fraudulent financial reporting need not be 
the result of a grand plan or conspiracy.” In Example 2-1, the owner was able to rationalize the 
appropriateness of the misstatement as a temporary condition that would correct itself shortly. The 
standard goes on to describe other ways in which a fraud starts out as something relatively simple. 
Although not stated in the standard, frauds due to theft have similar characteristics. They typically 
do not start as a grand plan, but rather something innocuous that grows bigger over time.
Professional Skepticism
There are several reasons why auditors fail to detect material misstatements in the financial 
statements caused by fraud. Some of the more commonly observed include:
• An overreliance on client representations (both oral and written) or a failure to collaborate 
those representations with other audit evidence
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• A lack of awareness or a failure to recognize that an observed condition may indicate a 
material fraud
• A lack of experience in understanding why frauds occur or what behavior patterns to look for. 
This lack of experience can result in a complacent attitude about fraud.
• Personal relationships with clients and a belief that they are honest and conduct themselves with 
integrity
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.13) reminds auditors that they need to overcome these natural tendencies 
and biases and approach the audit with an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical 
assessment of the audit evidence. Also critical is the need for the auditor to set aside past 
relationships with the client and to view every audit as an opportunity for management to perpetrate a 
fraud. Chapter 4 provides suggestions on how auditors can learn to adopt a more critical, skeptical 
mindset on their engagements.
Discussion Among Engagement Personnel
As described in Chapter 1, SAS No. 99 requires the audit team to discuss the potential for a material 
misstatement in the financial statements due to fraud before or during the information-gathering 
process. This required “brainstorming” session is a new concept in the auditing literature, and early 
in the adoption process, firms will need to decide how best to implement this requirement in practice. 
Keep in mind that the brainstorming is a required procedure and should be applied with the same 
degree of due care as any other audit procedure, such as inventory observation or confirmation of 
accounts receivable.
Most businesspeople treat brainstorming as a check box, a threshold variable, such as “Can you 
ride a bicycle?” or “Do you know how to tie your shoes?” They overlook the possibility that 
brainstorming can be a skill or an art, more like playing the piano than tying your shoes.1
Practice Pointer. For reasons discussed elsewhere in this publication (for example, Chapter 4), 
the brainstorming requirement has the potential to significantly improve the auditor’s ability to 
detect material misstatements caused by fraud. The ultimate effectiveness of brainstorming in 
achieving this goal hinges on the emphasis and importance placed on it by the engagement 
team leaders.
Objective of the Brainstorming Session
There are two primary objectives of the brainstorming session. The first one is strategic in nature.
1 From Tom Kelley, The Art o f Innovation (New York: Doubleday, 2001), p 55.
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To the uninitiated, the art of fishing may seem a mysterious and random act. A fisherman casts 
his line into the sea in what seems to be an act of pure faith that fish exists below the inscrutable 
surface of the sea. And the line hangs for minutes, hours, even days (in the case of Hemingway’s 
The Old Man and the Sea, 84 days). To the nonfisherman, it seems to be pure luck when a fish 
finally takes the bait, and the pole begins to shimmy and bend.
The experienced fisherman knows the amount of skill and planning that goes into the exercise. 
Before setting out on his excursion, the fisherman determines what kind of fish he is trying to 
catch. He chooses the equipment he needs. He reviews the habits of the target fish— where they 
swim, when they are active, the type of motion that they are attracted to and what will prompt 
them to strike. Armed with this information, he then is prepared to cast his line, into the spot 
where the fish are likely to be, at the time of day they are hungry, and with a retrieval technique 
that is likely to induce a strike.
Detecting a material misstatement in the financial statements caused by fraud should not be 
viewed as a random and mysterious act, something the auditor “ stumbles upon” while conducting 
the audit. Rather, like the experienced fisherman, the auditor should determine what kinds of 
frauds (fish) are likely to be present and which tools and techniques are best equipped to find 
them.
As a result of the brainstorming session, the engagement team should have a good understanding of:
• Information that experienced team members have about their experiences with the client.
• How a fraud might be perpetrated and concealed at the entity.
• The procedures the team might perform to detect any material misstatement that results.
The second objective of the brainstorming is to set the proper “tone at the top” for conducting the 
engagement. Within the context of assessing an entity’s internal control, auditors have long 
recognized the importance of the control environment and the proper tone at the top set by 
management. Intuitively, we recognize that a proper corporate culture can permeate an entity’s 
internal control, making individual controls much more effective in identifying misstatements, 
whether due to error or fraud.
SAS No. 99 takes that same approach and applies it to the audit itself. The requirement that the 
brainstorming session is to be conducted with an attitude that “includes a questioning mind” is an 
attempt to model the proper degree of professional skepticism and set the culture for the engagement.
This is not the first publication to use a fishing analogy to describe the search for fraud. Defense attorneys are fond of 
using the term fishing expedition to describe an investigation into their client’s activities that seems to lack a well-defined 
purpose. Fraud and other crime investigators use similar metaphors, for example, describing how their investigations “cast 
a wide net.” Experts in fraud and forensic accounting also use fishing analogies to describe the process of conducting a 
fraud investigation. Howard R. Davia, CPA, used a fishing analogy in two of his books, Accountant’s Guide to Fraud 
Detection and Control (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000) and Fraud 101: Techniques and Strategies for Detection 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000). This is our version of the fishing analogy.
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As in a client’s control environment, the belief is that this audit engagement culture will infuse the 
entire engagement, making all audit procedures that much more effective.
As a practical matter, many auditors do not encounter material misstatements in the financial 
statements caused by fraud during the course of their career in public accounting, and the auditor’s 
sensitivity to the existence of fraud possibly could be dulled over time. The mere fact that the 
engagement team engages in a serious discussion about the entity’s susceptibility to fraud also serves 
to remind the team members that the possibility does exist in every engagement—in spite of any 
history or preconceived biases about the honesty and integrity of management.
In his short story “On the Zaterre,” William Trevor tells the tale of Verity, a 38-year-old woman 
who moves back into her father’s house after the death of her mother. In the opening paragraph 
we learn that after she moved back home, she “ became as her mother had been, her father’s chief 
companion and was in time exposed to traits in his nature she had not known existed. Preserving 
within the family the exterior of a bluff and genial man, good-hearted, knowledgeable and wise, 
her father had successfully disguised the worst of himself.”
In the story the father and daughter go on vacation together to Venice, and during that time, Verity 
notices the worst of her father at every turn. He is mean about spending small sums of money. He 
tells petty, unimportant lies. He can be boorish beneath his urbane exterior. It is apparent that 
now that she has acknowledged the worst of her father, she recognizes it all the time.
As auditors, we may have created certain images of our clients in our mind. One of the objectives 
of the brainstorming session is to remove these images and to acknowledge the possibility that 
fraud may exist at any entity. Once we become sensitized to that possibility, we will be more likely 
to recognize the indicators of fraud when they present themselves.
Practice Pointer. SAS No. 99 does not provide any requirements on who should attend the 
brainstorming session other than stating that it ordinarily should involve key members of 
the audit team. That would require the participation of those planning, performing, or 
supervising key aspects of the audit. In rare situations, if it is not possible fo r a key member 
to be present, important messages and items discussed during the session should be 
communicated to that person. SAS No. 99 does not require the discussion to be conducted 
face-to-face; however, in-person sessions typically are more effective than those conducted 
over the phone or via e-mail.
Continuous Communication
You should note that SAS No. 99 does not restrict brainstorming to the planning phase of the audit 
process. Brainstorming can be used in conjunction with any part of the information-gathering 
process. Auditors gather information continuously throughout the engagement, so look for 
opportunities to brainstorm throughout the engagement. Some auditors may choose to conduct a 
brainstorming session near the conclusion of the audit in order to consider the findings and
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experiences of all team members during the audit and whether the team’s assessment about and 
responses to the risk of material misstatement due to fraud were appropriate.
In addition to brainstorming, SAS No. 99 requires audit team members to communicate with 
each other throughout the engagement about the risks of material misstatement due to fraud. In 
fact, SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.74) requires the auditor with final responsibility for the audit to 
determine that there has been appropriate communication among team members—not just during 
the brainstorming, but throughout the engagement.
Suggestions for an Effective Brainstorming Session
Structuring the Session
First, split the session into two parts. The main objective of brainstorming is to generate 
ideas about how fraud might be committed and concealed at the entity. That is all that is 
required by SAS No. 99. As a practical matter, some engagement teams may choose to 
discuss how the engagement team may respond to the identified risks. If you choose to 
discuss audit responses as part of a brainstorming meeting, it is important to recognize 
that the two activities require two very different processes and mindsets. Generating ideas 
is a right-brain, intuitive exercise. Developing an audit plan is just the opposite. One sure 
way to kill the generation of new ideas is to critique and analyze them as soon as they are 
brought up.
For that reason, if you choose to discuss audit responses at your brainstorming meeting, you 
should consider dividing the session into two distinct segments. First, get all the ideas out, 
without analyzing or commenting on their merit. Take a break, make sure that group members 
understand that they are switching gears, and then discuss an audit response.
Then, determine a reasonable time limit. Consultants and business owners who participate 
regularly in business brainstorming sessions suggest that a good session lasts about an hour. 
After that, the energy begins to fade, and the law of diminishing returns sets in. Plan on 
spending about an hour brainstorming ideas on how the entity might be vulnerable to fraud.
The Brainstorming Process
First, consider assigning “homework. ” The actual brainstorming session will be much more 
productive if all members have a similar level of understanding about the client, the nature of its 
business, and its current level of financial performance. In his book The Art o f Innovation, Tom 
Kelley describes an experiment he performed at his company regarding brainstorming 
homework. One group did no homework, a second performed detailed quantitative analysis of 
the situation, and the third did research that was more intuitive and impressionistic in nature, 
such as visiting stores of the client’s competitors. The group that performed analytical homework
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outperformed the group that did no preparation, but the group that performed less structured 
research performed best of all.
For auditors brainstorming about fraud matters, it may certainly be beneficial to perform analytical, 
fact-based research before the brainstorming session. Examples might include:
• Analytical procedures of the most current financial information
• Review of prior year’s or interim financial statements
• Review of previously issued management letters
• Review of selected working papers from the previous engagement that may provide ideas for 
possible areas of vulnerability to fraud. Examples of these working papers include: internal 
control documentation, summary of audit differences, and summaries of key legal agreements.
• Review of client acceptance and continuance documentation
• Review of press releases, current marketing literature, and other information released by the 
entity
• Review information about the industry
In structuring your session it will help to consider the characteristics of the fraud triangle.
For example, you might discuss the incentives/pressures that may exist at the entity or the 
opportunities management or employees have to commit fraud. You also may discuss observations 
about attitudes or rationalizations that may indicate the presence of a risk of material misstatement 
caused by fraud.
If the circumstances of the client permit, engagement teams also may consider preparing for the 
brainstorming session by engaging in non-fact-based research. Example 2-1 describes a fraud 
committed by a consumer electronics retailer. In a similar situation, it may be instructive for the 
auditors to visit a client location and observe the entity’s operating procedures and methods.
Next, during the session, focus on the energy o f the group. The energy in a brainstorming session 
is like popping popcorn in the microwave. At first there is little activity. This is followed by a 
quickly accelerating burst of energy in which a great many ideas are “popped.” Eventually, the 
energy plateaus and peters out. In a brainstorming session, this “popping” process will repeat 
itself several times.
During the early stages of the session, the facilitator should be patient and encourage the group to 
share ideas. Avoid the temptation to have the most senior person in the group express his or her 
views to “get the ball rolling,” as this will tend to stifle creativity. No one likes to challenge the boss.
As the energy rises, keep building the momentum. Introduce variations on the main idea being 
discussed as a way to push the limits of the idea. For example, if the group is discussing ways to 
prematurely record revenue, a question that builds momentum would be, “Side agreements with 
customers is one way the entity might improperly recognize revenues. What are some others?”
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As the energy begins to plateau, “jump” the discussion to another topic or back to one that was 
discussed previously. For example, “We can always come back to revenue recognition. What are 
some ways the entity might underreport expenses?”
Finally, describe the objective o f the session in language people can relate to. SAS No. 99 
describes the objective of brainstorming to identify “how and where the team believes the 
entity’s financial statements might be susceptible to material misstatement due to fraud.” This is 
wonderful language for an audit standard but not for generating creative ideas. To help generate 
creative, practical ideas, pose questions that people can more easily understand:
• If you were the bookkeeper for the entity, how could you embezzle funds and not get caught?
• If you worked on the loading dock, how could you steal inventory?
• If you owned this company, what impression would you want to make on third parties, such as 
banks or the IRS? How might you manipulate the financial statements to create this impression?
Practice Pointer. SAS No. 99 does not indicate how a sole practitioner who has no staff 
should conduct a brainstorm ing session. This lack of guidance should no t be construed 
to mean that a sole practitioner is exempt from  the sp irit of what the standard requires. 
The purpose of the brainstorm ing session is to cultivate a questioning mindset during the 
engagement and to consider how a fraud m ight be perpetrated at the entity. Introspection 
and reflection upon the guidance contained in this Practice Aid and the standard itself 
would be one way in which the sole practitioner could comply with the sp irit of the 
requirement even in the absence of other individuals necessary to conduct a 
brainstorm ing session.
Rules of Engagement
You might consider developing and posting brainstorming rules to help you achieve your objective. 
Here are some examples.
• There are no dumb ideas or questions. Prejudging questions by labeling them “dumb” is 
one sure way to stifle the contribution of ideas. Similarly, you should try to explore even 
the most seemingly basic questions. You never know where a “dumb” idea or question 
might lead.
• No ownership o f ideas. When individuals become personally invested in an idea they tend 
to “fight” for it as long as possible. There may be a time and a place for battling over the 
validity of an idea, but a brainstorming session is not that time or place. People should not 
take the “rejection” of an idea personally. One way to achieve this outcome is to let 
everyone know that once an idea is before the group, the group owns it.
• No hierarchy. The world of ideas does not recognize rank, experience, or compensation 
level. Work to create an environment in which senior members of the team share
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information without dominating the discussion, and junior members feel “safe” 
contributing their own ideas.
• No excessive note-taking. A brainstorming session is an intuitive, spontaneous process. Excessive 
note-taking is a barrier to this process. Those individuals who take notes as if it were the last class 
period before a biology exam will not be effective contributors to the session.3
Obtaining Information to Identify the Risks of Material
Misstatement Due to Fraud
As described earlier, the audit is an iterative process that includes gathering information, identifying 
and assessing risks, and responding to the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. SAS No. 99 
(AU sec. 316.09-.34) provides guidance on obtaining information for the purpose of identifying and 
assessing risks from the following sources.
• Inquiries of management and others within the organization
• Analytical procedures
• Consideration of fraud risk factors
• Other information
Practice Pointer. As stated in Chapter 1, the previous audit standard relied on typical audit 
procedures and the auditor’s assessment of internal controls as sources for gathering 
information to identify fraud risk factors. SAS No. 99 significantly expands the number of 
information sources for identifying risks of fraud.
Inquiries
The new SAS requires you to make the following inquiries.
• Management. The SAS lists several items that you should ask management relating to their 
awareness and understanding of fraud, fraud risks, and the steps taken to mitigate this risk at 
the entity. Several of these inquiries were not required under previous standards.
• Others. The new SAS requires you to make inquiries of the audit committee, internal audit 
personnel (if applicable), and others within the entity about the existence or suspicion of fraud and 
to make possible inquiry about the individual’s views about the risks of fraud within the entity. 
Even if the entity’s audit committee is not active (which is common in smaller public companies
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), requires you to document how and when the brainstorming occurred, who 
participated, and the subject matter discussed. It does not require you to document in great detail the specific risks 
discussed. As a practical matter, the over documentation of risk factors discussed may provide unnecessary litigation 
exposure to the firm.
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and many not-for-profit organizations), you are still required to ask the chairperson about fraud. 
As discussed later in this section, “others” also includes those individuals who are outside the 
financial reporting process.
Inquiries of Management
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.20) lists the inquiries you should make of management. Some of these 
inquiries will need little or no explanation. For example, asking whether management has knowledge 
of fraud affecting the entity is relatively straightforward.
Other inquiries may require you to “educate” the entity’s management about the 
characteristics of fraud (for example, the fraud triangle), the nature of fraud risks, and the 
types of programs and controls that will deter and detect fraud. The guidance contained in 
SAS No. 99 and this publication provide you with the background necessary to discuss these 
matters with most clients.
SAS No. 99 does not define management. As a practical matter, your inquires of management about 
fraud should be directed to those individuals within the entity who sign the management 
representation letter. SAS No. 85 (AU Sec. 333.09) states that the management representation letter 
should be signed:
...by those members of management with overall responsibility for financial and operating 
matters whom the auditor believes are responsible for and knowledgeable about, directly or 
through others in the organization, the matters covered by the representations. Such members of 
management normally include the chief executive officer and chief financial officer or others with 
equivalent positions in the entity.
You also should consider making inquiries of the controller and, in an owner-managed business, the 
owner.
Practice Pointer. The discussions you have with client management about fraud are tangible 
benefits to your clients of the adoption of SAS No. 99. If you make the effort to have a 
thoughtful, comprehensive discussion with them, they will ascribe more value to your services. 
Some firms are planning to conduct more formal fraud awareness “ training” sessions for their 
audit clients, which business owners may receive even more favorably.
►Practice Pointer. Thorough advance preparation will increase the effectiveness of your inquiries. Chapter 5 of this Practice Aid provides further suggestions on how to prepare for and conduct inquiries of entity personnel regarding fraud matters.
Practice Pointer. Inquiries about fraud may involve the discussion of relatively sensitive 
matters that will require auditors to exercise discretion and judgment in balancing their need to 
obtain information with a desire to maintain a relationship of mutual trust with the client. Audit 
teams should carefully consider which team member is most qualified to conduct these inquiries.
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Inquiries of Others Within the Entity
For the most part, auditors tend to restrict their inquiries of the client to personnel directly involved in 
the financial reporting process. This approach is appropriate for matters that accounting personnel 
have direct knowledge of, such as how transactions are processed or controlled. However, it is less 
effective to ask accounting personnel about matters for which they do not have first-hand knowledge 
(for example, the procedures used to examine, count, and receive items into inventory, or the terms 
of certain contracts). Critics of the audit process frequently cite the auditor’s reluctance to make 
inquiries outside of the accounting department as a reason for the lack of in-depth understanding 
necessary to plan and perform an effective and efficient audit.
SAS No. 99 is the first standard that requires auditors to make inquiries of “others within the entity” 
(for example, nonaccounting personnel). The SAS suggests making inquiries of:
• Operating personnel not directly involved in the financial reporting process
• Individuals with knowledge of complex or unusual transactions
• In-house legal counsel
Further, you should not restrict your inquiries to senior management. The standard suggests making 
inquiries of personnel at various levels within the organization.
There are two primary objectives in making inquiries of others within the organization.
• To obtain first-hand knowledge o f fraud. Fraud can happen in any department, at any level 
within the organization. Anyone in the entity may have observed first-hand someone 
committing or concealing a fraud. Oftentimes, those with knowledge of a fraud have stated, 
after the fact, that they would have told someone, “but nobody asked.” SAS No. 99 increases 
the likelihood that the auditor will now be that “someone” who asks.
• To corroborate or lend perspective to representations o f others. Operating personnel can 
corroborate representations made by others or provide a different perspective on how things “really 
work.” For example, accounting department personnel may be able to provide you with the 
recommended control procedures relating to the safeguarding of inventory. Operational personnel, 
in this case, those who work in the warehouse, can tell you how the control procedures are applied in 
practice and when, if ever, those controls are overridden or circumvented.
The standard allows you to use considerable judgment in determining to which individuals within the 
organization you should direct your inquiries and what you should ask.
By Way of Analogy...
Drop a rock into a still, glassy pool and watch the water ripple in an ever-widening circle.
In an audit, the focus of activity is the accounting department and entity management. You start 
there, asking questions to gain a preliminary understanding of the entity. To improve that
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understanding and corroborate what you have learned, you must expand the reach of your 
inquiries to those outside the firs t group. The tight, initial circle widens, until you have gathered 
enough reliable, persuasive evidence to form an opinion.
Other Inquiries
SAS No. 99 lists certain specific inquiries that you are required to make of management and others in 
the entity. However, the statement does not restrict you to making only those required inquiries. In 
fact, inquiry can be an effective procedure to help you gather or corroborate a wide variety of 
information that can help you identify or assess risks of material misstatement due to fraud. For 
example, you may wish to use inquiries to:
• Identify incentives/pressures, opportunities, or attitudes/rationalizations that can lead to 
material misstatements caused by fraud.
• Understand the policies, procedures, and controls at the entity for recording journal entries or 
other adjustments directly to the financial statements.
• Identify circumstances under which management has or may override internal control.
• Understand policies and procedures related to revenue recognition.
• Understand the business rationale for significant unusual transactions.
Many of the inquiries related to these matters should be asked of personnel outside of management or 
the accounting department. Asking the same question of different people can increase the 
effectiveness of your inquiries, as you can compare answers to identify consistencies or anomalies in 
the responses. The following table provides summarizes examples of inquiries you might consider 
making of entity personnel. These inquiries are not required by SAS No. 99.
Objective o f Inquiry Example Inquiries Direct Inquiries to
Identify • Describe the current threats • Management
incentives/pressures affecting the financial stability or • Sales personnel
that can lead to
material
misstatements 
caused by fraud.
profitability of the entity.
• How do these threats create 
pressure on the entity to report 
improved financial results?
• Production personnel
• What expectations to third parties • Management
have regarding entity performance 
and reported financial results?
• Investor relations
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Objective o f Inquiry Example Inquiries Direct Inquiries to
• Describe significant provisions of • Management
management and/or board 
compensation.
• Has management made any 
personal guarantees on behalf of 
the company?
• Describe the nature of any 
significant investment management 
has made in the company.
• Human resources
• Describe the way in which • Management
financial targets are used to 
motivate employee performance.
• Human resources
• Employees affected by the
• What is the nature and magnitude 
of the pressure felt by employees to 
achieve these targets?
financial target incentives
Identify • Describe any industry • Sales personnel
opportunities that conditions that allow the • Purchasing personnel
can lead to material entity to dictate terms or
misstatements conditions to suppliers or
caused by fraud. customers.
• Describe any significant • Human resources
turnover of personnel in 
accounting, information
• Accounting
technology, or internal • Information technology
audit.
• How does the entity’s turnover 
experience compare with others of 
its size in the same industry? With 
companies of a different size or 
different industry?
• Internal audit
(continued)
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Objective o f Inquiry Example Inquiries
• How active is management in the 
oversight of the financial reporting 
process?
• Is this involvement effective?
Direct Inquiries to
• Accounting
• Management
Identify • Describe the entity’s values and • Management
attitude/rationalization ethical standards. • Employees
that can lead • How are these communicated,
to material
misstatements 
caused by fraud.
supported and enforced?
• To what extent does nonfinancial • Accounting
management participate in the 
selection of accounting principles
• Sales personnel
or determination of significant 
estimates?
• Other nonfinancial management
• Do any accounting policies seem 
overly aggressive or inappropriate?
• To what extent is “materiality” 
used to justify marginal or 
inappropriate accounting policies?
• Accounting
Identify fraud risk • Are there any adverse or • Management
factors relating to strained relationships between • Human resources
the misappropriation employees and the company?
of assets. • Employees
• Are there any recent or planned • Management
layoffs or changes to employee 
compensation or benefit plans that 
could create resentment among 
the employees?
• Human resources
• Are there any recent or planned • Management
bonuses, promotions, or other actions 
that were/will be inconsistent with 
expectations and could create 
resentment among the employees?
• Human resources
32
Chapter 2: Considering Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Objective o f Inquiry Example Inquiries Direct Inquiries to
• How involved is management in 
overseeing employees with access 
to cash and other assets susceptible 
to misappropriation?
• Management
• Employees
• What is the attitude of management 
and employees toward internal 
control and established policies and 
procedures?
• Management
• Employees
• Have you observed any unusual or 
unexplained changes in behavior or 
lifestyle of management or 
employees?
• Management
• Employees
Understand policies, 
procedures, and 
controls related to 
journal entries and 
other adjustments to 
the financial
statements.
• What is the process for recording 
nonstandard journal entries or other 
adjustments directly to the financial 
statements, including:
— Description and purpose
— Individuals responsible
— Timing
— Review and approval process
• Accounting
Identify instances of 
management
override of internal
control.
• Under what circumstances will 
members of management waive or 
bypass established policies or 
procedures?
• Describe the policies or procedures 
that management has waived or 
bypassed during the past year.
• Management
• Accounting
Understand policies 
and procedures 
related to revenue 
recognition
• See Chapter 6 of this Practice Aid • Management
• Accounting
• Sales and marketing personnel
• Shipping personnel
(continued)
33
Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit
Objective o f Inquiry Example Inquiries Direct Inquiries to
Understand business • Has management discussed the • Management
rationale for nature and accounting for these • Audit committee
significant, unusual transactions with the audit
transactions. committee or board of directors?
• Have transactions involving 
unconsolidated related parties 
been reviewed and approved by - 
the board?
• Board of directors
• Does management seem to place • Audit committee
on the need for a particular 
accounting treatment rather than
• Board of directors
on the underlying economics of 
the transaction?
• Accounting
Practice Pointer. For further guidance on formulating follow-up questions, please refer to the 
following.
• Questions relating to incentives/pressures, opportunities, or attitudes/ rationalizations, see 
the Appendix to SAS No. 99, which provides example fraud risk factors.
• Questions relating to nonstandard entries and other adjustments to the financial statements, 
see SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.58-.62).
• Questions relating to the business rationale of significant unusual transactions, see SAS No. 
99 (AU sec. 316.67).
Planning Analytical Procedures
Example 2-2
XYZ Investment Partnership owned several commercial office buildings. One of these buildings 
was managed by an onsite property manager, who managed to embezzle several rent payments 
received from tenants. To conceal the fraud, the property manager credited rental income, 
knowing that the XYZ asset manager focused solely on the property’s income statement and 
would not notice any difference in rental income. To balance the credit to income, the property 
manager debited accounts receivable.
The fraud was detected when the audit engagement senior reviewed interim financial statements 
and noticed an odd relationship between receivables and rental income. The balance in rental 
income receivable represented approximately four months of rental income. Given the nature of 
the property— a commercial office building where tenants paid on a monthly basis— it did not 
make sense that four months of income would go uncollected. That observation prompted a 
series of questions and extended procedures that quickly discovered the fraud.
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One of the reasons auditors fail to detect material misstatements caused by fraud is a tendency to 
look at current numbers in isolation from the past or other relevant information. For that reason, S AS 
No. 99 states that the auditor should consider the results of analytical procedures in identifying the 
risks of material misstatement caused by fraud. Example 2-2 illustrates how the result of an analytical 
procedure performed during planning was effective at identifying a fraud. The example analytical 
procedure was performed during the overall review stage of the audit process, but it could just as 
easily have been performed during the planning phase of the engagement.
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.72) provides a good list of example analytical procedures that may 
indicate a risk of material misstatement due to fraud.4 5 This paragraph also notes that some analytical 
relationships are more effective than others at identifying fraud risks because management or 
employees generally are unable to manipulate certain information to create seemingly normal or 
expected relationships. For example, management may be able to manipulate earnings, but it can not 
manipulate cash flow. Thus an unusual relationship between reported earnings and cash flow may 
indicate a risk of material misstatement due to fraud. The standard also provides limited examples of 
analytical procedures related to revenue that may be helpful in identifying material misstatements 
caused by fraud. Here are some other analytical relationships you might use.
The CPA’s Handbook o f Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention describes the results of an 
academic study based on companies identified by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as 
earnings manipulators during a 10-year period. The purpose of the study was to develop quantitative 
fraud warning signs by analyzing a series of ratios that might be used as predictors of material 
misstatements caused by fraud.6
The research identified a group of financial statement variables that may be helpful in identifying 
material misstatements caused by fraud. These variables are:
• Day’s sales in receivables index. Calculate day’s sales in receivables for the current period. 
Compare that to the same calculation for the immediate prior period. A ratio of 1:1 indicates that 
the days sale’s in receivables has held steady between the two periods. Receivables that are 
beginning to become large in relation to sales may be a sign of fraudulent revenue recognition.
• Gross margin index. Compare gross margin for the current period to that for the immediate prior 
period. In this instance, look for a ratio that is less than 1:1, which indicates gross margins are 
deteriorating for the entity. As indicated in the list of fraud risk factors included as the Appendix 
to SAS No. 99, declining margins may indicate a lack of financial stability or profitability, 
providing management with an incentive to fraudulently misstate the financial statements.
4 These examples are provided within the context of the overall review stage of the audit; however, they can just as 
easily be performed during the information gathering phase to help identify and assess fraud risks.
5 The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention, Avey et. al (New York: AICPA, 2002).
6 The study was conducted by Messod D. Beneish, an associate professor at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana 
University. The results were published in “The Detection of Earnings Manipulation,” Financial Analysts Journal 24 
(1999): 24-36.
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• Asset quality index. Asset quality is the ratio of noncurrent assets exclusive of property, plant, 
and equipment to total assets in any given year. The asset quality ratio measures the ability of 
the company to produce reliable earnings in the future. The higher the proportion of 
noncurrent assets to total assets, the greater the risk to the company of future earnings growth. 
A ratio of current year asset quality to prior year asset quality that is greater than 1:1 means 
more costs are being capitalized and deferred, which could be a sign of fraudulent earnings 
manipulation.
• Sales growth index This is the ratio of current year sales to prior year sales.
• Total accruals to total assets This is a measure of changes in noncash working capital to total 
assets at the end of the current period. Start with working capital excluding cash. Determine year- 
to-year change in this amount. Divide this amount into total assets at the end of the period. A large 
result indicates that a growing percentage of the entity’s working capital is composed of noncash 
items, which is a sign of possible fraudulent financial reporting.
The following table summarizes the results of the research. The findings indicate that financial 
statement “manipulators” exhibit certain financial statement characteristics that are detectable and 
different from “nonmanipulators.”
Characteristic
Measures
Manipulators
Mean
Nonmanipulators
Mean Difference
Difference
(%)
DSRI 1.460 1.030 0.430 42
GMI 1.190 1.010 0.180 18
AQI 1.250 1.040 0.210 21
SGI 1.610 1.130 0.480 42
TATA 0.031 0.018 0.013 72
Of course, you should not automatically assume that entities that exhibit unusual, unexplained ratios 
have engaged in fraudulent financial reporting. The information presented here is intended only to 
alert you to the possibility of fraud under certain circumstances.
Fraud Risk Factors
A fraud risk factor is an event or condition that indicates:
• An incentive or pressure to perpetrate fraud
• Opportunities to carry out the fraud
• Attitudes or rationalizations to justify a fraudulent action
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Note that this definition of fraud risk factors tracks with the three conditions of the fraud risk 
triangle. Although fraud risk factors do not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud, they often 
are present in circumstances where fraud exists.
The Appendix to SAS No. 99 lists examples of fraud risk factors. Although these examples 
cover a broad range of situations, they are only examples. You may wish to consider 
additional or different risk factors, especially those that are unique to specialized industries. 
Appendix A to this publication provides examples of fraud risk factors for a number of 
specialized industries.
Practice Pointer. Even though you are allowed some flexibility in determining which risk factors 
to consider, use caution when deciding that some of the risk factors listed do not apply. Expect 
questions to be raised if a material misstatement due to fraud is discovered in the entity’s 
financial statements or several of the example fraud risk factors listed in SAS No. 99 were 
identified during the course of your audit, but you decided not to consider them as possible 
indicators of fraud.
Practice Pointer, redux. On the flip side, you should consider the presence of risk factors that 
are not listed as examples in SAS No. 99. As indicated earlier in this publication, research found 
that auditors who used checklists that also required them to consider other risk factors 
outperformed those who just relied on a checklist.
Designing Audit Procedures to Identify Fraud Risk Factors
SAS No. 99 states:
When obtaining information about the entity and its environment, the auditor should consider 
whether the information indicates that one or more fraud risk factors are present.
As a practical matter, the application of SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 311), relating to audit planning; SAS No. 55, 
Consideration o f Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), as amended, relating to internal controls; and the other sections 
of SAS No. 99 should allow you to identify the broad categories of fraud risk factors related to 
incentive/pressure and opportunity.
Regarding fraud risk factors relating to attitude/rationalization, the Appendix to the standard 
acknowledges that these risk factors may not be susceptible to observation by the auditor related 
to the attitude/rationalization condition. In other words, you cannot possibly know with certainty 
an individual’s ethical standards and beliefs. However, during the course of your engagement, 
you may become aware of some of the circumstances described in Appendix A and should 
consider the possible presence of a fraud risk factor.
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Other Information
SAS No. 99 requires you to consider other information that may be helpful in identifying the risks of 
material misstatement due to fraud. This other information includes that obtained during:
• The engagement team brainstorming session.
• Client acceptance and continuance procedures.
• Reviews of interim financial information.
• Consideration of inherent risks at the account or transaction level.
Identify and Assess Fraud Risks
By Way of Analogy...
All the President’s Men is a true account of how Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and 
Carl Bernstein investigated and reported the Watergate scandal. At one point early in the 
investigation the two are frustrated, for their work is not leading anywhere productive. Woodward 
meets with a secret source high up in the Nixon administration. During that meeting he explains 
that he and Bernstein have collected various bits and pieces of data. They are like pieces of a 
puzzle, but the two of them cannot even begin to determine how they might fit together or what 
the picture looks like.
Woodward’s source tells him, “ Follow the money.” The source is unwilling to tell him any of the 
details he knows of the crime and its cover-up. The best he can do is give Woodward guidance on 
how to analyze the pieces of the puzzle to develop clues on how they might fit together.
As an auditor, you gather information that may be relevant to detecting a material misstatement 
caused by fraud. These are the pieces of the puzzle. Like Woodward, you will become stuck, 
unsure how the pieces might begin to fit together and how you are to proceed. What you need is 
advice that can get you back on track, a device that allows you to organize and understand the 
bits and pieces you have assembled.
SAS No. 99 provides that advice.
After the release of the previous SAS on fraud, the AICPA sponsored academic research to 
determine the effectiveness of that guidance. One of the most significant findings was that auditors 
were very good at identifying the presence of fraud risk factors. However, they were not very good at 
designing audit tests that responded to those identified risk factors.
The key to designing effective audit tests is to perform an effective synthesis of the identified risks. 
The following illustration maps the audit process from risk identification to audit test design. 
“Synthesis” is the element that links the two ends of the process.
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Eliminate risk synthesis from the process step, and the chain is broken—there is no link to risk 
identification.
Once that link between risk identification and audit test design is eliminated, it is not surprising that 
the design of audit tests does not respond effectively to identified risks.
The example describes the process as one of synthesis, which can be defined as “the assembling of a 
complex whole from originally separate parts.” That is what you must do after you identify risks. 
Previous auditing standards (and to a lesser degree, the current one) use the term assessment, which 
caused some confusion in practice. As auditors, we have ascribed a certain specific meaning to 
assessing risk—we typically take this to mean that we should describe it as high, medium, or low. 
That is not how the term is meant to be interpreted in SAS No. 99. Auditors are not required to, nor 
should they, “assess” fraud risks as high, medium, or low.
Instead, what is intended is for you to synthesize the identified risks as a way to determine where the 
entity is most vulnerable to material misstatement due to fraud, the types of frauds that are most 
likely, and how those material misstatements are likely to be concealed.
To help you do a more effective job synthesizing identified risks and providing that necessary link, 
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.35-42) provides the following guidance.
Build a Fraud Triangle
Remember the three elements of the fraud triangle: incentive/pressure, opportunity, and attitude/rationali- 
zation. The risk of material misstatement due to fraud generally is greater when all three are present.
Example 2-3 Sound Machine, Continued
An earlier example described a fraud at Sound Machine, a retailer of high-end consumer 
electronics. The owner-manager of the business always had the ability to override controls, which 
gave him an opportunity to commit fraud. Within his personality were the seeds of rationalization. 
Without an incentive, no fraud was committed. However, once the company overextended itself 
and was in danger of defaulting on its debt, the owner felt a great deal of pressure— the missing 
third element of the triangle— and he committed fraud.
39
Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit
As an auditor, use your intuition, judgment, and experience to look for patterns in the identified fraud 
risks.
Using the fraud triangle framework is not foolproof. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.35-.36) reminds you 
that that the failure to observe one of the elements of the triangle does not guarantee that no fraud has 
been committed. For example, it usually is difficult to identify attitude/rationalization. For that 
reason, you should not conclude that that the risk of material misstatement due to fraud is absent 
simply because you did not observe the necessary attitude/rationalization. Stated another way, it has 
been observed that auditors have a tendency to identify incentive and opportunity but mistakenly 
decided not to pursue the issue because they have not observed an attitude/rationalization that is 
conducive to fraud.
You also should be aware that some elements of the triangle may weigh more heavily than others in 
certain situations. Nevertheless, the fraud triangle framework can be helpful in synthesizing 
identified fraud risks.
Pervasive or Specific
It also helps to consider whether the identified risks are related to either:
• Specific accounts or transactions, or
• To the financial statements as a whole.
Example 2-4
Suppose that a company manufactures semiconductors, which are small, easy to transport, and 
extremely valuable. For these reasons, the company is vulnerable to theft. Now suppose that 
recent layoffs and budget cuts at the company have left the employees extremely angry 
(rationalization), and that you discover that the company does not have very effective physical 
control over its inventory (opportunity). Under these circumstances, finished goods inventory 
would be the specific account that is the most directly related to the identified fraud risks.
Once you can link the identified risks to a specific account (or the financial statements taken as a 
whole) you can then design and perform more effective procedures. In Example 2-4, the auditors 
would want to modify the nature, timing, or extent of procedures relating to inventory shrinkage. 
Chapter 8 provides detailed examples of audit procedures you may consider that address risks of 
fraud for specific accounts or groups of transactions.
Accounting Estimates and Soft Information
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.39) reminds us that estimates and other “soft” accounting information may 
present risks of material misstatement due to fraud because of the high degree of management 
judgment involved. Chapter 7 provides guidance on auditing techniques for accounting estimates.
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Attributes of Risk
When assessing information about potential fraud risks, consider:
• The type of risk that may exist, that is, whether it involves fraudulent financial reporting or 
misappropriation of assets.
• The significance of the risk, that is, whether it is of a magnitude that could lead to a possible 
material misstatement of the financial statements.
• The likelihood of the risk, that is, the likelihood that it will result in a material misstatement in 
the financial statements.
• The pervasiveness of the risk, that is, whether the potential risk is pervasive to the financial 
statements as a whole or specifically related to a particular assertion, account, or class of 
transactions.
Required Risk Assessments
When synthesizing risks, the new SAS has two additional requirements. You should:
• Presume that improper revenue recognition is a fraud risk. In its report, the Public Oversight 
Board observed that the vast majority of fraudulent financial reporting schemes involved 
improper revenue recognition. This observation was consistent with the findings of other 
groups and individuals who examined fraudulent financial reporting. Because of these 
problems, SAS No. 99 states that you should ordinarily presume that there is a risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud relating to revenue recognition. The key threshold is “should 
ordinarily,” which stops just short of requiring the presumption on every audit engagement. If 
you do not identify improper revenue recognition as a risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud, you should document the reasons supporting this conclusion (see SAS No. 99 [AU sec. 
316.83]).
• Identify the risks of management override of controls. Those who have studied fraudulent 
financial reporting have noted that the risk of management override is unpredictable, and therefore 
it is difficult for auditors to design procedures to identify and assess it. Therefore, the risk of 
management override of controls should be considered a fraud risk on every audit. For that reason, 
auditors should perform tests in response to the risk of management override in every audit.
Evaluating the Entity’s Programs and Controls
Once you have identified specific risks of fraud, you should consider the entity’s programs and 
controls that mitigate or exacerbate identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud.
A new document titled “Management Antifraud Programs and Controls: Guidance to Help Prevent, 
Deter, and Detect Fraud” is included as an exhibit to SAS No. 99. This document, which was issued 
by the AICPA and other distinguished organizations, discusses and provides examples of programs
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and controls that management can implement to help deter, prevent, and detect fraud. In addition to 
the guidance provided by that exhibit, consider the following.
The Entity’s Environment and Culture (“Tone at the Top”)
It seems that virtually every organization or individual who has studied the effects of internal control 
starts the discussion by describing the importance of establishing a proper “tone at the top.” Culture 
and values are a critical element of control because these are the mindset from which all other 
controls are applied. Culture drives behavior.
In traditional Hawaiian culture, there was no private ownership of land. The land belonged to the 
gods— as humans, we were just its caretakers. In the middle of the 19th century the Western 
concept of private land ownership was introduced, and by-and-large, that system is fully 
functional in Hawaii today.
Important vestiges of the traditional culture remain, however. Many state laws exist to ensure that 
beaches remain open to the public and that private citizens cannot block access to those beaches. 
Hike to a waterfall, and you are likely to see a fellow hiker take a rock from somewhere deep in the 
pool, wrap that rock in a ti leaf, and place it in a crevice high up on the face of the waterfall. That 
is a sign of respect for the land, a token of appreciation to its real owner. The official state motto, 
translated into English, is “The life of the land is perpetuated in righteousness.”
And so it goes. The values of the culture drive the behavior of those who are part of it.
Business entities have their own culture and values. Postmortems on famous (or infamous) 
frauds inevitably describe a corporate culture that had a direct bearing on the fraud that was 
committed. When assessing the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, auditors that fail to 
consider an entity’s culture do so at their own peril.
The CPA's Handbook o f Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention compares the environment and 
culture of high fraud potential entities with those of lower potential.7
Variable High Fraud Potential Lower Fraud Potential
Management style • Autocratic • Participative
Management orientation • Low trust • High trust
• Power driven • Achievement-driven
Distribution of authority • Centralized; reserved by top 
management
• Decentralized, dispersed to all 
levels, and delegated
7
From The CPA’s Handbook o f Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention, 15.
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Variable High Fraud Potential Lower Fraud Potential
Planning • Centralized • Decentralized
• Short range • Long range
Performance • Measured quantitatively and 
on a short-term basis
• Measured both quantitatively 
and qualitatively and on a 
long-term basis
Business focus • Profit • Customer
Management strategy • Management by crisis • Management by objectives
Reporting • Reporting by routine • Reporting by exception
Policies and rules • Rigid and inflexible; strongly 
policed
• Reasonable; fairly enforced
Primary management
concern
• Capital assets • Human, then capital and 
technological assets
Reward system • Punitive • Generous
• Penurious • Reinforcing
• Politically administered • Fairly administered
Feedback on performance • Critical • Positive
• Negative • Stroking
Interaction mode • Issues and personal 
differences are skirted or 
repressed
• Issues and personal differences 
are confronted and addressed 
openly
Payoffs for good behavior • Mainly monetary • Recognition, promotion, added 
responsibility, choice 
assignments, plus money
Business ethics • Ambivalent; rides the tide • Clearly defined and regularly 
followed
Internal relationships • Highly competitive; hostile • Friendly, competitive, and 
supportive
Values and beliefs • Economic, political, and self- 
centered
• Social, spiritual, and group- 
centered
Success formula • Works harder • Works smarter
(continued)
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Variable High Fraud Potential Lower Fraud Potential
Human resources • Burnout
• High turnover
• Grievances
• Not enough promotional 
opportunities for all the talent
• Low turnover
• Job satisfaction
Company loyalty • Low • High
Major financial concern • Cash flow shortage • Opportunities for new 
investment
Growth pattern • Sporadic • Consistent
Relationship with competitors • Hostile • Professional
Innovativeness • Copy cat; reactive • Leader, proactive
CEO characteristics • Swinger, braggart, self- 
interested, driver, insensitive 
to people, feared, insecure, 
gambler, impulsive, tight- 
fisted, numbers- and things- 
oriented, profit-seeker, vain, 
bombastic, highly emotional, 
partial, and pretentious
• Professional, decisive, fast- 
paced, respected by peers, 
secure risk-taker, thoughtful, 
generous with personal time 
and money, people- products- 
and market-oriented, builder- 
helper, self-confident, 
composed, calm, deliberate, 
even disposition, and fair; 
know who they are, what they 
are, and where they are going.
Management structure, • Bureaucratic • Collegial
systems and controls • Regimented
• Inflexible
• Imposed controls
• Many-tiered structure; vertical
• Everything documented; a 
rule for everything
• Systematic
• Open to change
• Self-controlled
• Flat structure; horizontal
• Documentation is adequate but 
not burdensome; some 
discretion is afforded
Internal communication • Formal, written, stiff, 
pompous, and ambiguous
• Informal, oral, clear, friendly, 
open, and candid
Peer relationships • Hostile, aggressive, and 
rivalrous
• Cooperative, friendly, and 
trusting
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Most Common Control Failures at Small Business Entities
The “Management Antifraud Programs and Controls: Guidance to Help Prevent, Deter, and Detect 
Fraud” exhibit to SAS No. 99 discusses and provides examples of programs and controls, some of 
which apply only to larger entities. Here are some examples of weak control environments in small 
business entities and that can directly affect the entity’s vulnerability to fraud.8
• Poor physical access controls. Most business owners acknowledge the need to control 
physical access to assets and information. In practice, these controls may be lax. Many frauds 
require that the perpetrator come into physical contact with either the asset being 
misappropriated or the related asset records (or computer terminal to access those records) 
used to conceal the fraud.
• Lack o f formal job descriptions. As auditors, we recognize the need to have a proper 
segregation of duties. We also acknowledge that entity personnel perform important control 
functions. Yet, when it comes to formally segregating duties or describing how control 
functions are to be performed, the typical small business owner is loathe to perform this task. 
It is not the written job description, per se, that is important, but rather the disciplined process 
that requires the owner to decide who should perform what and how that can reduce the 
entity’s vulnerability to fraud.
• Proper supervision. The approval and review of key information processing procedures are important 
controls that may be overlooked by small entities that believe they lack necessary resources.
Additional Resources
Chapter 8 describes specific fraud prevention control procedures for individual accounts or classes of 
transactions.
Responding to the Assessed Risks
You will respond to the risks of material misstatement due to fraud in the following three ways:
• A response that has an overall effect on how the audit is conducted
• A response to identified risks involving the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures
• A response to address management override of controls
Overall Responses
Judgments about the risks of material misstatement due to fraud have an overall effect on how the 
audit is conducted in the following ways.
Adapted from The CPA’s Handbook o f Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention.
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Assignment o f personnel and supervision. SAS No. 99 provides relatively straightforward guidance 
on this matter that is easy to understand and implement. Essentially, the guidance says that the 
greater the risk of material misstatement, the more experienced personnel and the greater amount of 
supervision required on the engagement.
Practice Pointer. In an expansion over previous guidance, SAS No. 99 acknowledges that 
engagement teams may want to consider whether the judgments about fraud risks might 
require the addition of a fraud specialist to the engagement team. Firms should consider setting 
formal policies or informal guidelines on circumstances that require or encourage teams to add 
fraud specialists to the audit team.
Accounting principles. The standard audit report expresses an opinion about whether the financial 
statements “present fairly ... in accordance with GAAP.” Some auditors and others involved in the 
financial reporting process have questioned whether the “present fairly” criterion has become 
subordinate to “in accordance with GAAP.” That is, the issue may be whether some entities make a 
case that “since GAAP does explicitly not prohibit a particular accounting, it must be acceptable,” 
without considering whether the accounting will result in a “fair presentation” of the financial 
position, results of operations, and cash flows.
Thus, the choice of accounting principles, in addition to their application, becomes crucial for auditors to 
consider. SAS No. 99 requires you to consider management’s selection and application of significant 
accounting principles as part of your overall response to the risks of material misstatement. As indicated in 
SAS No. 99, SAS No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, 
AU sec. 380), provides additional guidance on communicating with clients about the quality of their 
accounting principles. To help you with those discussions and to provide you with further suggestions for 
considering an entity’s choice of accounting principles, Appendix C to this Practice Aid includes PITF 
Practice Alert No. 00-2, Quality o f Accounting Principles—Guidance for Discussions with Audit Committees.9
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.50) focuses your attention on accounting principles related to subjective 
measurements and complex transactions. In addition, given the presumption of revenue recognition 
as a fraud risk, you should consider the entity’s revenue recognition policies and whether these 
policies are consistent with key revenue recognition concepts, such as:
• Completion of the earnings process
• Realizability of the sales proceeds
• Delivery of the product or service
PITF Practice Alerts are prepared by the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA. The alerts are intended to provide 
auditors with information that may help them improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their audits. The alerts are 
based on the experiences of the individual members of the SEC Professional Issues Task Force and matters arising from 
litigation and peer reviews. A complete set of PITF alerts can be downloaded from the AICPA Web site at 
www.aicpa.org. They also are available electronically as part of the AICPA’s reSOURCE collection of literature (either 
online or on CD) and in print format as part of the Technical Practice Aids.
46
Chapter 2: Considering Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Chapter 6 provides additional suggestions for performing audit procedures related to revenue 
recognition.
Predictability o f auditing procedures. Successful perpetrators of fraud are familiar with the audit 
procedures external auditors normally perform on their engagements. With this knowledge, they can 
then conceal the fraud in accounts where auditors are least likely to look. For that reason, SAS No. 
99 requires you to incorporate an element of unpredictability into your procedures from year to year. 
This is important in auditing because these tests are not performed based on risk or materiality.
Here are some tips for implementing this requirement:
• Consider tests aimed at the misappropriation of assets, because procedures to detect 
immaterial defalcations (which may be material to the owner-manager) usually are not 
performed. Explain to the owner-manager that you have expanded your test work (make sure 
the owner-manager also understands the limits of your test work), and how the performance of 
additional procedures benefit him or her directly.
• Use the brainstorming session to identify transactions or accounts that you normally would not 
examine and that lend themselves to concealing a fraud.
• Use Chapter 8 of this book to identify common frauds and specific procedures that address 
these frauds.
• If you think of too many tests you want to perform, set a two- or three-year implementation plan 
and do a different set of procedures each year.
Procedures to Address Specific Accounts or Classes of Transactions
SAS No. 99 provides general guidance on modifying the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures 
you will perform to address identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud. In addition to the 
guidance contained in the standard, you also should consider the suggestions provided in Chapter 8, 
which describes common frauds by audit area and example audit procedures that address them.
Three other audit areas merit special mention in SAS No. 99: revenue recognition, inventory 
quantities, and accounting estimates. Besides the guidance contained in the standard, you also may 
want to consider the suggestions included in this Practice Aid.
• Revenue recognition, please refer to Chapter 6.
• Inventory quantities, please see Appendix B to this Practice Aid for a copy of PITF Issue 94-2, 
Auditing Inventories—Physical Observations.
• Accounting estimates, please refer to Chapter 7.
Addressing the Risk of Management Override
SAS No. 99 requires you to perform certain procedures to address the risk of management override 
of internal controls. Those procedures are explained below.
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Examining Journal Entries and Other Adjustments
Management can perpetrate financial reporting frauds by overriding established control 
procedures and recording unauthorized or inappropriate journal entries or other postclosing 
adjustments (for example, consolidating adjustments or reclassifications). For example, SEC 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1287 (Guilford Mills, Inc.) describes a 
situation in which the controller entered false journal entries debiting accounts payable and 
crediting purchases (cost of sales). The effect was to understate payables and significantly 
increase earnings.
To address situations such as these, SAS No. 99 requires you to test the appropriateness of 
journal entries recorded in the general ledger and other adjustments.
Understanding the financial reporting process. To effectively implement this required 
procedure, you will need to obtain a good understanding of the entity’s financial reporting 
process. This understanding is important because it allows you to what should happen in a 
“normal” situation so you can then identify anomalies. The following table describes example 
inquiries you may consider making of entity personnel. Adjacent to each inquiry is a description 
of how the information learned from the answer can help you identify and select journal entries 
and other adjustments for testing.
Example Inquiry
What are the sources of significant debits and 
credits to a given account? For example, is the 
account posted automatically as a normal part of 
transaction processing, or is it posted directly 
through a journal entry?
Who has the ability (for example, logical or 
physical access to the necessary records) to make 
journal entries or other adjustments?
Who is responsible for initiating journal entries or 
other adjustments?
What approvals are required for journal entries or 
other adjustments?
Identify and Select Items fo r  Testing 
Look for account activity being posted from 
unexpected sources (for example, a journal 
entry where none is expected).
Look for the information to be an 
“opportunity” within the fraud triangle 
framework. Look for incentives and the ability 
to rationalize related to the same individuals.
Look for transactions initiated from 
unexpected sources.
Look for unapproved transactions.
Your understanding of the financial reporting process also should include knowledge of how journal 
entries are recorded (for example, directly online or in batch mode from physical documents), the
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design of any controls over journal entries and other adjustments, and whether those controls have 
been placed in operation. This information will help you design suitable tests.10
Testing journal entries and other adjustments. Your assessment of the risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud, together with your assessment of the effectiveness of controls, will determine the extent 
of your tests. SAS No. 99 requires that you inspect the general ledger to identify journal entries to be 
tested and examine the support for those items. This procedure is required even if you determine that 
controls over journal entries and other adjustments are operating effectively.
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.61) provides extensive guidance on what to consider when selecting items 
for testing, including the characteristics of fraudulent entries or adjustments, the nature of accounts 
most susceptible to manipulation, and the identification of entries and adjustments outside the normal 
course of business or at the end of a reporting period. Computer-assisted audit techniques may be 
required to identify entries that only exist electronically.* 11
Retrospective Review of Accounting Estimates
Accounting estimates are particularly vulnerable to manipulation because they depend so heavily on 
judgment and the quality of the underlying assumptions. For that reason, SAS No. 99 requires you to 
perform a retrospective review of prior-year accounting estimates for the purpose of identifying bias 
in management’s assumptions underlying the estimates.
This review is not intended to call into question your professional judgments made in prior years that 
were based on information available at the time. Rather, this retrospective review should be 
considered within the context of its implications for the current year audit, and the facts and 
circumstances that currently exist. Although this procedure is included in that section of the standard 
used to describe responses to management override, it might also have been included as part of the 
information-gathering phase of the engagement. That is, the information you gain from a 
retrospective review of management’s assumptions underlying key estimates may be used to identify 
risks of material misstatement due to fraud.
Example 2 - 5
XYZ company designs and manufacturers men’s casual sportswear. One of the entity’s significant 
estimates is the amount of sales returns. In FY 20X1, the estimated sales returns were $100,000, 
which seemed reasonable given the information available at the time. In fact, actual sales returns 
related to 20X1 sales were $175,000.
Note that SAS No. 55, Consideration o f Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), as amended, already requires you to obtain an understanding of the entity’s internal 
control, including journal entries. The requirements of SAS No. 99 place an even greater premium on auditors 
understanding their clients’ financial reporting process.
11 You may refer to Chapter 9 for additional guidance on computer-assisted audit techniques.
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Further, the total sales for 20X1 were $8 million— $1 million of which were recorded in the last 
month of the fiscal year (holiday shopping season), which presumably would be the items most 
likely to be returned after the balance sheet date.
During 20X2, the company reported an increase to $9 million in sales, $1.5 million of which 
were recorded in the last month. For FY 20X2 the entity has estimated sales returns to be 
$60,000 and has provided the auditors with documentation supporting the assumptions 
underlying the estimate.
Given the relationship between estimated sales returns and actual sales for the past two years, 
together with the actual sales returns for the prior year, the auditor should question whether 
management’s assumptions are overly biased. Additionally, the auditor w ill want to perform 
additional tests to corroborate management’s estimate and the key assumptions used to form 
that estimate.
Business Rationale for Significant Unusual Transactions
Many financial reporting frauds have been perpetrated or concealed by using unusual transactions 
that are outside the normal course of business. For that reason, SAS No. 99 requires auditors to 
understand the business rationale for these types of transactions. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.67) 
provides an excellent list of items you should consider when understanding the business rationale for 
unusual transactions.
As indicated in SAS No. 99, entities intent on fraudulently reporting financial results may use related 
party transactions to perpetrate or conceal the fraud. The most common related party transactions 
used for these purposes include the following.
• Property sales and exchanges
— Sales of property (including real estate) at prices that differ significantly from their 
appraised value
— Exchanges of property for similar property in a nonmonetary transaction
— Sales without substance, including funding the other party to the transactions so the sales 
price is fully remitted
— Sales with a commitment to repurchase that, if known, would preclude recognition of all 
or part of the revenue
— Sales at below-market rates to an unnecessary “middle man” related party, who in turn 
sells to the ultimate customer at a higher price, with the related party (and ultimately its 
principals) retaining the difference
— Purchase of assets at prices in excess of fair market value
— Sales arrangements in which the seller has a concurrent obligation to the buyer to purchase 
goods or services or provide other benefits
— Sale of land with arranged financing
— Sales of marketable securities at a significant discount from quoted market prices
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• Lending activity
— Borrowing or lending on an interest-free basis or at a rate of interest significantly above or 
below market rates
— Making loans with no scheduled terms for when or how the funds will be repaid
— Loans to parties that do not possess the ability to repay
— Advancing company funds that are subsequently transferred to a debtor and used to repay 
what would otherwise be an uncollectible loan or receivable
— Loans advanced ostensibly for a valid business purpose and later written off as 
uncollectible
• Purchase of services
— Services of services or goods at little or no cost to the entity
— Payments for services never rendered or rendered at inflated prices
— Engaging in other transactions (for example, leases) at more or less than market value
— Agreements under which one party pays expenses on behalf of another party
As indicated in SAS No. 99, these types of related party transactions, per se, do not constitute 
fraudulent financial reporting. However, if these transactions were entered into without proper 
approval, or if entity management did not identify these transactions for you, there may be 
indications that fraudulent financial reporting is being concealed.
Practice Pointer. The auditing standard requires you to gain an understanding of the business 
rationale for significant transactions that are “outside the normal course of business for the 
entity or otherwise unusual.” As a prerequisite for performing this required procedure, the 
engagement team’s understanding of the entity and its environment must be sufficient to allow 
it to recognize an unusual transaction. When implementing SAS No. 99, firms may wish to 
consider whether current audit planning procedures are sufficient for engagement team 
personnel to obtain this depth of understanding.
Evaluating Audit Evidence
Earlier in this chapter we described the process of fraud as one that involves “commitment- 
conversion-concealment.” As auditors, we are most likely to observe attempts at concealment or the 
lack of concealment. Signs of concealment (or lack thereof) include:
• Discrepancies in the accounting records. For example, transactions that lack supporting 
documentation may indicate that a perpetrator failed to adequately conceal a fraud.
• Conflicting or missing evidential matter. For example, missing documents may be the attempt 
to conceal a fraud by destroying incriminating documents.
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• Problematic or unusual relationships between the auditor and client. For example, unusual delays 
by the entity in providing requested information may indicate that the information never existed in 
the first place because the purported transaction did not occur.
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.68) provides comprehensive examples of conditions you may identify 
during fieldwork that may be indicative of fraud. This paragraph reiterates that the assessment of the 
risk of material misstatement due to fraud is an iterative process that continues throughout the 
engagement. In a similar vein, SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.69-.73) reminds auditors that analytical 
procedures conducted as substantive procedures or as part of the overall review stage of the audit 
may also uncover previously unrecognized risks of material misstatement due to fraud. The standard 
provides several examples of unusual or unexpected analytical relationships that may indicate a risk 
of material misstatement due to fraud.
Practice Pointer. Brainstorming sessions conducted near the end of the audit can help the 
audit team evaluate the magnitude and collective significance of conditions that may be 
indicative of fraud that are identifies during the audit. Conditions that may seem 
inconsequential in isolation may take on added significance when considered within the context 
of all other observed conditions.
Misstatements That May Be the Result of Fraud
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.75-.78) describes how you should respond when you determine that a 
misstatement is, or may be, the result of fraud. Note the key threshold is “is or may be.” You do not 
have to know for certain the misstatement is caused by fraud or even be able to say the misstatement 
is probably the result of fraud. This threshold is considerably lower than “probable.”
If you believe that a misstatement is or may be the result of fraud, but the effect of the misstatement 
is not material to the financial statements, you still are required to evaluate the implications of your 
belief, especially those dealing with the organizational person(s) involved. For example, if you 
discover that a member of senior management has fraudulently overstated his or her expenses for 
reimbursement, you will want to reevaluate the integrity of that individual and the impact that a 
nontrustworthy person in that position could have on the financial statements and your engagement.
In those instances where the misstatement is or may be the result of fraud, and the effect is either 
material or cannot be determined, you are required to take the following steps.
• Attempt to obtain additional evidential matter.
• Consider the implications for other aspects of the audit.
• Discuss the matter and the approach for further investigation with the client. These discussions 
should be conducted at a level that is at least one level above those involved and also should 
include senior management and, if applicable, the audit committee.
• If appropriate, suggest the client consult with legal counsel.
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Note that one of the key factors in determining your response is the materiality of the misstatement. 
As stated earlier in this chapter, an auditor’s consideration of materiality should consider the 
qualitative aspects of the misstatement and should not be limited to quantitative measures.
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.78) provides guidance on the auditor’s course of action when the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud is such that he or she is considering withdrawing from the 
engagement. The circumstances under which you would withdraw may depend on the implications 
about the integrity of management and their cooperation in investigating the circumstances and 
taking appropriate action. It is impossible to definitively describe when withdrawal is appropriate, 
but in any event you probably will want to consult with your legal counsel.
Communication About Fraud Matters
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.79) states that “whenever you have determined that there is evidence that a 
fraud may exist, that matter should be brought to the attention of an appropriate level of 
management. This is appropriate even if the matter might be considered inconsequential, such as a 
minor defalcation by an employee at a low level in the entity’s organization.”
Thus, the threshold for communication is “evidence that a fraud may exist.” The mere presence of a 
fraud risk factor or some other condition that has been observed when fraud is present generally does 
not meet this threshold.
Assume that a single employee at a company has the authority to sign checks and also the 
responsibility to reconcile the bank account(s). Absent other controls, this lack of segregation of 
duties may provide an opportunity for that employee to commit fraud. However, by itself, the 
condition is not required to be communicated by the auditor to the entity, except within the 
context of reportable conditions and internal control weaknesses.
However, suppose that there is a delay of several weeks before the employee is able to provide 
the auditor with a year-end bank reconciliation. When testing the reconciliation, the auditor 
discovers that certain canceled checks are missing. The employee is unable to offer an 
explanation.
At this point, the auditor has evidence that a fraud may exist— namely, that the employee has 
stolen cash and attempted to conceal it by destroying the canceled check. Even though the theft 
may be immaterial to the financial statements, you should still bring the matter to the attention of 
management.
In addition, you also should consider whether the absence of or deficiencies in programs and controls 
to mitigate specific risks of fraud or to otherwise help prevent, deter, and detect fraud represent 
reportable conditions that should be communicated to senior management and the audit committee.
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Documentation
The documentation requirements of SAS No. 99 significantly extend the requirements of the 
previous standard, requiring documentation supporting compliance with substantially all the major 
requirements of the standard. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.83) provides a complete, easy-to-understand 
list of documentation requirements.
According to the standard, you are required to document the following.
• The discussion among engagement personnel in planning the audit regarding the susceptibility 
of the entity’s financial statements to material misstatement due to fraud, including how and 
when the discussion occurred, the audit team members who participated, and the subject 
matter discussed.
• The procedures performed to obtain information necessary to identify and assess the risks of 
material misstatement due to fraud.
• Specific risks of material misstatement due to fraud that were identified and a description of 
the auditor’s response to those risks.
• If the auditor has not identified, in a particular circumstance, improper revenue recognition as 
a risk of material misstatement due to fraud, the reasons supporting the auditor’s conclusion.
• The results of the procedures performed to further address the risk of management override of 
controls.
• Other conditions and analytical relationships that caused the auditor to believe that additional 
auditing procedures or other responses were required and any further responses the auditor 
concluded were appropriate, to address such risks or other conditions.
• The nature of the communications about fraud made to management, the audit committee, and 
others.
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The implementation of the vast majority of audit and accounting standards requires no formal plan. 
Many standards can be implemented quite easily by reading the standard itself or any one of a 
number of nonauthoritative publications (for example, articles in professional journals, books, and 
other publications) whenever you first have the need to implement the standard. Continuing 
education courses increase the awareness and provide basic training on the most significant new 
pronouncements.
However, as described in Chapter 1, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration 
o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), is a 
comprehensive standard that has the potential to affect many aspects of a CPA firm, including:
• Quality assurance and the audit practice
• Practice management, including client acceptance and retention
• Client relationships, including managing expectations related to fraud detection
• Human resource management, including the acquisition of skills necessary to implement the new 
standard
For these reasons, it is important that firms develop a comprehensive plan for the implementation of 
SAS No. 99.
Understanding How You Adopt New Standards
Adopting a new professional standard is not an instantaneous act. Social scientists who have studied 
how innovation diffuses through a culture have noted that adopting a new approach is a process that 
occurs over time. Initially, people become aware of the new process, form an attitude about it, and 
decide to adopt or reject it, and only then do they implement it.
Adopting a new professional standard is fraught with uncertainty. Faced with implementing SAS No. 
99, practitioners are likely to ask questions that reflect this uncertainty, including:
• How much will it cost to implement the new standard?
• Will clients bear that cost?
• How is my firm supposed to implement the (fill in the blank) required by the standard?
• How will I get my staff members to change their mindset about auditing?
• How do you train engagement teams not to think that client service means accepting what the 
client wants, but rather maintaining a questioning mind in light of the fact that management may 
be perpetrating a fraud?
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These types of questions are natural and relate to the uncertainty associated with anything new, 
whether it be a new standard for auditors or a new hybrid seed com for Iowa farmers. Thus, each 
stage of the innovation process consists of a number of actions and decisions aimed at addressing the 
uncertainty surrounding the adoption of something new.
In his book The Diffusion o f Innovations, Everett M. Rogers describes an innovation-decision 
process that essentially is an information-gathering and information-processing activity motivated by 
the need to reduce uncertainty.1 Throughout the process, individuals seek to understand the 
innovation and determine how it relates to them. Rogers describes five stages in the innovation- 
decision process. As these stages relate to adopting the new standard on fraud, they are:
• Knowledge. You become aware of the existence of SAS No. 99 and gain some understanding 
of its requirements.
• Persuasion. You form a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the new standard.
• Decision. You decide to accept and embrace the required standard or to reject it and 
implement only the bare minimum.
• Implementation. You put the new standard into practice.
• Confirmation. You seek reinforcement of the decision you made or, receiving feedback, change 
your previous decision.
Within this framework, the adoption of a new audit standard on fraud is a social process. The 
adoption of most other professional standards is primarily technical. But because of the eclectic, far- 
reaching nature of SAS No. 99, it is appropriate to put its adoption into this broader, social context.
Rogers and others have concluded that when people adopt an innovation, they generally pass through 
each of the five stages. As you and your firm move to implement the new fraud standard, you should 
expect to follow this innovation-decision process. A comprehensive implementation plan for SAS 
No. 99 should be aligned with this process. For that reason, it is important for you to understand the 
characteristics of each stage and the key issues you must address.
Knowledge
There are three types of levels of knowledge you will develop about the new fraud standard.
• Awareness. This knowledge is simply awareness that the new fraud standard exists and that it 
applies to you. Knowing that you will be affected by the new standard, you seek to obtain the 
next level of knowledge.
• How to. At this stage you will seek information that allows you to understand and implement the 
new standard. Because of the comprehensive nature of SAS No. 99, the amount of how-to 
knowledge needed for proper implementation is greater than for less complex standards.
1 Everett M. Rogers, The Diffusion o f Innovations, 4th ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1995).
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Practice Pointer. When an adequate level of how-to knowledge is not obtained before 
adopting an innovation, rejection and discontinuance are likely to result.
• Principles. This level of knowledge deals with the functioning principles underlying the new
standard. In the case of SAS No. 99, these principles include:
— The auditor’s overall responsibility for detecting material misstatements caused by fraud.
— The characteristics of fraud.
— Professional skepticism.
— Fraud risk identification, assessment, and response.
This publication provides both how-to and principles knowledge.
If you are responsible for implementing the new standard at your firm, you should attempt to achieve 
certain specific objectives at the knowledge stage of the implementation process. Before moving on 
to the persuasion phase, make sure that the audit staff can:
• Recall or describe key requirements of the new standard.
• Comprehend key messages, such as maintaining a questioning mind throughout the audit.
• Determine the knowledge or skills required for implementation.
Persuasion
The knowledge phase is cognitive; the persuasion stage is psychological. As CPAs we are most 
comfortable with processing information on a cognitive level and tend to discount or even ignore the 
psychological affect of information. However, when it comes to adopting the new standard on fraud, 
your chances for successful implementation improve greatly if you are aware of and respond to the 
psychological needs of those responsible for implementation.
At the persuasion stage, audit partners, managers, and staff will become more psychologically 
involved in adopting the new standard. They will develop an attitude about the new standard. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, which deals with professional skepticism, attitude is crucial because it 
determines what messages an individual receives and how those messages are interpreted.
Once people become familiar with the requirements of the new standard, they will ask questions 
such as:
• How will the new standard affect my engagements and client relationships?
• What are the advantages to adopting the new standard?
• What are the barriers to adoption and how can I overcome them?
Remember that the entire adoption process is about alleviating feelings of uncertainty. Note that 
the questions asked in this phase are all about the unknown future. Intuitively people know that
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there are no definitive answers to these questions (although many CPAs feel uncomfortable with 
this level of ambiguity). Therefore, they will feel a need for social reinforcement of their 
preliminary ideas about adopting the new SAS. Further, the tendency is not to look to an expert, 
authoritative source for guidance (for example, the partner in charge, the AICPA) but instead to 
peers and others just like them.
The outcome of the persuasion stage of the process is formation of a favorable or unfavorable 
attitude toward the adoption of SAS No. 99. Hopefully that decision will be to embrace the adoption 
of the new standard.
Decision
At the decision stage of the process, you or your firm will decide to adopt or reject the innovation. As 
an authoritative professional standard, all auditors are required to adopt SAS No. 99, so in the context 
of an audit standard the term adoption is relative. Some firms will embrace the new standard. They 
will actively seek not only to understand the how-to knowledge of the standard but also to understand 
and apply the principles knowledge of the standard, such as professional skepticism. They may use 
the standard to redesign their audit process, their relationships with clients, and their human resource 
management policies.
At the other end of the spectrum are those auditors who view adoption of the new standard as 
primarily an exercise in updated documentation. They will obtain only how-to knowledge and will 
implement it primarily through the completion of updated documentation practice aids. For example, 
some firms may de-emphasize or find some other way to “passively reject” the requirement to 
conduct engagement team brainstorming sessions by merely “going through the motions.” This 
would be regrettable, as these firms would not only fail to avail themselves of all the benefits of 
adopting SAS No. 99, they could also reduce the likelihood that their engagement teams will detect 
material misstatements due to fraud.
Trial or Partial Adoption
It is fairly common for consumers to try out new products on a trial or partial basis. This strategy 
allows them to reduce the uncertainty inherent in adopting something new. Typically, CPA firms do 
not opt for partial adoption of an auditing standard, but SAS No. 99 is different. In fact, some firms 
adopted the portions of the new standard upon release of the exposure draft.
Like any trial, the early adoption of SAS No. 99 should seek to answer a number of objectives, 
including:
• Which elements of the standard require changes to or clarifications of firm policy?
• Which required procedures are most difficult to implement? Why? How can the firm improve 
the ease with which these are implemented?
• What is the additional cost of performing the new procedures required by the SAS?
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• Which messages about the new standard and its cost resonate best with clients and will work 
toward convincing them to an increase in fees?
• How can the firm best leverage the new procedures required by SAS No. 99 to:
— Perform a higher quality audit?
— Perform a more efficient audit?
— Provide better service to the audited entity?
• What unanticipated effects does the new standard have on the firm’s audit practice?
Implementation
Implementation occurs when you put a new auditing standard into use. At this stage, uncertainty 
about the consequences of the new standard not only exists, but it also appears to be heightened. As 
engagement teams prepare for engagements in which the new standard will be used for the first time, 
they will raise numerous questions about exactly which procedures should be performed on then- 
engagements. (For CPAs with a low threshold for ambiguity, the operative word is exactly.}
If you are responsible for implementing the new standard at your firm, you should anticipate and be 
ready to respond to this demand for more information. Here are some suggestions for responding to 
this need:
• Establish a feedback loop with the engagement teams so you can identify those areas that are 
most difficult to implement.
• Develop best practices or, where appropriate, firm policies or training that provide 
implementation guidance.
• Encourage engagement teams to share implementation ideas with each other.
• Use technology (for example, firm intranet, discussion boards, threaded e-mails) to distribute 
information quickly over a wide audience. For example, answers to frequently asked questions about 
the new standard can help auditors learn about its requirements and how it affects their audits.
• Make sure that any training programs on the new SAS provide comprehensive, well-written 
materials that can be used as a reference source during implementation.
Adopting the Standard to Your Firm’s Circumstances
The adoption of a new auditing standard, particularly one as comprehensive as SAS No. 99, always 
involves a certain amount of “reinvention,” as auditors apply the guidance contained in the standard 
to their own unique circumstances. Social scientists who work in this area cite many positive results 
of this reinvention process, including the following:
• Fewer mistakes in applying the innovation
• Application of the innovation that is more tailored to particular circumstances
• Higher rate of continued adoption (as opposed to initial adoption followed by discontinuance)
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As Table 3-1 highlights, because of the nature of SAS No. 99, it is likely that your firm will reinvent 
its audit process as you begin to apply it. Your knowledge of the standard and the guidance and tools 
contained in this Practice Aid will help you in this reinvention process. As you study the new 
standard and this book:
• Be sure to distinguish between what is required (the auditor “should”) and what is not (the 
auditor “may consider”). This publication will help.
• Look for guidance in the SAS that seems to beg for reinvention of your audit process to meet 
the needs of your practice and the expertise of your staff.
• Use the suggestions contained in this book and other nonauthoritative aids to help you adapt the 
standard to your firm’s requirements.
Table 3-1 Reinventing Your Audit Process for SAS No. 99
Scholars in the study of innovation offer several reasons why a given innovation is more or less 
likely to be reinvented by those who adopt it. The following characteristics of SAS No. 99 make it 
likely that some re-invention by auditors in the field will be necessary.
• The standard is comprehensive and provides new guidance.
• Abstract concepts (for example, professional skepticism, brainstorming, assessment of the 
indicators of fraud) are at the heart of the standard.
• Like all professional standards, SAS No. 99 must be applied to a wide range of audit 
engagement situations.
• The standard itself encourages a certain amount of modification. Phrases like “professional 
judgment” and “the auditor may consider” signal to practitioners the areas where reinvention is 
expected.
Suggestions for a Successful Implementation1
Generate a Sense of Urgency
In his article “Leading Change,” change management expert John Kotter quotes the chief 
executive officer of a large European company who, when asked the secret to implementing 
change, said, “Make the status quo seem more dangerous than launching into the unknown.” As *
The suggestions in this section have been adapted from leading thinkers in the area of change management. 
An excellent summary of change management principles can be found in the article “Leading Change: Why 
Transformation Efforts Fail,” by John Kotter, which first appeared in the March-April 1995 issue of the 
Harvard Business Review. His article can be downloaded from the Harvard Business Review Web site at 
http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu. Kotter is a professor at the Harvard Business School and is the author of 
numerous books and articles on change management, including Leading Change.
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described earlier in this chapter, the primary force behind the resistance to change is uncertainty, 
fear of the unknown. When developing an implementation plan for SAS No. 99, you should plan 
to address this uncertainty early in the process. Create a sense of urgency surrounding the new 
SAS, and you will mitigate a great deal of resistance.
Form an Implementation Team
SAS No. 99 has the potential to affect many different aspects of your firm’s audit practice. Therefore, 
depending on your firm’s size, you should consider forming a team to address implementation issues. 
Collectively, the team should provide a variety of perspectives, including:
• Audit quality assurance
• Staff recruiting, training, and performance review
• Communications and marketing
• Needs of audit field personnel
If you do form an implementation team, it should have sufficient authority to set firm policy, monitor 
implementation, and take action when necessary.
Remember that SAS No. 99 is likely to affect the relationship between your firm and its clients. For 
that reason, it is essential for the firm’s leaders to be engaged in the implementation effort in a 
meaningful way. The managing partner and other members of leadership should be visibly and actively 
supportive of the implementation effort. This support is even more important if these individuals are 
not part of the firm’s audit practice or otherwise do not have audit engagement responsibilities.
Actively Address Strategic Issues of Adoption
SAS No. 99 poses several strategic questions that firms will need to address. Some of these, such 
as training, have been addressed elsewhere. Two other important strategic issues that firms 
should consider are:
• Leveraging the requirements of SAS No. 99 to improve other areas of the audit
• Recovering the increased audit costs
Improving Audit Quality and Client Service
Certain requirements of SAS No. 99 can serve as a catalyst for improvement in other areas of the 
engagement. For example, the standard’s emphasis on auditor communications, management 
inquiries, professional skepticism, and revenue recognition can lead to:
• More effective analytical procedures
• Greater focus on higher risk audit areas
• More valuable management letter comments
• Better understanding of the client’s business processes, risks, and controls
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Recognize that firms will not realize these and other benefits if their realization is left to chance. You 
and your firm should consider developing formal migration paths that allow for the effective 
distribution of knowledge gained while considering fraud risks to be diffused throughout the 
engagement. For example:
• Experienced engagement personnel could use the brainstorming session to share information 
useful for developing expectations for use in analytical procedures.
• The brainstorming session could include a discussion of the entity’s interim financial 
information to identify significant or unusual transactions.
• Management letter comments addressing internal control weaknesses could include a 
discussion of how these weaknesses increase the risk of fraud to the entity.
• The required retrospective review of accounting estimates can be used to identify key 
assumptions, strengths and weaknesses of the entity’s estimation process, and reliable sources of 
information that can be used to assess the reasonableness of the model used to generate the 
estimate or its underlying assumptions.
Develop a Communications Strategy and Appropriate Messages
In his article “Leading Change,” Kotter makes the following observation about communicating 
change.
I ’ve seen three patterns with respect to communication, all very common. In the first, a group 
actually does develop a pretty good transformation vision and then proceeds to communicate 
it by holding a single meeting or sending out a single communication. Having used about .001 
percent of the yearly intracompany communication, the group is startled that few people seem 
to understand the new approach. In the second pattern, the head of the organization spends a 
considerable amount of time making speeches to employee groups, but most people still don’t 
get it (not surprising, since vision captures only .0005 percent of the total yearly 
communication). In the third pattern, much more effort goes into newsletters and speeches, 
but some very visible senior executives still behave in ways that are antithetical to the vision.
The net result is that cynicism among the troops goes up, while belief in the communication 
goes down.
In a CPA firm, new professional standards typically are communicated to the staff through training 
channels. Updated forms and checklists are included in the audit manual. Communications with 
clients are done once, if at all, through a newsletter. In some cases, new auditing requirements may 
not be discussed with clients at all until the cost of implementing new standards requires the firm to 
increase its fees.
To improve the chances for a successful implementation of SAS No. 99, CPA firms should develop 
communication strategies and appropriate messages for two different audiences: internal and external.
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Internal Communications
Internal communications are directed primarily at the firm’s audit professionals who must use the 
new standard on their engagements. An appropriate objective for this audience would be to facilitate 
the effective and efficient adoption of SAS No. 99.
Once the firm decides on the outcome of its strategic communications plan, it should address 
communications tactics, including the questions of:
• What to communicate
• How to communicate
In deciding what to communicate, keep in mind the innovation-adoption model discussed earlier in 
this chapter. For each stage in the process you should develop two or three messages that address 
audience needs, satisfy those needs, and encourage them to move forward to the next stage of the 
adoption process.
Each message should be concrete, concise, and clearly articulated. For example, during the 
awareness stage of the process, appropriate messages might include:
• During 2003, our firm will implement a new standard on fraud. (The SAS exists.)
• This standard must be applied on all audit engagements. (It affects you.)
• Successful implementation of this important standard will require the concerted effort of all audit 
professionals. (You need to learn more.)
As Kotter points out in his article, the mistake made by most organizations is undercommunicating 
(in his estimate, by a factor of 10). It is incumbent on the leadership of the firm to reinforce key 
elements of the new SAS regularly and consistently, including those situations in which fraud and the 
new SAS are not the primary topic of discussion.
External Communications
You and your firm should consider communicating information about the new fraud standard to 
clients and prospective clients.
Clients will go through a process that is similar to the innovation-adoption process. Table 3-2 
describes the stages of the process and examples of related messages.
Table 3-2 Stages of External Communications
Process Stage Example Messages
Awareness • In a continuing effort to improve audit quality and meet public 
expectations, the professional standards for audit engagements have 
changed.
(continued)
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Process Stage Example Messages
• Auditors are now required to perform new, substantial, audit procedures 
aimed at detecting material misstatements caused by fraud.
• The degree to which this new standard increases audit fees will be 
dependent upon the effectiveness of internal controls and programs to 
prevent and deter fraud.
Persuasion • Adopting the new audit standard will allow the firm to provide you with
higher quality service and other benefits.
Confirmation • During our engagement, we successfully delivered the promised benefits.
• The benefits to the entity of our new audit approach is greater than the 
increase in costs.
During the comment period for the exposure draft, some practitioners expressed the belief that audit 
costs and fees may rise as a result of adopting SAS No. 99. If you and your firm discover that you 
will have to increase audit fees, be sure to articulate the benefits to clients for implementation. It is 
natural for people to think that if they are paying more, they should be getting more. Try to avoid 
describing the fee increase as something that has been imposed on you by standard setters, or the 
current business environment. This communication strategy runs the risk of positioning the audit as a 
commodity, something that can and should be differentiated based solely on price.
Instead, identify and describe the benefits to the entity of your new procedures and approach for 
considering fraud in the audit. These benefits will vary according to your firm’s service delivery 
techniques and its own unique client base. However, some benefits that may accrue to entities whose 
auditors adopt SAS No. 99 include:
• Greater awareness of the risks of fraud within the entity.
• External auditors who, through the expanded use of inquiries throughout the entity, put 
employees on alert that “someone is watching,” possibly serving as a fraud deterrent.
• Suggestions from auditors that reduce the entity’s risks of fraud.
Describing to your clients how the implementation of SAS No. 99 will benefit them must be done in 
a way that does not create an unrealistic expectation for the auditor’s responsibilities (to detect 
material misstatements caused by fraud, not fraud, per se) or the degree of assurance an audit 
provides (reasonable, not absolute).
That is, the articulation of client benefits must be tempered with the need to not promise what cannot 
be delivered. The exact benefits any firm can deliver to its clients will depend on the skills of the firm 
members, how they implement the standard, their service delivery processes, and the characteristics 
of the audited entity.
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Phase In the Implementation
Early adopters of the new standard have reported success by phasing in its implementation, choosing 
carefully which requirements of the standard to implement first on which engagements. The new 
statement is effective for audits of financial statements for periods beginning on or after December 
15, 2002. Suppose that you had a client whose fiscal year-end was June 30. For the fiscal year end 
June 30, 2003, audit you could implement all, some, or none of the requirements of SAS No. 99. A 
phased-in approach takes advantage of that flexibility by allowing the firm to “beta test” its 
implementation of the new standard.
Early, partial implementation of the standard also will help the firm to recognize early “victories,” 
which will help build the momentum necessary for full-scale implementation.
Which Elements of the Standard to Implement First
Some requirements of the standard require professional judgment or otherwise are likely to require a 
reinvention of your audit process. The brainstorming session, procedures that address the risk of 
management override of controls, and the assessment of fraud risks are all examples of the more 
subjective elements of the standard. Other elements require less judgment or otherwise are less likely 
to be reinvented.
In general, the firm would be better served if it worked to implement the subjective requirements 
first. These more subjective areas are more susceptible to trial and error. Additionally, many experts 
think that these areas will provide you with the greatest benefits.
It also pays to implement the “upstream” procedures before those required near the end of the audit. 
For example, the brainstorming and discussion of professional skepticism is required early in the 
audit process. Requirements related to responding to the assessed risk of fraud relate to the fieldwork 
phase of the audit. Because the planning procedures have a direct effect on how the engagement team 
responds to the assessed risks, it is more effective to fully implement procedures required at audit 
planning before moving on to those required later in fieldwork.
Choosing the Engagements and Engagement Teams for Early Adoption
The overall objectives of a phased-in implementation are to:
• Identify previously unknown implementation issues.
• Define effective techniques and procedures for implementing various requirements of the 
SAS.
• Test communication messages.
• Create “wins” that will generate momentum for the full-scale implementation.
• Increase the chances that your engagement team will detect material misstatements caused by 
fraud on your highest risk clients.
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In designing your implementation plan, you should choose the engagements and engagement teams 
that are most likely to deliver these results.
When choosing clients, consider the nature of the relationship between the firm and the entity. Think 
of the early implementation as a beta test. It helps if the beta test client will be supportive of the 
firm’s initiative and who have a good working relationship with firm personnel. If your firm has 
niche practices in several specialized areas, try to choose clients from each area.
New clients can be an excellent choice for early implementation because you have the opportunity to 
make a “fresh start” with entity management and do not have to change their expectations of what 
your audit has been like in the past.
Also, you would be wise to consider early adoption of SAS No. 99 on those engagements where you 
believe there may be a significant risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
The choice of engagement team is crucial. Ideal engagement teams for phased-in implementation of 
the new standard are those that have:
• Experience and a good working relationship with the chosen entity.
• Excellent technical auditing and accounting skills, and the professional judgment to apply 
them in a variety of situations.
• The communication skills necessary to both implement the standard and serve as an in-firm 
resource for others as implementation becomes required on all engagements.
• A tolerance for ambiguity and the ability to think creatively and in a nonlinear fashion.
Don’t Leave Implementation to Chance
SAS No. 99 is a unique audit standard, something that comes around once every 10 to 20 years. 
Effectively implementing the standard will be a time-consuming effort. A formal, rigorously 
developed implementation plan will help ensure that the results of those efforts are commensurate 
with their cost.
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DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), touches on a great many elements of the audit 
process. These six chapters explore some of those areas in more detail, providing extended 
implementation guidance on professional skepticism, inquiries of entity personnel, and revenue 
recognition. Chapter 8 provides detailed examples of common frauds, organized by financial 
statement account or transaction type, together with audit procedures and control procedures that 
directly address the risk.
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Professional skepticism is one of the cornerstones of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, 
Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU 
sec. 316). The Statement provides as much guidance as a professional auditing standard possibly can 
on a topic that essentially is an exploration of human psychology. The standard does a thorough job 
of highlighting the importance of professional skepticism, defining it, and pointing out those areas of 
the engagement where a questioning mind is particularly apt.
What exactly is “a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence?” If we can define it, 
then how do we instill this mindset in our staff? The purpose of this chapter is to explore the issue of 
professional skepticism in more depth as a way to implement the spirit of what SAS No. 99 requires.
The Attitude Found It
By Way of Analogy...
In his book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Robert Pirsig tells a story that many of 
us can relate to. He was having problems with his motorcycle and so he took it to a mechanic. 
In a series of blunders, the mechanic actually made the situation worse, each time telling Pirsig 
that the motorcycle was fixed. After taking his bike into the shop three times, Pirsig got fed up 
and got his bike back, even though it was barely running. “Just don’t touch anything else,” he 
told them.
He knew nothing about motorcycle maintenance but pulled off the engine cover and poked 
around to see what he could find. Lo and behold, he soon discovered that a small pin had been 
sheared and was preventing oil from reaching the engine at high speeds. His “ crackerjack” 
mechanic failed to spot this problem on three tries, and that was why the mechanic was unable 
to fix  the problem.
The question that bothered Pirsig was, Why? Why did a so-called expert miss something so 
obvious, but a novice catch it? He writes:
And it occurred to me there is no manual that deals with the real business of motorcycle 
maintenance, the most important aspect of all. Caring about what you are doing is considered 
either unimportant or taken for granted.... [Emphasis in original]
When you want to hurry something, that means you no longer care about it and want to get on 
to other things. I just want to get at [this story] slowly, but carefully and thoroughly, with the 
same attitude I remember was present just before I found that sheared pin. It was the attitude 
that found it, nothing else. [Emphasis added]
Pirsig’s conclusion about his motorcycle is an apt reminder for auditors as it relates to the 
detection of material misstatements due to fraud. The attitude found it.
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SAS No. 99 embraces the idea that an auditor’s attitude can find misstatements, that the mindset one 
brings to the performance of a task can improve the effectiveness of the task. Some would argue that 
an appropriate mindset can even make up for a poorly designed procedure. Conversely, it is difficult 
for even the best procedure to maintain its effectiveness if the person performing it does not really 
care about how it is performed.
Attitude Is a Filter
By Way of Analogy...
You are snow skiing on a cloudless day. The white, crystalline snow dazzles in the sunlight. 
Unfortunately, you have lost your sunglasses.
As you start down the mountain, the fine details of the terrain blend and merge beneath the 
glare. You squint, trying to anticipate the bumps and imperfections in the snow. But you are 
moving too fast, the sun is too bright, and you simply cannot see very well. You ski poorly.
Imagine the exact same day, only this time you have your sunglasses. They are polarized to 
filte r out the glare. You put them on, and all the details of the trail now become apparent. As 
you head down the mountain you are much better prepared to respond; you ski better because 
now you can see.
Professional skepticism is like a filter. The mindset we bring to an engagement is a filte r 
through which we view audit evidence and other information we gather during the audit. Like a 
pair of tinted ski goggles, the skeptical mind allows us to “ see” what’s before us and react 
accordingly.
Professional literature requires us to have a neutral position, neither trust nor distrust of an entity’s 
management. This neutral mindset is described in the following diagram.
Complete
distrust
Complete
trust
Neutrality
Most auditors tend to rely too much on what management tells them. This was the conclusion of the 
Public Oversight Board’s report, which stated:
The Panel’s findings suggest that auditors do not always pursue sufficiently conditions 
discovered during an audit or corroborate adequately management representations made to 
them.
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In other words, we have weighed in on the right-hand side of the diagram and lost our balanced 
position. As a practical matter, this is understandable because most firms have thorough client 
acceptance and continuance procedures to screen out dishonest clients. Nevertheless, the standard 
reminds us that we should not assume management is always honest.
Complete
distrust
Current
mindset
Neutrality Complete
trust
What is clear is that the mindset of the auditors must shift left toward the middle of the spectrum, to 
bring us back to a position of neutrality.
Lessons From Psychology
The ultimate goal of adding a discussion of professional skepticism to SAS No. 99 is to change 
auditor behavior. But how do we change an individual’s attitude? We may describe someone’s
, attitude as cheerful, surly, helpful, abrupt, and self-centered. How do we change that?
Self-awareness is an important early step in modifying any behavior—especially a behavior that is 
done subconsciously. In that context, the objective of these next few pages is relatively simple—to 
increase your awareness of how the mind processes information in the belief that self-awareness can 
ultimately lead to a change in attitude.
In examining the role of professional skepticism on an audit, several questions come to mind, 
including:
• Auditors reach a conclusion based on information they receive during the engagement— 
information that is filtered through a particular mindset. How does that mindset affect our 
conclusions? In short, how do auditors “know” what they think they know?
• What assumptions or biases are embedded in an auditor’s attitudes toward his or her client?
• How can these assumptions or biases be overcome or set aside so we may assume a more 
neutral position?
To begin exploring the answers to these questions, we need to look to the field of cognitive 
psychology to gain a basic understanding of how the mind works to process information and reach 
conclusions about the world we live in.
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Assumptions Allow Us to Self-Select What We See
In a well-known experiment, a psychologist asked a group of individuals to look at individual playing 
cards and describe what they saw. Mixed in with “normal” cards were some “abnormal” cards in 
which the colors of the suits were switched. For example, instead of a red ace of hearts, the deck had 
a black ace of hearts. What the researchers found was that the observers self-corrected the abnormal 
cards. They reported the black ace of hearts as an ace of clubs. What the researchers concluded was 
that the observers’ assumptions about a situation (“a black suit is for clubs and spades”) limit then- 
awareness.1
This is not to say that assumptions are bad. In fact, they are absolutely essential if we are to function 
in the real world. We assume that the floor we are standing on is more or less level, that the ceiling 
runs parallel to it, and the walls rise at a 90 degree angle. Can you imagine how difficult it would be 
to live in a world where every time we entered a room we challenged that assumption? Assumptions 
allow us to conserve effort and to gain a measure of stability in our understanding of the world. The 
trade-off is that we often are resistant to new information that conflicts with our assumptions.
Example 4-1
The controller fo r a company involved in one of the most infamous financial reporting frauds 
tells the story of how the auditors almost caught him.
To conceal nonexistent transactions, the controller created fictitious supporting documents. If 
the auditors asked for support fo r one of these transactions, the controller would say that it 
must have been misfiled, would return to his office, and would create the needed document.
One time the auditors told the controller that they had been unable to locate a check supporting a 
particular transaction. Assuming that the transaction probably had never occurred, the controller 
excused himself and went to create the required document. He returned sometime later and 
handed the check to the engagement manager. At that moment, the staff accountant entered with 
the real check in question— the transaction was valid, and the check truly had been misplaced.
Now the auditor had two checks supposedly in support of the same transaction. In the 
controller’s mind, he had been caught red-handed, and as he tells the story, was ready to 
confess everything.
Instead of asking the controller to explain how such a thing was possible, however, the auditor 
provided his own explanation, describing how it was possible for the system to generate two 
different checks for the same item. The auditor’s assumptions about the situation— the client is 
honest, the accounting system is faulty— prevented him from seeing the true situation.
It is human nature to screen out much of our surroundings because we do not believe that certain 
events occur. If stimulus reaches us that does not fit our assumptions, we may ignore it, just the way
1 This experiment was conducted by Jerome Bruner and Leo Postman and was first published in the Journal o f Personality 
(1949) in their article “On the Perception of Incongruity: A Paradigm.”
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that observers in the card experiment self-corrected the abnormal playing cards. This happens to 
auditors. Information reaches us, but if it does not fit with what we “know,” we find a way to make it 
fit.
Where do these assumptions come from? Past history and personal experience play a big role, as do 
the culture o f the societies or organizations we are part o f and our professional training. Once these 
assumptions are part of us, we tend to not challenge them. Edward de Bono, author of Lateral 
Thinking, maintains, “It is historical continuity that maintains most assumptions—not a repeated 
assessment of their validity.”2
We Construct Reality
Many psychologists and philosophers have come to the conclusion that what we know as “reality” is 
actually something we construct from the information we receive. What we know is not reality per se 
but a personal approximation of reality. In his book The Psychology o f Consciousness, the 
psychologist Robert Omstein describes the process this way.
Our biological inheritance determines that we select the sensory personal consciousness 
from the mass of information reaching us. This is done by a multilevel process of filtration.
From this, we are ultimately able to construct a stable consciousness in coordination with 
the filtered input....
Each of us selects and constructs a personal world in several simultaneous procedures. Sense organs 
gather information that the brain can modify and sort. This heavily filtered input is compared with 
memory, expectations, body movements, and preparations for motor output until, finally, our 
consciousness is constructed as a “best guess” about reality. These “best guesses” are the formations 
of our assumptive world; they offer stability at the cost of exclusion.3
For auditors, once we accept that what we “know” about our clients (and their integrity, for example) 
is a construct, we also can accept the idea that what we “know” is just one of several possibilities. For 
example, we may “know” that our clients are honest, but in reality, there are other dimensions to our 
clients that we don’t know. We might not be aware of what sort of personal pressures or incentives 
may motivate them to commit fraud or the nature of their personal ethics that may allow them to 
rationalize it. As auditors, we should recognize that our perceptions of our clients may be incomplete 
or biased.
Once we accept that what we “know” about our clients is a personal construction, we can adopt a 
more skeptical mindset by changing the way in which we construct this reality. The point is that 
by understanding how we come to know what we think we know, we have the insight necessary 
to change.
2
From Edward de Bono, Lateral Thinking (New York: HarperTrade, 1990), 91.
3 Robert Ornstein, The Psychology o f Consciousness (New York: Viking Penguin, 1975), 43 and 44.
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Habituation and Categories
Up until the mid-1950s, an elevated train ran along Third Avenue in New York City. As you might 
imagine, late at night, when the street was otherwise quiet, the sound of the train rattling was quite 
noisy. After the train was tom down, police began receiving calls late at night from citizens close to 
the old train tracks who noted “something strange” occurring. The police later determined that calls 
were coming at about the time the old train used to run. What people were reporting as strange was 
the absence of a noisy train.
Psychologists have concluded that we human beings quickly adapt to constancies in our world. As 
long as the train runs every night at the same time, the noise doesn’t bother us. As soon as that 
routine is changed, we “hear” it. This phenomenon is known as habituation, and it explains why, if 
we view the same object over and over again, we begin to look at it in the same way each time.
Categories of information are a psychological response we develop to organizing and interpreting 
information. Over time, we develop certain “buckets” for interpreting information. For example, as 
an auditor, we may create a bucket called “reliable, virtually unassailable audit evidence,” which tells 
us that we can accept the evidence at face value and draw a conclusion without further investigation. 
Through experience, we come to associate certain items as being a part of a particular category. A 
signed confirmation from a third party may fall into our category of reliable audit evidence.
The system of categorization becomes a shortcut for analysis and interpretation. We are presented 
with information and perform some quick checks to determine which category to assign it. At that 
point we no longer experience the original item itself (the confirmation), but its category. We ascribe 
the in-depth characteristics of the category (convincing audit evidence) to the individual item, even 
though we only did a quick, superficial test of it (the confirmation was signed) in order to assign it to 
our category.
Recap
Ornstein summarizes how the mind works.
Our normal personal consciousness is not a complete, passive registration of the external 
environment; rather it is a highly evolved, selective, personal construction constrained 
primarily for individual biological survival....
Let us trace this process: The sensory organs discard most of the input information reaching 
us. The brain further limits input by selectively inhibiting sensory activity....W e quickly 
learn to “habituate” to the constancies of the world. Further, we sort the input into 
categories that depend on transitory needs, language, our past history, our expectations, and 
our cultural biases. Finally, we must construct a stable consciousness.4
4
Ornstein, page 69.
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As human beings we solve the problem of information overload by selecting what information we 
pay attention to. We adopt shortcuts to process that information more efficiently. All of these 
processes are heavily influenced by past experience and cultural expectations. Given that, in the vast 
majority of cases, client personnel are honest and that the firm culture emphasizes client service and 
audit efficiency, it is little wonder that auditors have drifted away from a position of neutrality.
Implications for Auditors
The preceding brief overview of how the mind processes information has several important 
implications for auditors.
• Acknowledge our assumptions. It is human nature to form assumptions and carry biases into a 
given situation. The first step toward eliminating these biases and assuming a neutral mindset 
is to acknowledge their existence. Label assumptions so they can be easily spotted when they 
arise and start to cloud your judgment. For example, a young staff accountant may work 
closely with client personnel to understand certain accounting procedures. The client knows 
these procedures backward and forward—everything he or she says about the way the system 
works proves to be true. Under those conditions, you would expect the staff accountant to 
develop an assumption that everything that particular individual said was true—which may 
not be the case. By becoming aware of this bias, the staff accountant at least has a chance to 
adopt a questioning mind toward the individual. One thing is certain, if the staff accountant is 
not aware of the bias, he or she stands very little chance of correcting it.
• Periodically challenge assumptions. Remember that most assumptions persist out of habit, not 
because we regularly confirm their validity. Rather than take information and try to determine 
which category it belongs to, take that same information and ask whether it confirms or 
contradicts assumptions you have about the entity, its owner, or employees.
For example, a duplicate check may not mean that the accounting system is in error because 
management has high integrity. It may mean that the system has integrity and management is 
falsifying documentation. SAS No. 99 reminds auditors to challenge your assumptions when 
evaluating audit evidence. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.68) provides an extensive list of conditions 
you might identify during fieldwork that could lead you to challenge assumptions about the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud at the entity. For example, missing documents may not have 
been inadvertently lost (assumption). Documents may be “missing” because the transaction 
selected by the auditor for testing is fraudulent—the documents never existed.
• Explore alternative categories. As an expedient, we drop things into preassigned categories. 
Once an item makes it to a category, we make additional assumptions about patterns that we 
know to exist within that category. In Example 4-1, the audit manager put “canceled check” 
into the “reliable audit evidence” category. Once categorized, it never left that original 
category. Alternative patterns or categories (for example, “multiple checks for the same item” 
is a pattern for the “possible fraud” category) can lead us to breakthrough insights.
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• Provocative stimulation can be a catalyst fo r  insight. As de Bono says, “Insight is brought 
about by alterations in pattern sequence brought about by provocative stimulation.”5 By 
“alterations in patterns” he means the process we have of putting information into preformed 
categories for analysis. That is, he agrees with the conclusion reached in the previous bullet 
point, but he takes it one step further by stating that “provocative stimulation” can be a 
catalyst for considering alternative patterns. How can auditors create “provocative 
stimulation?” Enter brainstorming.
The Value of Brainstorming
SAS No. 99 requires an engagement team brainstorming session be conducted for every audit. 
Chapter 2 of this publication provides suggestions for implementing that requirement.
The brainstorming session is the perfect venue for addressing auditor assumptions about the client 
and for sensitizing the engagement team to alternative realities (for example, that fraud can occur in 
every entity). For example, in your brainstorming session you might:
• Ask engagement team members to describe the assumptions they have about the entity, its 
owner, management, and employees, and its financial performance.
• Identify conditions that lead the engagement team to believe that management is honest and 
has integrity. Set these aside. For the purposes of the brainstorming session, these assumptions 
are no longer valid.
• Discuss whether all remaining assumptions continue to be true.
• Discuss common frauds in the entity’s industry as a way to sensitize the team to alternative 
ways to organize audit evidence.
Applied Professional Skepticism
The value in adopting a skeptical attitude is that it can lead to additional or more effective audit 
procedures. SAS No. 99 requires auditors to apply professional skepticism in gathering and 
evaluating audit evidence, which in turn, can lead to changes in your audit. For example, your 
skepticism may lead you to:
• Design additional or different auditing procedures to obtain more reliable evidence. Chapter 8 
of this publication provides detailed examples of auditing procedures that are designed to 
respond to specifically identified risks of material misstatements due to fraud.
• Obtain additional corroboration of management’s explanations or representations concerning 
material matters. Examples include:
— Third-party confirmation
— Use of a specialist
5 De Bono, page 47.
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— Analytical procedures
— Examination of documentation from independent sources
— Inquiries of others within or outside the entity
Implementation Tips
When asked about his approach to arms control with the Soviets, President Reagan summed up his 
philosophy by saying that we must “trust but verify” their compliance. That phrase is a good 
summary of how audit teams should approach their engagements—trust the clients, but verify what 
they say.
How do we do that? The following table summarizes some of the reasons why we lose our 
professional skepticism and what we can do to get it back.
_________How We Lose Skepticism________
Personal relationship. We have a personal 
relationship with the client, who has never lied 
to us before. To question the client’s integrity 
seems like a violation of the friendship.
Past history. We rationalize. No one at this 
client has tried to commit fraud before, why 
should things be different now?
Lack o f experience in detecting fraud. It is rare 
that independent auditors experience a fraud at 
one of their clients. For this reason, we can “let 
our guard down” and fail to see the warning 
signs.
We only talk to the accountants. Most of our 
inquiries are made of the accounting personnel, 
who only reinforce our assumptions and 
“categories.”
__________How We Can Get It Back_________
Make it clear that investigation and corroboration 
is part of your engagement. It is nothing 
personal—professional audit standards require 
you to gather evidence.
Things change. Management or employees might 
have a change in personal circumstances that 
provide an incentive for fraud. Changes in 
controls may provide opportunities. What 
happened in the past is not audit evidence for the 
current period.
Become familiar with the most common frauds 
in your client’s industry, how they are concealed, 
and the signs that they have occurred. When 
brainstorming, think from the “fraudster’s” point 
of view. If you wanted to commit and conceal a 
fraud, how would you do it?
Get outside of the accounting department. Talk to 
operational personnel to corroborate 
management’s responses to your questions. Get a 
different point of view that challenges your 
assumptions.
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Note: Chapter 2 of this publication provides an understanding of the requirements of Statement 
on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), relating to inquiries of management 
relating to fraud. That chapter also offers suggestions for implementing those requirements of the 
SAS. This chapter provides additional suggestions for making inquiries of entity personnel about 
fraud matters, and these suggestions are intended to supplement what SAS No. 99 requires.
Introduction
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) has conducted research on improving 
the effectiveness of audit inquiry.1 In its research report, the CICA notes that traditional 
evidence-gathering techniques, such as confirmation, observation, or examination of supporting 
documents, may not work for “soft” information. That type of information includes an 
understanding of an entity’s information systems, the business, and how information can be 
manipulated within the system. Because traditional audit procedures are not appropriate for 
gathering this kind of information, inquiry is the only way to obtain evidence about these 
matters. Thus, it is essential that auditors improve the effectiveness of their inquiry techniques.
The information-gathering phase of SAS No. 99 requires you to gather a great deal of “soft” 
information about the entity. The standard significantly expands the audit requirement and 
guidance regarding the inquiries of management and others. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide additional suggestions on how you can make those inquiries more effective.
By way of Anology
Suppose that you were assigned to conduct an inventory observation at a client. It is the firs t time 
you have ever done an inventory observation.
Would you “wing it” ?
Probably not. Most likely you would do a fair amount of preparation. Among other things, you 
would become familiar with the objectives of your assignment and the procedures you would 
perform to achieve those objectives. You would prepare an audit program to structure your 
procedures to make sure you cover everything you should. The pressure you have to perform is 
even greater than normal because there are no “ do-overs” in an inventory observation.
1 The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) published the results in Audit Enquiry: Seeking More Reliable 
Evidence From Audit Enquiry. This is an excellent source of information for auditors wishing to improve the effectiveness of 
their inquiries. This report can be ordered directly from the CICA.
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Inquiry of entity personnel is every bit as “ legitimate” an audit procedure as a more traditional 
procedure, such as observation. As with an inventory observation, we may have only one chance 
to “ get it right.”
And yet, most auditors prepare very little for an inquiry, even the most crucial ones that can affect 
the entire engagement. They wing it. An inquiry is not a conversation. It is a structured process 
designed for a specific purpose.
Your Role as Interviewer
Before performing the interview, you should prepare and understand your role as the interviewer.
• Have a clear objective. Make sure you know what you are looking for. Do you just want 
information about the way a process works? For example, how do journal entries and other 
adjustments get posted to the general ledger? Or are you asking for thoughts and impressions? 
For example, where is the entity most vulnerable to fraud? Have a clear understanding of how 
the information you gather will be used. Are you trying to corroborate the representations of 
other entity personnel? To design your audit procedures? Clearly defined objectives will help 
you probe for additional information after the person you are interviewing has answered the 
first question.
• Understand the client's business. The better you understand the client’s business— such as its 
business model, the key operational processes, and how it compares to its peers—the better 
the inquiry. An in-depth understanding of the entity leads to more relevant and perceptive 
questions, and to a more insightful understanding of the responses.
• Be prepared to listen and guide. As CPAs we are accustomed to giving expert advice. Clients 
come to us for answers, and we provide them. We also receive expert advice from others. We 
have a question and ask someone for “the answer.” This is the type of professional 
conversations we most often engage in—hierarchical, linear, solutions-driven. Inquiries about 
fraud tend to be more intuitive. As the interviewer, look to ask questions and step aside. Don’t 
interrupt and think that you’ve found the “right answer.” There may not be one. Recognize 
that in an interview, a lot of pertinent information is volunteered. Create situations in which 
the person being interviewed feels comfortable volunteering information without being cut off 
or dismissed.
• Check your assumptions at the door. Chapter 4 of this Practice Aid describes how all of us 
bring a set of assumptions to any given situation. Before conducting an interview, review the 
assumptions and biases you bring to the situation. This review will accomplish two important 
things: (1) you will “deframe” your frame of reference, guarding against a biased 
interpretation, and (2) you will convey an unbiased attitude toward the person being 
interviewed, which will make him or her more open.
80
Chapter 5: Inquiries o f Entity Personnel
Starting the Interview
During the introductory phase of the interview, you will want to make sure that the person being 
interviewed feels at ease. Establish a nonthreatening tone. Make sure that the two of you are free 
from distractions and in a private setting.
Early on in the interview you should state its purpose. For example, “I’m hoping you can help 
me understand the procedures you follow to close the books and post journal entries to the 
general ledger.” Note that this explanation of purpose includes a description of the subject’s role 
in the interview (“I need you to help me understand....”). Throughout the interview, it is useful 
to include the interviewee as part of the process. A general description of the purpose of the 
interview is better than a more specific description. Explain that the inquiries you are making are 
routine and, if possible, provide an estimate of how long you think the interview will last. Avoid 
sensitive questions or questions phrased in a way that may generate a defensive response.
Structuring Questions
After the introductory phase of the audit, you will move into the information-gathering phase of 
the interview. The exact circumstances of each interview will vary, which will affect the way you 
phrase your questions. In its research, the CICA noted that effective questions, regardless of their 
circumstances, share the following characteristics.
• They make sense to the respondent.
• They use vocabulary that is common to both you and the respondent.
• They elicit the information required.
As you move through the information-gathering phase, you will want to move from the broad to 
the specific, from trying to elicit information indirectly to more direct questions. SAS No. 99 
requires you to ask some rather direct questions of entity personnel regarding their knowledge of 
fraud or possible fraud. Asking these direct and sensitive questions right away may not be 
effective at gathering the information you need. Instead, work toward the direct questions by 
asking broader questions first. Make sure that you provide the proper context for asking the 
direct kinds of questions required by SAS No. 99. An example might be:
Auditor: Part of my job is to identify material misstatements due to fraud and
areas of the company that are vulnerable to fraud. You understand 
that, don’t you?
Client: Yes.
Auditor: I’m curious about your observations. Where do you think the
company is most vulnerable to someone stealing assets?
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Periodically, the participant will provide an answer that requires follow-up. In those situations, it 
is helpful to use the respondent’s words and phrases to ask for additional information:
Client: I’ve never liked the way we handle those postclosing adjustments.
The auditor may ask several follow-up questions:
Auditor: Tell me about the adjustments.
Auditor: How do you handle postclosing adjustments?
Auditor: What is it you don’t like?
Auditor: Who likes the way the company handles postclosing adjustments?
In this exchange, note that the auditor has followed the general rule of proceeding from the 
broad, nonthreatening, to the specific and possibly sensitive.
In his training course Fraud Examination: Investigation Methods, Joseph Wells offers the 
following tips for asking questions during the information-gathering phase of an interview.2
• Ask questions in a manner that will develop the facts in a systematic order.
• Ask only one question at a time, and frame the question so that only one answer is required.
• Ask straightforward and frank questions.
• Give the respondent ample time to answer. Do not rush.
• Try to help the respondent remember, but do not suggest answers. Be careful not to imply a 
particular answer through facial expressions, gestures, methods of asking questions, or types 
of questions asked.
• Repeat or rephrase questions, if necessary, to get the facts.
• Be sure that you understand the answers. If they are not perfectly clear, have the respondent 
interpret them at that time instead of saving this for later.
• Provide the respondent an opportunity to qualify his or her answers.
• Separate facts from inferences.
• Have the respondent give comparisons by, for example, percentages, fractions, and 
comparisons to last year, to ascertain accuracy.
• Get all the facts. Almost every respondent can give you information beyond what was initially 
provided.
• Some interviewers give the respondent an opportunity to provide a “free narrative” of the 
situation at the beginning of the interview. Once the respondent has given this narrative 
account, ask questions about every item.
This course is published and available from the AICPA. The questions cited here appear on pages 1 through 7 of the 
materials.
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Signs of Deception
Fraud experts are trained to spot clues that the person being interviewed is not being truthful. 
SAS No. 99 does not anticipate that auditors performing a generally accepted auditing standards 
(GAAS) audit will be similarly trained in these advanced interrogation skills, but the following 
information may be helpful.
Practice Pointer. Early in the interview, try to establish a “ baseline” for the interviewee’s 
reactions to relatively factual, nonthreatening questions. Later in the interview, when asking 
more sensitive questions, be alert for changes from this baseline response.
Nonverbal Clues
The Institute of Internal Auditors conducted studies designed to help internal auditors perform 
more effective interviews. Their monograph Conducting Internal Audit Interviews3 concluded 
that over 50 percent of a person’s message is communicated nonverbally. Most nonverbal clues 
come in clusters. Here are some things—usually in combination with each other—that might 
indicate the person you are interviewing is trying to deceive you.
• Barriers. When someone being interviewed feels uncomfortable with a particular line of 
questioning, he or she may put up nonverbal barriers to try to keep the interviewer at a 
comfortable distance. Barriers such as the following may indicate that the person being 
interviewed would rather avoid discussing the topic.
— Blocking their mouth, for example with their hands, pens, or pencils, or chewing on hair or 
comers of papers or folders.
— Crossing their arms and legs. The higher the arms are crossed, the greater the barrier.
— Making distracting noises, such as finger tapping or drumming.
— Leaning away from the interviewer, usually toward the door or a window, in an effort to 
create spatial distance.
• Signs o f stress. In most people, lying will produce stress, which can manifest itself physically. 
Here are some nonverbal signs of stress.
— Neck and face turning red and blotchy
— Yawning outside of drowsiness or boredom, particularly among younger individuals.
— Changes in the person’s normal pattern of eye contact.
— Excessive eye blinking or closing the eyes for extended periods of time
— Wobbling or bouncing knees up and down quickly
— Shuffling the feet or crossing them at the ankles and putting them beneath the chair.
J. W. Harmeyer, S. P. Golden, and G. E. Summers, Conducting Internal Audit Interviews (Altamonte Springs: Institute of 
Internal Auditors Research Foundation, 1984).
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Verbal Clues
In his training course Fraud Examination: Investigation Methods, Joseph Wells offers the 
following verbal clues that the person being interviewed may be either avoiding your question or 
answering it dishonestly.4
• Changes in speech patterns, such as speeding up or talking louder.
• Stalling for time. For example, repeating the question or complaining about the physical 
environment where the interview is taking place.
• Attempts to add credibility. For example taking an oath such as “I swear to God,” or “To tell 
you the truth.” Another way to add credibility is tell the interviewer to check his story with 
another party.
• Selective memory, for example, the use of the phrase “I can’t recall.”
• Overqualified responses, for example, the use of the phrase “To the best of my memory.”
• Reluctance to end the interview. Someone who has been honest and totally candid generally is 
ready to terminate the interview. Those who have been trying to deceive you may try to keep 
you a little longer to try to convince you they were telling the truth. Those who have withheld 
information may want you to keep asking questions so that they may “come clean.”
• Tolerant attitudes. The dishonest individual typically has a relatively tolerant attitude toward 
someone who may have committed fraud. For example, suppose you asked the question, 
“What should happen to someone who intentionally recorded false journal entries to boost 
profits?” The person with nothing to hide usually will make a strong statement, such as, “They 
should be fired or prosecuted.” Another person with knowledge of a similar fraud might 
provide a softer answer such as “It depends on the circumstances.”
Concluding the Interview
At the end of the interview, review the key points covered and ask the respondent if the 
information you have is correct. Consider asking if there is any other information the two of you 
should discuss. Examples of questions that can be used for this purpose include:
• If you were trying to...[understand how a fake journal entry could be entered into the general 
ledger], what would you do?
• Is there anything we haven’t covered that you think we should have?
• Do you have anything else to say?
4
This course is published and available from the AICPA. The questions cited here appear on pages 1 through 7 of the 
materials.
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CHAPTER 6: RESPONDING TO THE RISK OF 
IMPROPER REVENUE RECOGNITION
As described in Chapter 2, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration o f 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), 
includes a presumption that improper revenue recognition is a fraud risk. The objective of this 
chapter is to provide additional suggestions and guidance on revenue recognition issues.1
Revenue recognition focuses on when revenue can be reported in the financial statements. An 
entity’s revenue recognition policies describe the conditions that must be met before it can 
recognize revenue in the current period.
Revenue Recognition Accounting Concepts
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements o f Financial 
Statements, defines revenue as:
Inflows or other enhancements of assets of an entity or settlements of its liabilities (or a 
combination of both) from delivering or producing goods, rendering services, or other 
activities that constitute the entity’s ongoing major or central operations.
Conceptually, companies create economic value continually throughout this operating cycle. 
Theoretically, revenue could be recognized incrementally and continuously at many different 
points in the process. As a practical matter, the continuous recognition of revenue is impossible. 
Thus, for accounting purposes, we choose one event—the recognition event—to recognize 
revenue (and the corresponding expenses).
When does that event occur? In his essay “Revenue Recognition,” Professor David Hawkins 
describes the results of his analysis of revenue recognition practices:
An analysis of revenue recognition practices seems to indicate that revenue is typically 
recognized when the event that reduces the risk o f ultimately receiving a determinable amount 
o f revenue is reduced to a minimum level considered product by those issuing and using 
financial statements...Determining [this] critical event in novel situations can require 
management judgment which must be exercised in the light of a thorough, objective analysis of 
the particular circumstances and the generally accepted accounting principles applicable to 
analogous situations. [Emphasis added] 2
1 The auditing of revenue transactions is inextricably linked to the accounting guidance. At the time this book was written, 
certain elements of generally accepted accounting principles related to revenue recognition were being revisited. The 
completeness and effectiveness of the auditing procedures described in this chapter ultimately will depend on the changes 
made to the accounting literature.
2
David F. Hawkins, “Revenue Recognition” (Harvard Business School Publishing, 1995).
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In assessing an entity’s revenue recognition practices, two important questions to consider are:
1. Is its designation of the recognition event appropriate?
2. Are its accounting policies consistent with this designation?
The Accounting Literature
Conceptual Basis
FASB Concept Statement No 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements o f 
Business Enterprises provides the conceptual basis for revenue recognition. Paragraph 83 of FASB 
Concept Statement No. 5 states that recognition of revenue involves consideration of two factors:
1. Being realized or realizable.
2. Being earned.
Paragraph 84(a) of FASB Concept Statement No. 5 states that revenues from manufacturing and 
selling activities are commonly recognized at time the of sale, usually meaning delivery.
The rest of this chapter explores in detail the meaning of the key terms in italics.
Individual Pronouncements
Individual accounting pronouncements have been developed to provide guidance on revenue 
recognition for specific industries or transactions. For example, guidance on revenue recognition 
for sales of software is provided in Statement of Position (SOP) 97-2, Software Revenue 
Recognition (as modified by SOP 98-9, Modification o f SOP 97-2, Software Revenue 
Recognition, With Respect to Certain Transactions).
In general, the purpose of these individual pronouncements is to describe how the revenue 
recognition concepts described in FASB Concept Statement No. 5 should be applied to certain 
transactions. If an entity is involved in these transactions, it should follow the guidance in the 
relevant pronouncement. Otherwise, it should follow the conceptual guidance contained in FASB 
Concept Statement No. 5.
The Securities and Exchange Commission
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 101, Revenue 
Recognition in Financial Statements, represents the SEC staffs views on how the FASB 
conceptual guidance on revenue recognition should be applied. The SAB reflects the basic 
principles of revenue recognition in existing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
and does not supersede any existing authoritative literature.
Financial statement preparers of public companies are most directly affected by SABs. However, 
those who work for nonpublic companies may find the information contained in SAB No. 101 
useful.
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Revenue Recognition Criteria— Realizable
The general revenue recognition criteria state that revenue is recognized when realized or 
realizable. A sale has not taken place until there exists an actual, firm agreement between the 
seller and buyer. Contingent payment terms indicate that the revenue is not realizable because 
there is no firm agreement about sales price.
Indications that there is a lack of agreement between the buyer and seller include the following.
• The use of letters of intent in lieu of signed contracts or agreements
• Sales merchandise that is shipped in advance of the scheduled shipment date without evidence 
of the customer’s agreement or consent or documented request for such shipment
• Sales recorded upon shipment of a product to customers who have been given a free tryout 
period after which the customer can return the product with no obligation
• Recognition of sales when customers have unilateral cancellation or termination provisions
Sales to distributors (rather than to end-users) may raise additional concerns. It is not unusual for 
sellers to offer incentives or concessions to distributors that normally are not offered to retail, 
end-user customers. If your company sells to distributors, a firm sales agreement does not exist 
(and therefore revenue should not be recognized) in those circumstances in which the 
distributor’s obligation to pay for the product is contingent on the following:
• Resale to another (third) party (for example, the end user)
• Receipt of financing from another (third) party
The SEC
In SAB No. 101, the SEC clarifies that an agreement does not exist until it is executed by both 
parties. If it is the entity’s normal business practice to require a written sales agreement, a verbal 
agreement between the parties or the premise that the contract will be signed shortly does not 
constitute an agreement between the parties.
The interpretative response to question 2 in SAB No. 101 also provides guidance on consignment 
sales and other situations in which revenue should not be recognized even when delivery of the 
product has occurred.
Revenue Recognition Criteria— Earnings Process
The general revenue recognition criteria state that revenue is recognized upon completion o f the 
earnings process. The earnings process is complete when the entity has “substantially 
accomplished what it must do to be entitled to the benefits represented by the revenues.” 
Circumstances that indicate that the earnings process may not be complete include the following:
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• There are sales that require substantial continuing seller involvement after delivery of 
merchandise.
• There are sales in which evidence indicates the customer’s obligation to pay for the 
merchandise depends on fulfillment by the seller of materially unsatisfied conditions.
• Goods are preinvoiced while still in the process of being assembled.
• Shipments are sent to and held by freight forwarders pending return to the company for 
required customer modifications.
The SEC
Determining when the earnings process is complete is especially difficult when the customer 
pays an up-front fee for products or services that are delivered or performed over time. At issue 
is whether the company should recognize the initial fee as revenue when it is paid or as the 
services or goods are performed or delivered. Consider the following examples, which the SEC 
provided in question 10 of the frequently asked questions in SAB No. 101.
• A company charges users a fee for nonexclusive access to its Web site that contains 
proprietary databases. The fee allows access to the Web site for a one-year period. After the 
customer is provided with an identification number and trained in the use of the database, 
there are no incremental costs that will be incurred in serving this customer.
• An Internet company charges a fee to users for advertising a product for sale or auction on 
certain pages of its Web site. The company agrees to maintain the listing for a period of time. 
The cost of maintaining the advertisement on the Web site for the stated period is minimal.
• A company charges a fee for hosting another company’s Web site for one year. The 
arrangement does not involve exclusive use of any of the hosting company’s servers or other 
equipment. Almost all of the projected costs to be incurred will be incurred in the initial 
loading of information on the host company’s Internet server and setting up appropriate links 
and network communications.
In each of these cases, revenue should be recognized over time. Even though the majority of the 
cost and effort is incurred by the seller at the front-end of the agreement, the SEC staff believes 
that the substance of the transaction is that the buyer is paying for a service that is delivered over 
a period of time. The earnings process is completed as the service is provided—that is, revenue 
should therefore be recognized over the same time period.
Multiple-Element Arrangements
Many companies now offer complete, packaged solutions to their customers, which may involve 
the delivery or performance of multiple products, services, and/or rights to use assets, and 
performance may occur at different points in time or over different periods of time.
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Some arrangements are accompanied by initial installation, initiation, or activation services and 
generally involve either a fixed fee or a fixed fee coupled with a continuing payment stream. 
The continuing payment stream generally corresponds to the continuing performance and may 
be fixed, variable based on future performance, or composed of a combination of fixed and 
variable payments.
The issue is how to account for these so-called “multiple-element arrangements.” For example, is 
it acceptable to allocate a portion of the total fee to each element? Or should you defer the entire 
fee until all the elements are delivered?
At the time these materials were prepared, SOP 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition (as 
modified), provided the only authoritative guidance on accounting for multiple-element 
arrangements. Unfortunately, the guidance in that statement applies only to the sale of computer 
software. The Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) has added an item to its agenda to address 
multiple-element arrangements (Issue No. 00-21, Accounting fo r  Revenue Arrangements with 
Multiple Deliverables), and presumably, that guidance would be applicable to entities other than 
software companies.
Until the EITF reaches a consensus, you may wish to analogize the guidance contained in SOP 
97-2 to your particular situation.
Essentially, that is what the SEC has done in responding to questions about implementing 
SAB No. 101. In question 4 of the FAQs on SAB No. 101, the staff of the SEC stated that it 
will not object to a method of accounting for multiple-element arrangements that includes the 
following conditions:
• To be considered a separate element, the product or service in question represents a separate 
earnings process. The best indicator that a separate element exists is that a vendor sells or 
could readily sell that element unaccompanied by other elements.
• Revenue is allocated among the elements based on the fair value of the elements. The fair 
values used for the allocations should be reliable, verifiable, and objectively determinable. 
The allocation of revenue among the elements based solely on cost plus a profit margin that is 
not specific to the particular product or service is not acceptable.3
If sufficient evidence of the fair values of the individual elements does not exist, revenue 
would not be allocated among them until that evidence exists. Instead, the revenue would be 
recognized as earned using revenue recognition principles applicable to the entire arrangement 
as if it were a single-element arrangement.
3
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff makes reference to Statement of Position (SOP) 81-1, Accounting for 
Performance o f Construction-Type and Certain Production-Type Contracts, paragraphs 35 through 42, and SOP 97-2, 
Software Revenue Recognition (as modified by SOP 98-9, Modification o f SOP 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition, With 
Respect to Certain Transactions), paragraphs 9 through 14, for guidance on allocating among elements.
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• If an undelivered element is essential to the functionality of a delivered element, no revenue 
allocated to the delivered element is recognized until that undelivered element is delivered.
Revenue Recognition Criteria— Delivery
To recognize revenue, the product or service sold must be delivered. The general revenue 
recognition criterion states that revenue typically is recognized upon delivery, but the term 
delivery encompasses more than the physical shipment of the product. For a product to be 
considered delivered, the seller should substantially complete or fulfill the terms specified in the 
arrangement. When a partial shipment is made in which the portion not shipped is a critical 
component of the product, revenue should be deferred.
Other circumstances in which revenue should be deferred due to lack of delivery include the 
following.
• Sales are billed to customers before the delivery of goods and held by the seller (known as 
“bill and hold” or “ship in place” sales). However, as discussed in the following section, 
revenue from some bill-and-hold sales may be recognized if certain conditions are met.
• Shipments are made after the end of the period. Books that are kept open to record revenue for 
products shipped after the end of the period do not satisfy the delivery criterion for the current 
period.
• Shipments are made to a warehouse or other intermediary location without the instruction of 
the customer.
• Goods are preinvoiced before or in the absence of actual shipment.
• Purchase orders are recorded as completed sales.
For companies that provide services rather than products, revenue generally is recognized as the 
service is provided.
Bill-and-Hold Sales
In a bill-and-hold transaction, a customer agrees to purchase the goods but the seller retains 
physical possession until the customer requests shipment to designated locations. Normally, such 
an arrangement does not qualify as a sale because delivery has not occurred. Under certain 
conditions, however, when a buyer has made an absolute purchase commitment and has assumed 
the risks and rewards of the purchased product but is unable to accept delivery because of a 
compelling business reason, bill-and-hold sales may qualify for revenue recognition.
The interpretative response to question 3 of SAB No. 101 specifies certain conditions or criteria 
that a bill-and-hold transaction of a public company should meet to qualify for revenue 
recognition. In addition, it specifies certain factors that should be considered in evaluating 
whether a bill-and-hold transaction meets the requirements for revenue recognition.
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Although accounting and auditing enforcement release (AAER) No. 108 is not binding on 
nonpublic companies, they may find it useful in analyzing bill-and-hold transactions.
The SEC
SAB No. 101 clarifies that delivery occurs when the customer:
• Takes title to the product
• Assumes the risks and rewards of ownership
The SAB also states that a seller should substantially complete or fulfill the terms specified in the 
arrangement for delivery or performance to have occurred.4 If revenue is recognized upon 
substantial completion of the arrangement, all remaining costs of performance or delivery should 
be accrued.
Customer Acceptance Provisions
Customer acceptance provisions may be included in a contract for a variety of reasons, including:
• To allow the customer to test the product
• To require the seller to perform additional services
• To identify other work necessary to be done before accepting the product
After delivery of a product or performance of a service, if uncertainty exists about customer 
acceptance, revenue should not be recognized until acceptance occurs.
Other Guidance
SAB No. 101 provides additional guidance on when delivery of a product or performance of a 
service has been performed for the following revenue transactions:
• Delivery or performance of multiple deliverables (see interpretative response to questions 3 
and 6 of SAB No. 101)
• Licensing arrangements (see interpretative response to question 3 of SAB No. 101)
• Layaway sales (see interpretative response to question 4 of SAB No. 101)
• Nonrefundable up-front fees (see interpretative response to question 5 of SAB No. 101)
4
According to the Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB), only inconsequential or perfunctory actions may remain incomplete such 
that the failure to complete the actions would not result in the customer receiving a refund or rejecting the delivered products 
or services performed to date. In addition, the seller should have a demonstrated history of completing the remaining tasks in a 
timely manner and reliably estimating the remaining costs.
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Revenue Recognition When Right of Return Exists
It is not unusual for companies to provide their customers with the right of return—in fact, some 
would argue that the rights of customers to return merchandise are a part of our shared cultural 
values. For sellers, the sale of products with the right of return poses an accounting issue, 
namely, should revenue be recognized, and if so, how the possible sales returns should be 
accounted for.
FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 48, Revenue Recognition When Right o f 
Return Exists, provides guidance for sales of a product when the buyer has the right to return it. 
Certain transactions and industries are excluded from the Statement.
According to FASB Statement No. 48, revenue from sales transactions that provide the customer with 
the right to return the product should be recognized at time of sale only if certain conditions are met. If 
revenue is recognized at time of sale, a liability for expected returns also should be recognized.
If the conditions for immediate revenue recognition are not met, sales recognition should be 
postponed until the right of return substantially expires or until such time that the conditions are met.
The key to applying FASB Statement No. 48 is in determining whether the conditions for 
immediate revenue recognition have been met. When a sales transaction includes a right of 
return, FASB Statement No. 48 lists six conditions, all of which must be met in order to 
recognize revenue at the time of sale.
The most subjective of these conditions is the requirement that the amount of future returns can 
be reasonably estimated. FASB Statement No. 48 provides specific guidance on a number of 
factors that may impair, but not necessarily preclude, the ability to make a reasonable estimate. 
These are:
• The susceptibility of the product to significant external factors, such as technological 
obsolescence or changes in demand.
• Relatively long periods in which a particular product may be returned.
• Absence of historical experience with similar types of sales of similar products, or inability to 
apply such experience because of changing circumstances, for example, changes in the selling 
enterprise’s marketing policies or relationships with its customers.
• Absence of a large volume of relatively homogeneous transactions.
The SEC
In the interpretative response to question 9 of SAB No. 101, the SEC provided a list of other 
factors that may preclude an entity from making a reasonable and reliable estimate of product 
returns. These factors are:
• Significant increases in or excess levels of inventory in a distribution channel (sometimes 
referred to as “channel stuffing”).
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• Lack of “visibility” into or the inability to determine or observe the levels of inventory in a 
distribution channel and the current level of sales to end users.
• Expected introductions of new products that may result in the technological obsolescence of 
and larger-than-expected returns of current products.
• The significance of a particular distributor to the entity’s business, sales, and marketing.
• The newness of a product.
• The introduction of competitors’ products with superior technology or greater expected market 
acceptance.
• Other factors that affect market demand and changing trends in that demand for the entity’s 
products.
Audit Issues in Revenue Recognition
Many audits take a “balance sheet” approach, tying down the numbers at the beginning and end 
of the reporting period. This approach is fine, but you cannot overlook revenue recognition 
issues. On a fundamental level, you have to understand the client’s earnings process. With that 
information, you can critically assess whether the client’s revenue recognition procedures are 
appropriate.
Audit Planning Considerations
In planning your audits, you should obtain a sufficient understanding of the client’s industry and 
business, its products, its marketing and sales policies and strategies, its internal control 
structure, and its accounting policies related to revenue recognition. During the planning phase of 
the audit, you should seek to identify conditions that increase the risk of misstatement. Those 
conditions may include:
• New product or service introductions or new sales arrangements
• Sales to distributors or resellers
• Substantial sales at the end of the accounting period
• Individually significant sales
• Unusual or complex revenue transactions
• Control environment considerations, such as:
— Aggressive accounting policies or practices
— Pressure from senior management to increase revenues and earnings 
— Lack of involvement by the accounting or finance department in sales transactions or in
the monitoring of arrangements with distributors
Because material misstatements due to fraudulent financial reporting often result from an 
overstatement or understatement of revenues, SAS No. 99 states that you should ordinarily 
presume that there is a risk of material misstatement due to fraud relating to revenue recognition.
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Brainstorming
As described in Chapter 2 of this Practice Aid, engagement teams are required to have a 
brainstorming session prior to or in conjunction with the information-gathering phase of the 
audit. One of the main objectives of that session is to sensitize engagement team members to the 
possibility that fraud may exist at the client and to help the team exchange ideas about how and 
where they believe the entity’s financial statements might be susceptible to material 
misstatements due to fraud.
Knowledge of common frauds related to improper revenue recognition can help engagement 
teams conduct more effective brainstorming sessions. Typical revenue recognition frauds include:
• Recording fictitious sales. This may be accomplished by recording sales to nonexistent 
customers, or recording phony sales to legitimate customers. The latter schemes include 
double billing, or billing for items not shipped or ordered. A variation on this theme is to ship 
the goods to a warehouse that is undisclosed to the auditors, which creates a legitimate 
shipping document the entity can use to mislead the auditor into thinking that the goods were 
actually shipped to a customer. Fictitious sales schemes usually occur near the end of an 
accounting period and are concealed by issuing credit memos or other credit adjustments to 
accounts receivable in the period immediately following the balance sheet date.
• Recognizing revenue on transactions that do not meet the revenue recognition criteria. These 
include improper revenue recognition when the right of return exists, “bill and hold” 
transactions, or other transactions for which the earnings process is not complete. Rights of 
return and other sales terms that would preclude revenue recognition often are concealed 
through the use of written side agreements or oral agreements not disclosed to the auditors.
• Sham transactions. These include, for example, selling assets at inflated prices to an outside 
entity, while simultaneously buying assets at inflated prices from that same entity. These types 
of transactions are particularly difficult to detect because they involve collusion with a 
coconspirator outside the entity.
• Recognizing revenue in the improper period. The most common of these types of frauds is to 
recognize revenue on future, anticipated sales. This may be accomplished by altering dates on 
shipping documents or holding the books open until after the shipment has occurred.
Many fraud schemes are designed to accelerate the recognition of revenue; however, you should 
be alert for conditions that may motivate management to delay revenue recognition. For 
example, when sales estimates for a subsequent year are soft and management has met their 
earnings target for the current year, they may be tempted to improperly delay revenues into the 
next year. Additionally, an owner of a privately held entity may be motivated to improperly 
delay revenue recognition as a means of minimizing taxable income.
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Nature of Business and Accounting for Revenue
In gaining an understanding of the nature of the entity’s business, you might consider questions 
that are relevant to the entity’s revenue recognition, such as the following.
• What products does the company sell? Do any characteristics of the product itself pose 
revenue recognition issues? Characteristics might include:
— The bundling of products with services may make it difficult to determine when the 
earnings process is substantially complete.
— New products are sold with concessions such as liberal cancellation provisions or free trials.
— Products are shipped in components.
— Products require substantial continuing seller involvement after delivery of merchandise.
• What are the company’s current marketing campaigns? Does the company provide sales 
incentives that raise revenue recognition, measurement, or presentation issues?
• What are the company’s policies and procedures relating to revenue transactions? Could these 
relate to:
— Receiving and accepting orders
— Extending credit
— Relieving inventory, billing, and recording sales transactions
— Receiving and recording sales returns
— Authorizing and issuing credit memos
— Determining proper cut-off of sales at the end of the accounting period
• What are the company’s standard shipping methods and terms? Examine:
— When does title to the goods pass to the buyer?
— Are shipments sent directly to customers or third-party warehouses?
— How are shipments of nonsale items (for example, products shipped for demonstration 
purposes) separated from sales?
— Have there been recent changes to the entity’s shipping policies?
• Does the company enter into transactions that require special audit consideration, including but 
not limited to:
— Barter transactions
— Transactions involving side agreements
• What are the company’s revenue recognition policies? Are they an appropriate application of 
accounting principles in the context of the industry in which it operates?
• Has there been a change in the company’s revenue recognition policy and, if so, why?
• What is the company’s practice with regard to sales and payment terms? Are there any 
deviations from industry norms or from the entity’s own practices? These include:
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— Sales terms that do not comply with the company’s normal policies
— The existence of longer-than-expected payment terms or installment receivables
— The use of nonstandard contracts or contract clauses with regard to sales
• Do the results of preliminary analytical procedures indicate anomalies that suggest revenue 
recognition issues? Examples of anomalies that may require follow-up include:
— Significant sales volume at or near the end of the reporting period
— Unusual volume of sales to distributors
Identifying Risks of Material Misstatement Due to Fraud
Be alert for the following, which may indicate incentives/pressures to fraudulently misstate 
revenues, opportunities to carry out the fraud, or attitudes/rationalizations to justify the fraud. 
The Appendix to SAS No. 99 provides examples of fraud risk factors relating to fraudulent 
financial reporting, almost all of which may be relevant to revenue recognition.
In addition to those items provided in SAS No. 99, you may also want to be alert for the 
following.
• Excessive credit memo and other credit adjustments to accounts receivable after the end of the 
accounting period.
• Customer complaints and discrepancies in accounts receivable confirmations, for example 
disputes over terms, prices, or amounts.
• Unusual entries to the accounts receivable subledger or sales journal.
• Missing or altered source documents (for example, invoices or shipping documents) or the 
inability of the client to produce original documents in a reasonable period of time.
• Unusual reconciling of differences between the sales journal and the general ledger.
• Sales to customers in the last month before the end of the accounting period at terms more 
favorable than previous months.
• Sales with affiliates and related parties.
• Predated or postdated transactions.
• Journal entries made to the sales or revenue account directly, that is, not posted from the 
accounts receivable subledger or sales journal.
• Large or unusual adjustments to sales accounts made just before or just after the end of the 
period.
Other Issues to Consider
Side agreements. Side agreements are used to alter the terms and conditions of sales as a way 
to entice customers to accept the delivery of the goods or services. These agreements may 
include terms (such as relieving the customer of some of the risks and rewards of ownership,
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or creating post-sale obligations) that preclude revenue recognition. Frequently, side 
agreements are hidden from the entity’s board of directors and independent auditors, and only 
a very few individuals within the entity are aware of their existence.
• Channel stuffing. Channel stuffing (also known as trade loading) is a marketing practice that 
suppliers sometimes use to boost sales by inducing distributors to buy substantially more 
inventory than they can resell promptly. Inducements to overbuy may range from deep 
discounts on the inventory to threats of losing the distributorship if the inventory is not 
purchased. Channel stuffing without appropriate provision for sales returns is an example of 
booking tomorrow’s revenue today in order to window-dress financial statements. Channel 
stuffing also may be accompanied by side agreements that provide for the return of unsold 
merchandise beyond the normal sales return privileges. Even when there is no evidence of 
side agreements, channel stuffing may indicate the need to increase the level of anticipated 
sales returns above historical experience.
• Related-party transactions and significant unusual transactions. Related-party transactions 
require special consideration because related parties may be difficult to identify, and related- 
party transactions may pose significant “substance over form” issues. Undisclosed related- 
party transactions may be used to fraudulently inflate earnings. Examples include the 
recording of sales of the same inventory back and forth among affiliated entities that exchange 
checks periodically to “freshen” the receivables, and sales with commitments to repurchase 
that, if known, would preclude recognition of revenue.
Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions resulting in revenue recognition that are 
executed with customers who are not related parties similarly require special consideration 
because they also may pose “substance over form” questions and may involve the collusion of 
the entity and the customer in a fraudulent revenue recognition scheme.
Audit Response
SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.54) provides examples of responses to identified risks of material 
misstatements relating to fraudulent financial reporting. In addition to the procedures described 
in the standard, you also might consider the following.
• Examine inventory reports or other correspondence from distributors and reconcile this 
information with the company’s records.
• Vouch all large or unusual sales made at quarter end and year end to original source 
documents.
• Perform a detailed review of the entity’s quarter-end and year-end adjusting entries and 
investigate any that appear unusual as to nature or amount.
• Scan the general ledger, accounts receivable subledger, and sales journal for unusual activity.
• Check the clerical accuracy of the revenue journal or similar record and trace the postings of 
the totals to the appropriate account in the general ledger.
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• Check the reconciliation of revenue journals during the audit period to the general ledger 
control account, or check the postings to the general ledger control account from sources other 
than the revenue journal for unusual or unexpected activity.
• Analyze and review deferred revenue accounts at end of the period for propriety of deferral.
• Analyze and review credit memos and other accounts receivable adjustments for the period 
subsequent to the balance sheet date.
• Scan the general ledger or subsidiary ledgers, as appropriate, for a period subsequent to year 
end for reversals of sales or large sales returns.
• Review significant year-end contracts for unusual pricing, billing, delivery, return, exchange, 
or acceptance clauses. Perform post-year-end specific review for contract revisions or 
cancellations and for refunds or credits issued.
• As part of the accounts receivable confirmation effort, confirm with customers the terms of 
sales agreements, including the absence of right of return and terms that might preclude 
immediate revenue recognition.
• Compare operating cash flow to sales; analyze by salesperson, location, or product.
Confirmations and Management’s Representations
Standard confirmation requests, which typically confirm only the outstanding balance, may not 
always provide sufficient audit evidence to determine whether revenue transactions have been 
recorded. You should consider designing your confirmations to obtain information from customers 
about payment terms, right-of-retum privileges, continuing obligations on the part of the seller, and 
other significant risks retained by the audit client. You also may wish to confirm the terms of 
individually significant sales and the absence of any side agreements. Because of concerns about 
fictitious sales, contract terms, and undisclosed side agreements, you should consider addressing the 
confirmation to a specific individual and obtaining additional oral confirmation from that individual.
Additionally, when performing alternative procedures for nonresponding confirmation requests, 
you should consider whether the evidence obtained from these procedures is as reliable as the 
evidence gained from direct confirmation from third parties.
Representations from management are not a substitute for the application of audit procedures. A 
management representation letter merely confirms in writing representations that management 
made to you during the course of the engagement. Examples of representations you may wish to 
obtain from management relating to revenue recognition include:
• The absence of any contingencies that affect the obligation of customers to pay for 
merchandise purchased.
• The disclosure of all side agreements with customers
In addition to obtaining representations from management, you also should consider making 
inquiries of others familiar with the transaction, for example, sales personnel.
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Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), recognizes that, because 
of their highly subjective nature, accounting estimates are susceptible to abuse and can be used to 
facilitate fraudulent financial reporting or possibly cover up a defalcation. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 
316.54) provides some guidance on auditing estimates (with a reference to the guidance 
contained in SAS No. 57, Auditing Accounting Estimates [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 
1, AU sec. 342]). The purpose of this chapter is to offer suggestions on auditing estimates that 
are in addition to those currently contained in the auditing literature.2
The Auditor’s Responsibilities
It is the auditor’s responsibility to assess the evidence supporting management’s estimate and to 
draw a conclusion about whether management’s estimate and related assumptions are reasonably 
supported. As an auditor you are not trying to conclude that any given outcome is expected. 
What you are trying to do is determine whether certain assumptions are supportable and in turn 
provide a reasonable basis for the development of the estimate. This will allow you to form a 
conclusion about the reasonableness of the resulting estimate in the context of the financial 
statements takes as a whole.
Characteristics of Accounting Estimates
The characteristics of accounting estimates are fundamentally different from more objective 
information. It’s important for you to understand these differences because the underlying 
characteristics of an accounting estimate dictate your auditing procedures. These procedures will 
be much different from the ones you use to audit more objective information.
Table 7-1 highlights some of the differences between an accounting estimate and a more 
objectively determined, “hard” amount.
1 This chapter was adapted from Auditing Estimates and Other Soft Accounting Information, by Michael Ramos (New York: 
AICPA, 1998).
2
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), refers to accounting estimates in two different contexts. The first focuses on 
examples of auditor responses to identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud. This chapter provides suggestions on 
additional audit responses related to accounting estimates that go beyond the guidance contained in SAS No. 99. The standard 
also requires you to perform a retrospective review of significant accounting estimates to look for a possible bias on the part of 
management and their override of internal control. Chapter 2 of this Practice Aid describes this procedure—required on every 
engagement—in greater detail.
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Table 7-1 Characteristics of Hard Information and Accounting Estimates
Hard Estimates
Past or future? Based on past transactions Based on future events
Actions or intentions? Based on management’s 
previous actions
Based on management’s 
intentions about future actions
Available audit
evidence?
Can confirm or observe Difficult to confirm or observe
Precision of measure? Measurements are more precise. Measurements are less precise.
By W ay of Analogy...
When we audit a “ hard” number, it is like we are affirming the winner after the race has already 
been run. We can see the results of the race, perform our tests, and declare who “appears to have 
won” and by how much.
Auditing an estimate is more like calling the winner of a race while it is still being run. We do not 
know who will win the race but must look at the facts that exist during the performance to come 
to a conclusion about the winner. Experts at racing have certain benchmarks to gauge the 
performance of the runners and how the race is progressing. For example, an experienced analyst 
may tell us that if Jones gets off to a fast start, she almost certainly will win. Jones’s start then 
serves as a benchmark for developing a conclusion about the outcome.
Similarly, the audit of an accounting estimate forces us to come to a conclusion about the 
reasonableness of an amount before the transaction has been completed. For example, we must 
assess the reasonableness of an estimated return allowance before all the items have been 
returned. Our task in this chapter is to help you develop the expertise you need to be able to 
establish touchstones for “calling the race” while it is still in progress.
Audit Approach for Accounting Estimates
During the planning phase of the audit, you will identify significant accounting estimates and 
focus your attention on those that have the highest risk for potential misstatement. Once you’ve 
accomplished that, you will need to gather and assess the audit evidence supporting the estimate.
When auditing an accounting estimate, you will focus on assessing the quality of the process and 
the reasonableness of the inputs to that process.
By Way of Analogy...
If you take a golf lesson, your instructor will dissect your swing. He or she probably won’t even 
need to watch the flight of the ball. Instead, the instructor will observe how you set up— your grip, 
the position of your body, your posture. Next, he or she will focus on the swing, how you take the
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club away from the ball, enter into a back swing, then transition forward, striking the ball and 
following through.
Most instructors don’t even have to watch the ball to tell you where it went. Based solely on what 
they observe about your set up and swing, they can tell you with reasonable accuracy how well 
you struck the ball and how it flew.
When we audit an objectively determined amount, it is like we tracked the flight of a golf shot, 
went out to the fairway (or into the woods, as the case may be), saw where the ball landed, and 
reported the position back to the golfer. When we audit an estimate, we are acting like a golf 
instructor, carefully observing the quality of the inputs (set-up) and the integrity of the process 
(the swing) to make an educated guess as to where the ball most likely landed.
Characteristics of a Quality Process
A high-quality estimation process is characterized by two important features:
• Good faith effort. A client makes a good faith effort to develop an estimate when they:
— Make a diligent effort to develop appropriate assumptions
— Exercise care not to mislead the financial statement users 
— Develop information that is consistent with their plans
• An appropriate model. A model is simply a representation of the situation to be analyzed, for 
example the number of customers that will return a given product. To be appropriate, a model 
must accurately represent the situation to be analyzed.
Quality Inputs and Significant Assumptions
Remember the old saying, “garbage in, garbage out.” The quality of your client’s accounting 
estimate is only as good as the quality of the underlying assumptions used to make the estimate. 
When auditing an estimate, you therefore need to assess the quality of the entity’s assumptions.
Your first step should be to identify the assumptions that are most significant to the estimate. Pay 
particular attention to those assumptions that are:
• Sensitive to variation
• Inconsistent with historical patterns
• Subjective and susceptible to misstatement and bias
Beware of Hidden Assumptions
Be on the lookout for assumptions that are built into the client’s estimation process. For example, 
suppose an estimate of the allowance for doubtful accounts is based on individual allowances for 
the various categories of aged receivables: 1 percent for current receivables, 5 percent for
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receivables over 30 days, and 25 percent for receivables over 60 days. These percentages are 
based on the company’s past experience. The following are two frequent situations that create 
built-in assumptions:
• Same as last year. Circumstances change, and the assumptions used previously may ho longer 
be appropriate.
• Global assumptions fo r  nonhomogeneous populations. The example in the preceding 
paragraph used fixed percentages for certain categories of receivables. The underlying 
assumption is that all items in the category are similar. If the population is not constructed 
carefully, that assumption might not be valid.
Characteristics of Quality Assumptions
Garbage in, garbage out—not all assumptions are created equal. How can you tell a high-quality 
assumption from a wild guess? Consider the following.
• Consistency. The assumptions need to be consistent with each other, the historical data, and 
any other relevant information, such as industry data.
• Known changes or trends. The assumptions should consider planned changes or trends in the 
business or industry. For example, deteriorating economic conditions should be considered 
when assessing assumptions relating to the allowance for doubtful accounts.
• Management’s plans. The assumptions must reflect management’s plans for the future. A plan 
is something management intends to do, not merely an option of something they could do.
Two Techniques for Gathering Audit Evidence
Up to this point, we’ve stressed the need for you to focus on the client’s estimation process and 
underlying assumptions as a way for you to get “comfortable” with the client’s accounting 
estimate. This approach assumes that if you have high-quality input and a good process, the 
output (the estimated amount) will be reliable.
You cannot ignore completely the final estimated amount, however. You should perform some 
substantive procedures directed at the amount itself to make sure it seems reasonable. Techniques 
that can help you make this determination include:
• Hindsight. Use post-balance sheet information to refine estimates and corroborate 
reasonableness of assumptions and estimates.
• Ranges. Develop a range of what you consider to be a reasonable amount and determine 
whether the client’s estimate falls within that range.
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Management’s Ability and Intent
Management’s future plans and their positive intent and ability to carry out those plans are key 
assumptions underlying the development of almost all accounting estimates.
In assessing management’s ability and intent keep in mind that management’s plans are different 
from management’s options. When assessing ability and intent, be sure that the client’s future 
plans are based on management’s positive intent to take action.
The positive intent to take action is not the same as the lack of intention to take a contrary action. 
For example, the mere absence of management’s intent to sell a debt security is not the same 
thing as management’s positive intent to hold that security to maturity.
Suggestions for assessing management’s ability and intent include the following.
Inquiry. Make inquiries of the client regarding the specific details of their plan. Table 7-2 
provides suggestions for making inquiries of the client regarding their intended future plans.
Table 7-2 Making Inquiries of the Client
Suggestion Description
Corroborate management’s • Extend inquiries to people outside of management and
answer with other inquiries. outside of the accounting department.
• Try to corroborate management’s statements about the 
existence of a plan.
• Assess whether field personnel believe the plan is 
achievable.
Be skeptical and disciplined. • Look for inconsistencies between what management say and 
what they do.
• Understand the who, what, when, where, why, and how of 
the plan.
• Lack of details may indicate the “plan” is merely an option 
of what might be done.
History. Management’s past history and behavior in similar situations can provide you with 
strong evidence about their intended future actions. Here are some questions you should consider 
when analyzing management’s past behavior:
• What actions has management taken in the past under similar situations? Are those actions 
consistent or inconsistent with management’s stated future plans?
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• If previous actions are consistent with future plans, are the internal and external conditions in 
the future expected to be similar to the conditions in the past? For example, if your client was 
able to successfully restructure a debt obligation in the past, will it be able to do so in the 
future, given the existing capital market and other economic conditions?
• Does the company have a history of successfully implementing previous plans? Or do stated 
plans rarely materialize?
Written plans. Management may be able to provide you with written plans and other 
documentation to support their assumptions about future actions. Table 7-3 provides suggestions 
for obtaining and analyzing these documents.
Table 7-3 Obtaining and Analyzing Documentation
Suggestion ________________________ Description________________________
Sources of information Documentation about future plans may include:
• Budgets
• Marketing plans or surveys
• Sales backlog orders
• Minutes of the board
• Engineering studies
What to look for The mere existence of written documentation is not sufficient for
you to reach a conclusion about the reasonableness of 
management’s plans. You still should consider:
• Is the documentation relevant?
• What other information is available to corroborate the 
conclusions in the documentation?
Business reason. As an auditor with an appropriate level of professional skepticism, you should 
ask yourself why management is undertaking the plan they have presented to you. Are they 
presenting this plan as a way, however well-intentioned, of resolving an existing audit issue? Or 
does the plan have a real business purpose? What economic benefits will accrue to the company 
if it follows this plan?
You should take some “comfort” in management’s plans and intentions when they coincide with 
the company’s business strategy. Be skeptical of plans that seem to lack a clear business purpose.
Ability. It’s not enough for management to have a plan of what they intend to do. As an auditor, 
you also should assess management’s ability to carry out their plan. In assessing management’s
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ability to carry out their plan, it helps to separate the risk factors into those internal to the 
company that management can exercise some control over, and those factors external to the 
company over which management has no such control. In general, plans that rely significantly on 
external factors and the actions of others are riskier than plans that can be controlled mostly by 
management. Here are some suggestions for assessing internal factors.
• Consider length o f time. Projects that take an extended period of time may require significant 
financial and other resources. Does management have the resources to “stay the course” and 
stick with their plan?
• Assess the need and availability o f financing. When plans require significant amounts of 
financing, you should consider the source, availability, and cost of that financing.
• Consider the need fo r  specialized knowledge. Some plans require specialized knowledge, such 
as engineering, sales and marketing, production, or labor. If this knowledge is not available 
currently, what plans have been made to acquire it?
Fraud Risk and Accounting Estimates
The vast majority of all financial statements include an accounting estimate of some sort. 
Auditors are accustomed to gathering and assessing evidence supporting these estimates. SAS 
No. 99 serves as a reminder that, because of their subjective nature, accounting estimates are 
vulnerable to manipulation and perpetration of fraudulent financial reporting. The standard draws 
your attention to several estimates that are particularly vulnerable to manipulation, including:
• Asset valuations (including asset impairment issues)
• Estimates related to specific transactions (for example, acquisitions, restructurings, or 
disposals of a segment of the business)
• Significant accrued liabilities
Chapter 2 of this Practice Aid describes the approach required by SAS No. 99 as an iterative 
process that involves several phases, including brainstorming, gathering information, identifying 
and assessing the risks of material misstatement due to fraud, and responding to identified risks. 
In planning your audit approach for accounting estimates, you should be sure that it is fully 
integrated into this process described by SAS No. 99. For example, you should consider adding a 
discussion of estimates to the brainstorming session.
Beware of Bias
This chapter focuses on assessing the integrity of the entity’s estimation process. However, 
because of the highly subjective nature of many of the assumptions underlying an estimate, a bias 
held by one making the assumptions can subvert even the best estimation process. Further, as 
described in Chapter 4, it is typical for us to be unaware of our biases, which means that auditors
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will have a difficult time approaching this issue “head on.” That is, asking entity personnel to 
describe their biases relating to an assumption will likely be met with a blank stare.
Chapter 4 also briefly describes the psychology of bias. Based on that description, here are some 
questions you might consider for detecting possible bias of entity personnel.
• What information does management tend to screen out? What events do they believe will not 
occur?
• What events have occurred recently that management interpreted in such a way that it seemed 
counterintuitive? (For example, the business failure of an important customer, typically a 
negative development, was interpreted as a positive opportunity for the company.)
• What is the history of the entity or its management (for example, never had a problem 
generating revenue, always able to find financing, and a surplus of demand for its product or 
services)? How might this past history create a bias?
• What biases are part of the culture of the organization or the personality of its members?
• What “shortcuts” does entity management take in processing information? What “categories” 
are implied by these shortcuts?
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The purpose of this chapter is to help you design extended audit procedures whenever you believe 
planned audit procedures are insufficient to respond to the assessed risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud. This chapter is organized according to audit area, and within each area you will find:
• A description of the typical fraud schemes you might discover in that area. As described in 
Chapter 4, it is relatively unusual for auditors to encounter a fraud and thus, they can become 
lulled into believing that the risks of material misstatement due to fraud may be negligible at 
their client. One of the keys for overcoming this assumption and developing a more skeptical 
attitude is for auditors to become familiar with the types of fraud that might occur. The 
descriptions included in this chapter are designed to do just that. You should consider 
discussing these common frauds as part of your brainstorming session.
• A listing of what you may discover during the information-gathering and risk assessment 
phase of the audit that may indicate the existence of the specified frauds.
• A description of audit procedures that may help you detect material misstatements resulting 
from those frauds. As indicated in Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, 
Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 
1, AU sec. 316), your response to address specifically identified risks of material misstatement 
due to fraud may include changing the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures. The 
example procedures in this chapter go beyond the example procedures included in SAS No. 99 
(AU sec. 316.53).
For fraud schemes relating to the misappropriation of assets, a listing of supplemental internal control 
questions helps you and your clients identify control deficiencies that leave them susceptible to fraud. 
(Note: Fraudulent financial reporting usually is perpetrated by management, who has the ability to 
override most internal controls. For this reason, the sections dealing with fraudulent financial reporting 
do not include a discussion of controls.)
This chapter, like the entire book, is written for auditors performing an audit in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). When you extend your audit procedures, you should 
continuously evaluate whether the procedures you perform are part of a GAAS audit or part of a fraud 
examination consulting engagement.
The material presented in this chapter consists of the author’s observations and recommendations. The 
example audit procedures are not required by SAS No. 99.
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Extended Audit Procedures 
Misappropriation of Assets 
Accounts Receivable
Typical Frauds
Most frauds relating to the misappropriation of collections on accounts receivable involve the 
diversion of payments received from customers. The scheme is fairly simple to perform, for 
example, an employee opens a bank account with a name similar to that of the company (Acme 
Inc. rather than Acme Company). Customer payments can then be taken by the employee and 
deposited into this bogus bank account.
What varies in accounts receivable frauds is how the frauds are concealed. Common techniques include 
the following:
• Lapping. The payment from customer A is diverted by the employee. To keep customer A 
from complaining, the payment from customer B is applied to customer A’s account. 
Customer C’s payment is applied to customer B ’s account, and so on.
• Posting bogus credits to the account. To conceal the fraud, the employee posts credit memos 
or other noncash reductions (for example, representing a sales return or the write-off) to the 
customer account from whom the funds were diverted.
• Altering internal copies o f invoices. The company’s copy of the sales invoice is altered to 
report an amount lower than that actually billed to the customer. When payment is received, 
the “excess” amount is diverted by the employee.
Another accounts receivable fraud involves the diversion of payments from written-off accounts. Most 
companies do not monitor the activity on accounts that have been written off, which provides the 
employee with the opportunity to divert payments from these customers and not be detected. For 
example, an employee will work with a customer to collect an overdue receivable. As the customer is 
about to pay, the employee writes off the account, removing it from the books.
Finally, the author is aware of one fraud committed by an employee who made an arrangement with 
customers to “manage” their past-due accounts. The employee took steps to make sure these customers’ 
accounts were always shown as current in the company’s books and records. This effectively gave the 
customers an unlimited amount of time to pay their bills and avoid late fees and interest charges. In 
exchange for this service, the employee received a kickback from the customers.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described here are occurring or have 
occurred.
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• Unexplained differences noted by customers on their accounts receivable confirmations.
• Significant delays between the time when the customer states a payment was made and the 
payment was recorded as received by the company.
• A significant number of credit entries and other adjustments made to the accounts receivable 
records.
• Unexplained or inadequately explained differences between the accounts receivable subsidiary 
ledger and the general ledger.
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described above. Depending on your 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these procedures may be performed as part 
of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the 
scope of a GAAS audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider expanding then- 
extent, for example, by selecting more items.
• Confirm account activity (not just the balance) with the customers directly. Be sure to confirm 
credit memo and sales return activity, as well as the date payments on account were made.
• Perform analytical reviews of credit memo and write-off activity, for example, by comparing 
to prior periods. Look for unusual trends or patterns, such as large numbers of credit memos 
pertaining to one customer or sales person, or those processed shortly after the close of an 
accounting period.
• Vouch credit memos and other write-offs to receiving records for returned goods, 
correspondence with customers, and other documentation supporting the transaction.
• Investigate all differences between the payment date reported by the customer and the payment 
date recorded by the company. Do not rely on company-generated activity summaries— 
review both sides of the original checks or check copies.
• Analyze recoveries of written-off accounts.
• Obtain an understanding of how the accounts receivable aging is prepared and who has access 
to the data used to prepare the aging.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying the client’s vulnerability to 
the misappropriation of accounts receivable. Make sure the person completing the questionnaire 
understands the implication of these questions. “No” responses may not change your control risk 
assessment or your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. As a client service 
matter, however, you should consider discussing these items with your client and explaining how the 
lack of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.
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Internal Control Questions 
Related to Fraud
Accounts Receivable
1. Are different employees responsible for preparing invoices, receiving 
payment, and maintaining accounts receivable records?
2. Has the company limited the logical access to computerized accounts 
receivable records and processes?
3. Are employees with accounts receivable responsibilities required to take 
vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to perform those 
functions when an employee is absent?
4. Are credit memos approved and reviewed by management?
5. Does the entity have a method for tracking and monitoring customer 
complaints related to billing? Are these complaints periodically reviewed 
by management?
6. Is the accounts receivable subsidiary ledger reconciled to the general ledger 
account balance on a regular basis?
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Extended Audit Procedures 
Misappropriation of Assets 
Inventory
Typical Frauds
One of the more common inventory frauds is the theft of inventory for personal use. This is more likely 
to happen when inventory items are small and easy to steal, and the items have value to an employee as 
a consumer. For example, computer chips are small and easy to steal, but they have no value to the 
employee as a consumer. A laptop computer has the physical characteristics that make it susceptible to 
theft, plus the employee can use it immediately. The computer is more likely than the computer chip to 
be stolen for personal use.
A more lucrative inventory fraud is the theft of inventory for sale. For these frauds, it’s not necessary 
for the inventory to have value to the employee as a consumer, since the goods won’t be used for 
personal use. A common scheme is for the receiving personnel to steal the goods right from the 
receiving dock, before physical custody is established by the warehouse. For example, the employee 
signs a receiving report stating that 100 units were received, but only 90 are stocked in the warehouse 
and 10 are placed in the trunk of the employee’s car. The missing units will not be discovered until the 
year-end physical inventory count.
For larger inventory items that are more difficult to transport, the receiving personnel may collude with 
the vendor’s delivery personnel. The delivery personnel diverts 10 units of inventory to another location 
and delivers the remaining 90 units. The receiving personnel prepares a receiving report indicating that 
all 100 units were received. The stolen merchandise is then sold and the proceeds split between the two.
Theft of scrap is another common fraud. For example, a hospital employee was convicted of stealing 
used x-rays, then recovering and selling the silver. In most companies, inventory scrap is not recorded 
or well-controlled, which makes it easy to steal. These thefts can be significant, especially in situations 
where the embezzler has the ability to inappropriately designate good inventory as scrap.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described here are occurring or have 
occurred.
• Large differences between the physical inventory counts and perpetual inventory records.
• Unexpected or unexplained increases in inventory turnover accompanied by decreases in gross 
profit percentages.
• Unexplained entries in the perpetual inventory records.
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• Key inventory ratios (for example, shrinkage, turnover, or gross profit) that vary significantly 
from industry norms or between company locations or inventory types.
• Shipping documents (that is, showing goods were shipped from the company) without 
corresponding sales documentation.
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described here. Depending on your 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these procedures may be performed as part 
of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the 
scope of a GAAS audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider expanding their 
extent, for example, by selecting more items.
• Analyze inventory shortages by location or product type. Compare key inventory ratios to 
industry norms. Look for unusual concentrations, patterns, or trends as a way to direct further 
inquiries and investigations.
• Review receiving reports and look for indication of alternative shipping sites.
• Review supporting documentation for reductions to the perpetual inventory records.
• Compare shipping documents to corresponding documentation.
Because of the nature of inventory theft, it may be difficult to detect using traditional audit 
techniques. If your client has reason to believe inventory is being stolen, a fraud examination 
may be required. For example, a fraud examiner might perform surveillance of receiving 
personnel or make surprise counts of items received into inventory.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your client’s vulnerability 
to the misappropriation of inventory. Make sure that the person completing the questionnaire 
understands the implication of these questions. “No” responses may not change your control risk 
assessment or your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. As a client service 
matter, however, you should consider discussing these items with your client and explaining how the 
lack of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.
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Internal Control Questions 
Related to Fraud
Inventory
Yes
Does the client maintain adequate safeguard controls (for example, locked
warehouses) over inventory susceptible to misappropriation?
Is there proper segregation of duties between persons responsible for
inventory recordkeeping and those responsible for its physical custody?
Are employees with inventory, shipping, and receiving responsibilities
required to take vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to perform
those functions when an employee is absent? ____
Has the company limited the logical access to computerized inventory
records?
Are physical inventory counts performed regularly? Are the count procedures 
adequate to ensure an accurate count?
Is scrap inventoried and controlled?
Is there a proper segregation of duties between those with
the authority to sell scrap and those with the responsibility
for doing so? ____
No
113
Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit
Extended Audit Procedures 
Misappropriation of Assets 
Purchasing and Payroll
Typical Frauds
The purchasing function is particularly vulnerable to fraud. For many small businesses it 
represents the largest area of the risk of embezzlement.
The most common fraud scheme is the payment of invoices to a fictitious company. To 
perpetrate this scheme, the embezzler establishes a fake entity (often with a P.O. box for an 
address, and a name similar to that of a legitimate company) and gets the fake entered into 
company records as a legitimate vendor. The embezzler then produces invoices for the fake 
vendor, which get processed by the accounts payable system. Sometimes the embezzler is 
responsible for authorizing payment; other times not. The scheme may also require collusion 
between various people, such as receiving (doctoring a receiving report to indicate something 
was received) and accounts payable (approving the invoice for payment).
Another common fraud is a kickback paid by vendors to the company’s purchasing agent. In collusion 
with suppliers, a purchasing agent may get paid a kickback for any number of activities, including:
• Allowing the vendor to submit fraudulent billing and approving the payment. Examples of 
fraudulent billing practices include billing for goods or services never performed or received, 
billing more than once for the same item, substituting lower quality items than the ones billed, 
or overbilling for the items delivered.
• Excess purchasing of property or services.
• Bid-rigging.
Kickbacks are “off-the-book” frauds, that is, their concealment is not recorded on the books of the 
company. For that reason, it is often difficult for auditors to detect the presence of kickbacks.
The most common payroll fraud is the use of ghost employees, where the embezzler enters fictitious 
employees into the payroll system and receives the resulting payroll checks. A variation on this scheme 
is to keep terminated employees on the payroll several pay periods after they leave their job. The 
embezzler then receives the paycheck for the terminated employee.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described here are occurring or have 
occurred.
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• Fictitious vendors
— Photocopied invoices or invoices have obviously been tampered with (for example, 
sections have been “whited out” and typed over).
— Invoice numbers from the same vendor occur in an unbroken consecutive sequence.
— Invoices from companies have a P.O. box address or no phone number.
— Invoices from companies have the same address or phone number as an employee.
— The amount of each invoice from a particular vendor falls just below a threshold for review. 
— Multiple companies have the same address and phone number.
— Vendor names appear to be a “knock-off’ of well-established businesses.
• Kickbacks
— Purchasing agent handles all matters related to a vendor even though it might be outside or 
below his or her normal duties.
— Vendors who receive an inordinate amount of business from the company for no apparent 
business reason.
— Vendor salesmen make frequent, unexplained visits to purchasing personnel.
— Prices from a particular vendor are unreasonably high when compared to others.
— Quality of goods or services received is low.
— Tips or complaints are received from other employees or honest vendors.
— Key contracts are awarded with no formal bid process.
• Ghost employees
— Employees with duplicate addresses, checking accounts, or Social Security numbers.
— Employees with no withholding taxes, insurance, or other normal deductions.
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described in the previous list. 
Depending on your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these 
procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. 
Alternatively, they may be performed outside the scope of a GAAS audit. If these procedures are 
already being performed, consider expanding their extent, for example by selecting more items.
• Review selected invoices and look for evidence that the invoice has been doctored.
• Perform a computerized search of the vendor list and look for P.O. box addresses, duplicate 
addresses, and vendors with no phone number.
• Perform a computerized match of the vendor list with a list of employees and look for matches 
of addresses or phone numbers.
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• Perform a computerized sort of invoices by vendor and look for unusual sequencing or amount 
(indication of possible fictitious company). Look for unusual pricing and volume trends 
(indication of possible kickback).
• Review selected invoices and examine supporting documentation indicating goods or services 
were received.
• Perform a computerized search of payroll records to identify duplicate addresses, Social 
Security numbers, or bank accounts.
• Review personnel files and look for those that contain little or no evidence of activity, for 
example, a lack of performance evaluations, requests for changes to withholdings, or 
retirement plan options.
Because kickbacks are conducted off the books, they may be difficult to detect using traditional 
audit techniques. If your client has reason to believe a purchasing agent is accepting kickbacks, a 
fraud examination may be required.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your client’s 
vulnerability to the misappropriation of assets in the purchasing and payroll functions. Make sure 
that the person completing the questionnaire understands the implication of these questions. 
“No” responses may not change your control risk assessment or your assessment of the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud. As a client service matter, however, you should consider 
discussing these items with your client and explaining how the lack of certain controls leaves the 
company exposed to fraud.
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Internal Control Questions 
Related to Fraud
Purchasing and Payroll
Yes No
1. Is there adequate segregation of duties between purchasing, receiving, and 
the accounts payable function?
2. Are employees with purchasing and accounts payable responsibilities 
required to take vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to perform 
those functions when an employee is absent?
3. Has the company limited the logical access to computerized vendor, 
accounts payable, and payroll records?
4. If the company chooses suppliers based on competitive bids, are all bids 
date stamped when received, and opened at the same time under dual control?
5. Does the accounts payable system include controls to avoid duplicate 
payments?
6. Are new vendors reviewed by management before being added to the list of 
qualified vendors?
7. Does the company have a written policy on the amount and type of gifts an 
employee can accept from suppliers and customers? Is that policy 
communicated to employees, customers, and suppliers?
8. Does the company include a “right to audit” clause in its contracts with 
major suppliers?1
9. Are new employees approved by management before being added to the 
payroll records?
10. Are there controls in place to ensure that terminated employees are removed 
from payroll records in a timely fashion?
11. If the size of the entity permits it, does the owner-manager periodically 
review the payroll records to determine if every employee listed is personally
known to him or her? _____  ___
1 “Right to audit” clauses can be included in contracts or printed on the back of all purchase orders. Under a right-to-audit 
clause, the company reserves the right to audit the vendor’s books at any time. Vendors who know their records are subject to 
examination generally are reluctant to make bribery payments.
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Extended Audit Procedures 
Misappropriation of Assets
Cash
Typical Frauds
The most common way in which a company (particularly a small business) is defrauded of cash 
is through fraudulent disbursements. Under these schemes, the employee uses company checks to 
either (1) withdraw cash directly for their own benefit or (2) pay personal expenses. For example:
• An employee wrote checks payable to cash and posted the debit to various expense accounts. 
When the bank statement came back with the canceled checks, she simply discarded the ones 
she had cashed then proceeded to perform the bank reconciliation.
• An employee used company checks to pay personal credit card bills. Each month, he had a credit 
card bill approximately equal to the company’s required payroll tax withholding. Instead of 
making the payroll tax deposit, he wrote a check to the credit card company. He discarded these 
checks when they were returned with the bank statements. He also discarded the notices received 
from the IRS stating that the company’s payroll withholding deposits had not been made.
There are infinite variations on these types of frauds.
People who commit these kinds of frauds are faced with two tasks. First, they must post a debit 
somewhere in the general ledger to disguise the disbursement. The clever embezzler will post 
this debit to an expense account (which is closed out at the end of the year, thus eliminating the 
audit trail), or to inventory (where differences between the books and the physical count flow 
through cost of sales, thus eliminating the audit trail). Second, the embezzler must have a way for 
avoiding detection during the bank reconciliation process. In a small business, this usually is 
possible because of a lack of segregation of duties. It might also involve collusion.
Companies that handle large amounts of cash are also susceptible to theft of cash on hand. Industries 
such as retail sales or restaurants are particularly susceptible to these kinds of frauds. It would be rare 
that the theft of cash on hand would be material to an entity’s financial statements, but as a client 
service matter, you should be alert to the possibility. Common schemes include:
• Skimming. Cash is “skimmed” before it enters the accounting system. For example, the 
employee accepts cash but never prepares a receipt, or prepares a receipt for less than the 
amount taken.
• Substituting personal checks fo r  cash. The employee takes money from the cash register and 
substitutes a personal check. In that way, the cash drawer is always “in balance,” but the 
employee never submits the personal check for deposit to the company’s bank account. In that 
way, the employee receives free use of the cash.
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• Fictitious refunds and discount. The employee records a refund and removes cash as if a 
refund had occurred, but no merchandise was returned or discount given.
• Altered credit card receipts. This is a problem in the restaurant business where the waitperson 
will increase the tip on a credit card receipt.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described above are occurring or have 
occurred:
• Large, unexplained reconciling items in the bank reconciliations.
• Bank statements that do not include canceled checks.
• Some canceled checks are missing.
• Disbursements are unsupported by invoices or other documentation.
• Customer complaints.
• Altered or missing cash register tapes.
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described above. Depending on your 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these procedures may be performed as part 
of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the 
scope of a GAAS audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider expanding their 
extent, for example by selecting more items.
• Examination of bank reconciliations. A thorough review of bank reconciliations is one of the 
best ways to detect fraud relating to cash.
• Review bank statements and canceled checks. Look for checks made out to cash or to 
employees. Compare endorsement to payee. Make sure all canceled checks are accounted for.
• Obtain a bank cut-off statement. Cut-off statements are ordered from the bank and delivered 
directly to the auditor who reconciles them.
• Search for and examine unusual expense account activity close to the end of an accounting 
period. The theft of cash usually is concealed with a debit to an expense account because 
expenses are closed to retained earnings at the end of the accounting cycle. The clever 
embezzler will concentrate his or her theft at the end of the cycle to limit the amount of time 
the theft remains on the books.
• Surprise cash counts. These will sometimes turn up embezzlement of petty cash.
• Analyze sales discounts and returns. Compare current period to prior periods or breakdown 
activity by employee. Look for unusual patterns or trends.
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Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your client’s 
vulnerability to the misappropriation of cash. Make sure that the person completing the 
questionnaire understands the implication of these questions. “No” responses may not change 
your control risk assessment or your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. 
As a client service matter, however, you should consider discussing these items with your client 
and explaining how the lack of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.
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Internal Control Questions 
Related to Fraud
Cash
Yes No
Are all bank accounts reconciled on a timely basis? _____
Is the person who reconciles the bank accounts different from the person 
responsible for cash disbursements? _____
Does the company receive canceled checks along with its bank
statements? _____
Do the bank reconciliation procedures include accounting for all
canceled checks? _____
Are employees with cash disbursement and bank reconciliation duties
required to take vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to
perform those functions when an employee is absent? _____
Has the company limited the logical access to computerized cash
disbursement records? _____
Does the company limit the physical access to negotiable assets, such as
blank checks? _____
Does the owner review and sign all checks? If not, do disbursements over 
a certain dollar amount require dual signature or other control procedure? _____
If company employees process a significant amount of cash transactions,
does the company adequately control and monitor these transactions? _____
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Extended Audit Procedures 
Misappropriation of Assets
Computer Schemes
Typical Frauds
The most common types of computer schemes involve input tampering. This can be accomplished by 
altering, forging, or fabricating computer input documents. In an entity without adequate logical access 
control (which is not uncommon for small businesses), input tampering is quite easy to accomplish. 
The more common computer input schemes include:
• Entering false transactions. For example, entering invoices for fake vendors into the accounts 
payable system or recording false credit memos to accounts receivable.
• Entering bogus file  maintenance transactions. File maintenance activities include such 
transactions as changing a customer’s address or adding a new employee to the payroll. Bogus 
file maintenance transactions can lay the groundwork for any number of frauds, for example, 
the use of ghost employees to embezzle funds.
• Failure to enter legitimate transactions or file maintenance instructions. For example, when 
an employee is terminated, that information should be entered into the computer system to 
remove that employee from the payroll records. A failure to do this creates a ghost employee.
• Altering input data. For example, changing the amounts, dates, or other information contained 
on the input data.
Other computer frauds involve program modification schemes, sometimes referred to as “throughput 
frauds.” To accomplish these schemes requires an understanding of and the ability to modify computer 
application programs. Typical schemes include:
• Bogus instructions. A computer programmer may place bogus instructions into a computer 
program so the computer will perform unauthorized functions, for example, making payments 
to a vendor not listed on an approved list.
• Siphoning funds. Funds can be siphoned in small amounts from a large number of accounts, 
for example, pennies and portions of pennies (due to rounding) can be shaved from 
thousands of savings accounts. The money is then accumulated in a single account that is 
accessed by the embezzler.
• Direct manipulation o f accounts. Computer programs may be altered to obtain direct access to 
manipulate files without authorization. For example, file maintenance changes may be 
accomplished without the input of the normal documentation.
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What to Look For
Computers often are used to accomplish the frauds listed elsewhere in this section of the publication. 
Observing signs of other frauds may lead you to one of the computer fraud schemes listed here. In 
addition to the items listed elsewhere, be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds 
described here are occurring or have occurred.
• Inability to process computer applications in a timely manner.
• Unexplained differences in batch or hash totals, or other means to control computer input.
• Undocumented or unauthorized account postings, file changes, or modifications to application 
programs.
• Unexplained differences between the general ledger and computerized accounting records (for 
example, a computer spreadsheet) maintained on a separate computer.
Most small businesses use microcomputers, either to process accounting information or to prepare or 
summarize information for input (for example, through use of a spreadsheet). The use of 
microcomputers and a highly decentralized computer processing environment can leave a company 
vulnerable to various fraud schemes because of:
• A lack o f segregation o f duties. The same person can prepare a source document (for example, 
an invoice), process the information (prepare a spreadsheet summary for the day or month), 
and review the output (review the output and input the totals to the general ledger).
• Lack o f logical access. Many off-the-shelf computer programs contain logical access controls, 
such as password protection. Unfortunately, entities often fail to install these controls or do so 
ineffectively.
• Lack o f adequate computer processing controls. Most microcomputer accounting packages 
contain controls to ensure the accuracy of processing or to identify conditions that require user 
follow-up (for example, exception reports). Again, many entities fail to properly implement 
these controls.
When gaining an understanding of the entity’s internal controls, be alert for weaknesses relating 
to the entity’s use of microcomputers. An excellent source of additional information is Auditing 
in Common Computer Environments, an Auditing Procedures Study published by the AICPA.
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described above. Depending on your 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these procedures may be performed 
as part of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed 
outside the scope of a GAAS audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider 
expanding their extent, for example by selecting more items.
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• Review documentation supporting a selection of financial transactions or file maintenance 
procedures.
• Review error reports, batch processing totals, and other user controls over the input and 
processing of financial transactions or file maintenance procedures.
• Reconstruct accounts or files from original source documents.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your client’s 
vulnerability to computer fraud. Make sure that the person completing the questionnaire 
understands the implication of these questions. “No” responses may not change your control risk 
assessment or your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. As a client 
service matter, however, you should consider discussing these items with your client and 
explaining how the lack of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.
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Internal Control Questions 
Related to Fraud
Computer Schemes
Yes
Is there a proper segregation of duties between the authorization of input, the 
preparation of input, and the reconciliation of output?
Are employees with computer input duties required to take vacations, and
are other employees cross-trained to perform those functions when an
employee is absent? ____
Is there a proper segregation of duties between computer programmers and
computer operators?
Has the company implemented effective logical access controls, including
access to application programs, master files, and databases?
Does the company have adequate controls to ensure the adequacy and
legitimacy of input data?
Does the company have adequate controls to ensure that changes to computer 
applications are authorized and they function as planned?
Are exception reports, error listings, and other computer-generated items that 
require user follow-up investigated and resolved in a timely manner?
Are spreadsheets and other microcomputer applications used to process
significant accounting information checked for accuracy by someone other
than the person who prepared it? ____
No
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EXTENDED AUDIT PROCEDURES 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
Inventory
Typical Frauds
Inventory frauds are perpetrated to manipulate earnings—inflated ending inventory balances 
reduce the amount of reported cost of goods sold, which results in improper increases to gross 
profit and net income. The usual method for inflating ending inventory is to report fictitious 
inventory amounts. This can be done in numerous ways, including:
• Altering quantities reported on inventory count tags that were not checked by the auditors.
• Entering inventory count tags for nonexistent inventory.
• Shifting the same inventory between several different locations.
• Altering or disguising the physical characteristics of inventory items to make it appear as if 
larger quantities are on hand. For example, hollow stacks of inventory that are made to appear 
solid, or inventory boxes filled with weights.
In other instances, management may be predisposed to understate beginning inventory balances, 
which has the same desired effect of increasing current period earnings. For example, this 
scheme may be perpetrated when there has been a change in management, and current 
management wishes to report improved profitability. The most common method for understating 
beginning inventory is to overstate the allowance for inventory obsolescence.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described above are occurring or have 
occurred.
• Inability to produce all inventory count tags.
• Lack of control over the population of used count tags.
• Slow inventory turnover; increases in certain types of inventory or in branches or other 
locations not examined by auditors.
• Inability to produce vendor invoices supporting purchases (for example, invoices unavailable 
while performing price test work).
• Significant changes in gross profit percentages.
• Large unexplained reconciling differences between the inventory amounts recorded on the 
books and the physical inventory count.
• Large increases in inventory balances without corresponding increases in purchases.
• Journal entries made directly to the inventory account and not through the purchases journal.
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Example Audit Procedures
Your primary audit procedure relating to the existence of inventory is the physical inventory count. The 
following audit procedures, performed during the physical inventory count, will help detect the frauds 
described here. Depending on your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these 
procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, 
they may be performed outside the scope of a GAAS audit.
• Account for all inventory tags used during the physical count.
• Expand the number of test counts.
• Rigorously examine all items counted, for example by opening sealed boxes to observe the 
contents.
• Perform physical inventory counts at all locations simultaneously.
• Use the work of a specialist to help determine the quality (for example, the purity, grade, or 
concentration) of the inventory items.
• Perform analytical review procedures of gross profit; analyze according to location or 
inventory type.
• Perform analytical review procedures of inventory balances and purchases; analyze according 
to location or inventory type.
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EXTENDED AUDIT PROCEDURES 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
Overvalued Assets
Typical Frauds
Overvaluing assets is a relatively simple way to directly manipulate reported earnings because 
overstated assets usually result in understated expenses. Common schemes for reporting overvalued 
assets include:
• Improper capitalization of costs that should have been expensed.
• Failure to recognize impairment losses on long-lived assets.
• Recognition of fictitious assets, for example, through the use of related-party transactions, the 
manipulation of intercompany accounts, or the failure to write off expired assets.
• Recognition of assets that the company does not have title to.
• Unreasonable or unsupportable asset valuation allowances.
• Unreasonable or unsupportable estimates of fair value, for assets required to be reported at fair value.
• Improper classification of marketable securities such as trading, available-for-sale, or held- 
to-maturity.
• Manipulation of depreciation expense, for example through unreasonable assumptions about 
the useful lives of assets or their residual values.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described above are occurring 
or have occurred.
• Unusually high fixed-asset balances, when compared to total assets or to comparable entities.
• Unrealistically large changes in asset balances.
• Unusual or unexplained relationship between depreciation expense and fixed asset balances.
• Events or changes in circumstances that indicate assets may have been impaired.
• Missing documents related to asset transactions.
• Journal entries affecting the reported amount of assets, particularly entries made near the end 
of the reporting period or those that are unsupported or unauthorized.
• Unusual discrepancies between the entity’s asset-related records and the general ledger.
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Example Audit Procedures
Auditors have an advantage when auditing for overvalued assets because they direct their audit 
procedures toward an amount the entity has already recorded. This is much easier than trying to detect 
transactions or amounts that the entity has not recorded, such as unrecorded liabilities. In addition to 
your normal procedures to address the assertions related to assets, you also might consider performing 
the following:
• Extending the scope of detailed audit procedures related to the acquisition of fixed assets, such 
as the examination of supporting documents.
• Physical observation of fixed assets.
• Confirm the terms of significant fixed asset additions with the counterparty to the transaction.
• Confirm that the entity has title to reported assets through a review of relevant legal documents 
or public records.
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EXTENDED AUDIT PROCEDURES 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
Underreported Liabilities
Typical Frauds
The fraudulent underreporting liabilities can have a direct positive effect on an entity’s financial 
position and its reported earnings. Common schemes to underreport liabilities include the following:
• Understating accounts payable, for example, by recording purchases in subsequent accounting 
periods, overstating purchase returns, or falsifying documents that make it appear liabilities 
have been paid off.
• Recognizing unearned revenue as earned revenue.
• Failure to record all debt or other liabilities.
• Failure to recognize contingent liabilities.
• Underreporting future obligations, such as warranty costs.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may indicate that one of the frauds mentioned above is occurring or 
has occurred.
• Unusual or unexplained trends in accounts payable balances or differences between the 
entity’s payables balances and those of comparable entities.
• Evidence of contingent liabilities in attorney’s letter responses, correspondence from 
regulatory agencies or others, or other information gathered during the engagement.
• Significant purchases of assets with no recorded debt.
• Unusual or unexplained relationships between interest expense and recorded liabilities.
• Unexplained significant decreases in liabilities.
• Unusual relationship between the trend in the accrual for estimated warranty expense and 
sales.
• Receiving reports received near the end of the reporting period without a corresponding 
invoice.
• Amounts listed on vendor’s statements that were not reported as purchases.
• Discrepancies in debt confirmations.
• Obligations reported as being discussed by management in the entity’s minutes, but not 
reported in the accounting records.
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Example Audit Procedures
In addition to the audit procedures typically performed related to liabilities, you might also consider the 
following:
• Perform lien searches on entity properties to search for unrecorded debt.
• Confirm the existence and terms of liabilities, including payables, with third parties.
• Read internal correspondence and correspondence between the entity and third parties to 
identify the existence or possible underreporting of liabilities.
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For many years, fraud experts have recognized that computer assisted audit techniques (CAATs) 
can be a powerful tool to help detect indicators of fraud. CAATs provide you with the ability to 
apply audit techniques that would be either impossible to perform manually or very inefficient or 
ineffective if applied manually. The purpose of using CAATs, as with performing manual 
procedures, is the identification of the signs of possible material misstatements due to fraud. 
CAATs are a perfect opportunity to use computerized procedures to make the audit more 
effective and efficient. In general, CAATs allow you to:
• Identify patterns in the data that may indicate fraud
• Quickly examine large volumes of information
For the purposes of helping you identify or respond to the risks of material misstatement due to 
fraud, the most popular CAATs involve the use of data extraction software.
Data Extraction Software
Data extraction software is used to read, analyze, and manipulate client data that is stored 
electronically. After telling the software how the client’s data is organized (the file record 
layout), you can manipulate that data in a variety of ways, including:
• Sort data into different categories, including numeric, date (for example, aging analysis), or 
other nonfinancial criteria (for example, sales by region, product, or salesperson)
• Join and match files, for example, matching the vendors paid per the accounts payable master 
file against the approved vendor file as a way to determine if any payments were made to 
unapproved vendors.
• Select individual items that meet specified criteria for additional test work. Criteria may be 
financial (all invoices over a certain dollar amount) or nonfinancial (all payments made to a 
certain vendor).
• Perform analytical procedures.
Sample Uses of CAATs to Identify Material Misstatements Caused by Fraud
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), and this Practice Aid describe numerous 
example procedures that will help you identify or respond to the risks of material misstatement 
due to fraud. In this section, we summarize those tests that may be performed using CAATs.
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Fraudulent Financial Reporting
General Ledger Analysis
• Identify journal entries that meet certain criteria and require additional test work, for example:
— Nonstandard entries.
— Journal entries that exceed a specified dollar amount or occurred during a particular time.
— Entries made by individuals who typically do not make journal entries.
— Journal entries with no explanation, description, or account numbers.
Revenue Recognition
• Match recorded sales to customer database. Identify sales to customers not listed in the 
database, which may indicate sales made to nonexistent customers.
• Match recorded sales to electronic shipping records and/or customer purchase orders. 
Unmatched sales may indicate sales that were recorded before shipment or without being 
ordered.
• Search sales records for duplicate invoices, which may indicate duplicate billing as a way to 
increase reported sales.
• Search recorded sales for sales to related parties.
• Search sales records for entries made directly via journal entries or other unusual sources.
• Search sales and shipping records and identify sales that meet certain criteria (for example, 
over a certain dollar amount or those made to a certain customer or shipped after a certain 
date) for additional test work.
• Analyze revenue using disaggregated data. For example, compare revenue reported by month 
and by product line or business segment during the current reporting period with comparable 
prior periods or budgeted amounts.
Inventory
• Search inventory records for entries made directly via journal entries or other unusual sources.
• Analyze increases in inventory or inventory turnover at locations not visited by auditors.
• Analyze gross profit using disaggregated data, such as individual products or location.
• Compare inventory quantities for the current period with prior period or perpetual records. Use 
disaggregated data, such as category of inventory, location, or other criteria.
• Search inventory records for unusual entries or adjustments, such as negative entries for 
inventory received.
• Sort physical inventory records by:
— Tag number, to test tag control, or
— Item serial number to test the possibility of item omission or duplication.
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Misappropriation of Assets
Cash
• Analyze expense account activity at a disaggregated level. Compare current-year activity to 
prior-year activity. Look for patterns that may indicate someone is debiting expense accounts 
as a way to conceal a defalcation.
• Analyze sales returns by employee or compare current period to prior period.
• Sort disbursements by check number and look for missing or duplicate check numbers.
Accounts Receivable
• Search accounts receivable records and identify credit entries and other adjustments or credit 
balances.
• Match accounts receivable aging to invoice and shipping files. Look for mismatched dates that 
may indicate incorrect aging.
• Analyze credit memos at a disaggregated level, for example, by customer, sales person, or 
product. Look for unusual patterns or trends, such as a large number of credits issued for the 
customers of a particular salesperson.
Accounts Payable and Payroll
• Search accounts payable and vendor files for indications of fictitious vendors, including:
— Vendor invoices from the same vendor that occur in an unbroken consecutive sequence.
— Vendors with only a P.O. box address and/or no phone number.
— Different vendors that have the same address and phone numbers.
— Vendor names that are very similar to the names of approved vendors, for example, ABC 
Enterprises instead of The ABC Company.
• Match accounts payable and vendor file with employee data. Look for vendors with the same 
address or phone number as an employee, as this could indicate a fictitious vendor.
• Analyze payment details and look for prices from a particular vendor that are unreasonably 
high when compared to the prices for the same or a similar product from a different vendor. 
This unusual relationship may indicate a kickback scheme.
• Sort payments by amount and identify transactions that fall just under control limits 
established by the entity.
• Search payroll records for indications of a “ghost employee,” for example:
— Employees with duplicate addresses, checking accounts, or Social Security numbers.
— Employees with no withholding taxes, insurance, or other normal deductions.
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Benford’s Law
Benford’s law was developed by Frank Benford, a research engineer for GE during the first 
half of the 20th century. Benford’s law predicts the occurrence of digits in data, and it 
concludes that the first digit in a large population will be a 1 about 30 percent of the time. Less 
frequently the digit will be a 2, even less frequently a 3, and so on. A 9 will be a first digit only 
5 percent of the time.
Not all populations will have distributions according to Benford’s law. For example, suppose that 
it costs an entity a minimum of $5.50 to ship all products that weigh less than two pounds and 
that most products shipped weigh less than two pounds. In this circumstance, the digit 5 will 
probably occur more frequently than predicted by Benford’s law.
To use Benford’s law to help identify risks of material misstatement caused by fraud, you should 
make sure that the population has the following characteristics:
• No minimum or maximum values
• No price break points (for example, $5.50 to ship all products less than two pounds)
• No assigned numbers (for example, Social Security numbers)
Fraud specialists can use Benford’s law to identify indicators of possible frauds. When 
populations of data are analyzed and the distribution of digits does not follow Benford’s law, that 
may indicate the data has been manipulated or fraudulently prepared. For example, an auditor 
might analyze disbursements from the accounts payable files or debit entries to expense accounts 
and compare the digit frequency to Benford’s law. Discrepancies between actual and predicted 
occurrence of digits may indicate fraudulent transactions.
Audit Considerations When Using CAATs
When determining whether and how to use CAATs on your audit, the factors to consider include 
the following:
• Audit objective. To determine whether CAATs are appropriate for your engagement, you first 
should consider the objective of the tests you want to perform and whether these tests are: (1) 
possible and (2) most efficient if performed by computer. Making this determination will 
require you to have a good understanding of the capabilities of the data extraction or analysis 
software. You also will have to work closely with the client to determine the timing and 
availability of all the necessary data files.
• Auditor’s knowledge, expertise, and experience. You should evaluate your own ability to 
perform any CAATs. You or your team should have a thorough understanding of the basics of 
data processing, as well as a working knowledge of the data extraction software. If you do not 
possess that information in-house, some companies can provide it to you on an outsource
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basis. For example, you can provide your client’s data files and other information to a third 
party, who will perform the data extraction and analysis for you.
• Reliability o f the entity's information technology (IT) system. The entity’s IT system must be 
able to generate reliable information. If past client history indicates that the accounting system 
is less than reliable and requires many adjustments to generate financial information, the use 
of CAATs may not be efficient or effective.
• Completeness and accuracy o f data received from  the client. It is imperative that you review 
the data files you receive from the client before you perform any analysis, extraction, or 
other test. Make sure that you obtain information from the client that will allow you to 
verify the completeness and accuracy of the information received. For example, you might 
want to obtain a record count or a total of key information. It also helps to obtain a printout 
of the first and last 100 or so records so you can compare these to the electronic information 
you received. The file that you use to perform your tests must be a complete and accurate 
copy of the client’s financial information, otherwise the results of the tests you perform will 
not be valid.
• Postprocessing review. After you have completed your procedures, you should review the 
results for possible indications that the files were not read or processed properly. For example, 
an unusual number of exceptions or the absence of items that should have been identified for 
follow-up, may indicate that the processing was performed incorrectly.
Additional Resources
Data Extraction Software and Processing
• Interactive Data Extraction & Analysis (IDEA). One of the leading data extraction software 
packages, www.caseware.com or www.audimation.com.
• ACL. One of the leading data extraction software packages, www.acl.com.
• AuditWatch. Provides training on both IDEA and ACL. Also provides outsourced data 
extraction services for auditors, www.auditwatch.com.
• PPC Guide to Data Extraction Software, www.ppcnet.com.
Use of CAATs to Identify or Respond to Risks of Fraud
• Audit Tools. Products, services, training and links to information about the use of CAATs. 
www.audittools.com.
• Colorado Accountants. Information and links to other sites on general use of CAATs. 
www.coloradoaccountants.com/Systems/dataextract.htm.
• Investigating by Computer. A self-study, CD-ROM-based course available from the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, www.cfenet.com.
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• Publications from Global Audit Publications, an independent division of ACL:
—  Fraud Detection: Using Data Analysis Techniques to Detect Fraud, by David Coderre.
—  Fraud Toolkit fo r  ACL by David Coderre.
—  Digital Analysis Using Benford’s Law: Tests & Statistics fo r  Auditors, by Mark Nigrini.
—  CAATs & Other BEASTs fo r Auditors, by David Coderre.
• Mark Nigrini, “I’ve Got Your Number,” Journal o f Accountancy (May 1999). A discussion of 
Benford’s law and how auditors might use it.
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EPILOGUE: LOOKING AHEAD
As I’ve worked on this book, I’ve come to believe that Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 
No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, 
vol. 1, AU sec. 316), has the potential to significantly advance the profession—to help us do our 
jobs more effectively, to audit smarter. It is a standard that reaches into all areas of the audit 
process and it moves us in a different direction, away from the “checklist mentality” and into 
more of a thinking person’s audit. It puts professional skepticism front and center and forces us 
to examine the psychology that we bring to our engagements. Depending on how the standard is 
implemented, it has the potential to be a watershed for how we think about and perform our 
engagements.
As an auditor, I would like to see the development of the following initiatives, which would 
continue what the issuance of SAS No. 99 has only just begun.
• Professional skepticism. If this is the cornerstone of auditing, more work needs to be done to 
understand the psychology of auditing, the assumptions and biases that are part of our current 
mindset, and how auditors can learn to develop and deploy an appropriate level of skepticism 
on their engagements.
• More effective inquiries. Auditors gather a great deal of information through inquiry; it is one 
of our primary auditing procedures. And yet, for all its importance, most auditors are never 
trained in how to conduct an effective inquiry. This weakness in our collective skills reduces 
the effectiveness of our audit procedures. For example, for years, observers of the profession 
have called for the application of more effective analytical procedures. Remedies invariably 
focus on how to perform a better analysis. That is not the problem—CPAs have analytical 
skills in spades. The problem with the performance of analytical procedures is that auditors 
have never been trained to ask the right questions and to structure their inquiries in a way that 
gathers the information they need to conduct an effective analysis. The same phenomenon 
occurs whenever inquiries are a significant part of the information gathering process, for 
example, understanding internal control, or the client’s business, or auditing estimates.
The implementation of SAS No. 99 places even more emphasis on inquiries as an effective 
audit procedure. To more effectively implement the new standard and to improve the 
effectiveness of existing standards, additional guidance on conducting inquiries is needed.
• Analysis vs. synthesis. Analysis involves the breaking apart of an item into its component 
parts and then examining those parts to see how they’re related. Synthesis is the opposite. 
Synthesis is the combining of elements to create a new, complex whole.
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As auditors, we are trained in (and some would argue, genetically predisposed toward) 
analysis. SAS No. 99 reminds us that effective auditing also involves synthesis, taking a wide 
variety of information and forming it into a coherent statement of where and how fraud is 
most likely to occur at the entity.
What is the process for synthesizing information and how does this process differ from 
analysis? How can auditors improve their ability to synthesize information? Audit 
effectiveness would be improved if we as a profession could begin to explore and discuss 
these questions.
• Diffusion o f innovation. Chapter 3 of this Practice Aid described basic concepts in the study of 
how innovation is diffused through society. Many of those who commented on the SAS No. 
99 exposure draft (both formally and informally) admired the way the standard was 
constructed and written but said that whether the standard meets its objective (changing 
auditor behavior) ultimately will depend on how it is implemented.
Writing this implementation guide only begins to scratch the surface of addressing the 
implementation issue. For complex standards like SAS No. 99, the profession would benefit 
greatly from research aimed at understanding the particulars of how new standards diffuse 
through the profession and ultimately are adopted (or passively rejected) by practitioners and 
financial statement users. All standard-setting bodies would benefit from this type of study.
• Skills training. SAS No. 99 introduces new procedures that require skills that, by and large, 
receive little if any formal training. Client inquiry and the ability to synthesize information are 
just two of these skills. The brainstorming requirement of SAS No. 99 calls for facilitation 
skills and a large dose of intuitive, nonlinear thinking. All of these skills will directly benefit 
the entire profession, not just auditors performing a generally accepted auditing standards 
audit. Work should be done to identify these skills and develop effective diffusion strategies 
so they can be adopted by the profession and those about to enter it. Do auditors need formal 
training on fraud detection and investigation matters? Will more formal training on fraud 
matters help us to better serve the public interest? Those questions should be addressed.
• Make fraud expertise available to smaller firms. With a renewed emphasis on detecting material 
misstatements caused by fraud, it is plausible that many auditors will need to use a fraud specialist 
on their engagements in the same way they use other specialists (for example, technology 
specialists or those with expertise in valuing particular assets). Many of the larger CPA firms have 
fraud specialists on staff to help with auditors performing a GAAS audit. But what about firms 
who do not have these resources? Somehow, fraud expertise must be made available to firms that 
do not possess it in-house or do not have the resources to acquire it. For example, strategic 
alliances between CPA firms performing GAAS audits and firms that specialize in fraud could be 
formed. Even a database of firms that provide fraud investigation and detection services would be 
a major help to GAAS auditors who need this type of expertise.
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Epilogue
All future initiatives in this area should be developed in the same type of environment present 
during the writing of SAS No. 99. That environment was relatively apolitical and devoid of 
marketing, public relations, or other extraneous needs creating artificial pressures and arbitrary 
deadlines. The result was a standard that demonstrates an ongoing commitment to improving the 
profession, a commitment that existed long before it became a political imperative, and one that 
will continue long after the current situation facing the profession passes.
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APPENDIX A: INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC CONDITIONS THAT MAY 
INDICATE THE PRESENCE OF FRAUD
Introduction
During the planning and performance of an audit, you may identify information that indicates the 
presence of one of the three conditions of the fraud triangle (incentive/pressure, opportunity, and 
attitude/rationalization). These conditions or events are referred to as fraud risk factors. Fraud risk 
factors do not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud; however, they often have been present in 
circumstances where fraud exists.
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration o f Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), provides fraud risk factor examples that 
have been written to apply to most enterprises. The purpose of this Appendix is to provide examples of 
industry-specific fraud risk factors and other conditions that may indicate the presence of a material 
misstatement due to fraud. Remember that fraud risk factors are only one of several sources of 
information you consider when identifying and assessing risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
Contents of the Appendix
The industry-specific fraud risk factors that follow include interpretations of some of the SAS No. 99 
example risk factors tailored to particular industries. Each section should be used to supplement, but 
not replace, the example risk factors included in SAS No. 99.
One of the key changes to audit practice that SAS No. 99 sought to impose was a better linking of 
auditor response to identified fraud risk factors. To help you develop more effective audit programs, 
the following sections also contain example audit procedures you may perform in response to 
specifically identified risks.
Additional Resources
You may be interested in fraud risk factors and possible audit responses for specialized industries 
that are not listed here. The CPA’s Handbook o f Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention, 
published by and available through the AICPA, is an excellent source for this information. 
Specialized industries included in Appendix A to that handbook that are not included in this Practice 
Aid include:
• Construction contractors
• High technology
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• Manufacturing
• Media and communications
• Professional services
• Recreation
• Natural resources
• Retail
• Transportation
• Wholesale
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Banks, Savings Institutions, and Credit Unions
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each type of fraud, the risk factors are further classified based on the 
three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a 
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider 
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not 
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
The following are examples of risk factors that might result in misstatements arising from fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Incentives/Pressures
1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by narrowing margins.
(1) An increase of competitor investment products that are close alternatives for the 
institution’s deposit products (for example, mutual funds, insurance annuities, and 
mortgage loans), placing pressure on the institution’s deposit rates.
(2) Competitor product pricing that results in loss of customers or market share for such 
products as loan, deposit, trust, asset management, and brokerage offerings.
b. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence, 
or interest rates.
(1) A failure or inability to keep pace with or to afford rapid changes in technology, if the 
financial stability or profitability of the particular institution is placed at risk due to 
that failure or inability.
(2) Significant unexpected volatility (for example, in interest rates, foreign exchange 
rates, and commodity prices) in financial markets where the institution has a
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significant capital market presence and is exposed to loss of revenue or has not 
appropriately hedged its risk to price changes that effect proprietary positions.
c. Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the 
industry or overall economy.
(1) Deteriorating economic conditions (for example, declining corporate earnings, 
adverse exchange movements, and real estate prices) within industries or geographic 
regions where the institution has significant credit concentrations.
(2) For credit unions, losing a very substantial portion of the membership base, which 
places considerable pressure on management insofar as financial projections are often 
based on gaining new members and offering commercial loans.
d. Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other peer financial 
institutions.
(1) Unusually large growth in the loan portfolio without a commensurate increase in the 
size of the allowance for loan and lease losses.
e. New and existing accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
(1) Substantially weak CAMELS, (capital adequacy, asset quality, management, 
earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk) or, for bank-holding companies, 
BOPEC (bank’s CAMELS rating, operation of significant nonbanking subsidiaries, 
parent’s strength and operations, earnings of the banking organization, and capital of 
the banking organization) ratings.
(2) Regulatory capital requirements.
f. Decline in asset quality due to:
(1) Borrowers affected by recessionary declines and layoffs.
(2) Issuers affected by recessionary declines and industry factors.
2. There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet financial targets set 
up by the board of directors or management, including incentive goals.
a. Unrealistically aggressive loan goals and lucrative incentive programs for loan 
originations.
(1) Relaxation of credit standards.
(2) Excessive extension of credit standards with approved deviation from policy.
(3) Excessive concentration of lending (particularly new lending).
(4) Excessive lending in new products.
(5) Excessive pricing concessions not linked to enhanced collateral positions or other 
business rational (for example, sales of other products or services).
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b. Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant pending 
transactions, such as business combinations.
(1) Acquisition of another institution has been announced in the press with the terms 
dependent on the future financial results of the acquiring institution.
c. Willingness by management to respond to these pressures by pursuing business 
opportunities for which the institution does not possess the needed expertise.
d. Excessive reliance on wholesale funding (brokered deposits).
e. Speculative use of derivatives.
f. Failure to establish economic hedges against key risks (for example, interest rate) through 
effective asset liability committee (ALCO) processes.
g. Changes in a bank’s loan loss accounting methodology that are not accompanied by 
observed changes in credit administration practices or credit conditions.
h. Frequent or unusual exceptions to credit policy.
i. Threat of a downgrade in the institution’s overall regulatory rating (for example, CAMEL, 
MACRO, or BOPEC) that could preclude expansion or growth plans.
j. Threat of failing to meet minimum capital adequacy requirements that could cause adverse 
regulatory actions.
3 .Management’s or the board of directors’ personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s 
financial performance arising from the following:
a. Heavy concentrations of their personal net worth in the entity.
b. Bank is privately owned by one person or family whose net worth or income (from 
dividends) is dependent on the bank.
Opportunities
l.T he nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant related entity transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related 
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
(1) Loans and other transactions with directors, officers, significant shareholders, 
affiliates, and other related parties, particularly those involving favorable terms.
(2) Be aware of special purpose entities, subprime, and predetorial lending by banks in an 
effort to obtain better yields.
(3) Transfers of impaired assets.
b. Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve 
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.
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(1) Significant estimates generally include the allowance for loan losses, and the 
valuation of servicing rights, residual interests, and deferred tax assets, fair value 
determinations, and the recognition of other impairment losses (for example, goodwill 
and investments).
c. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year end 
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
(1) Could include consolidation questions with special purpose entities (SPEs).
(2) The institution has material amounts of complex financial instruments and derivatives 
that are difficult to value, or the institution uses complex collateral disposition 
schemes.
d. Frequent or unusual adjustments to the allowance for loan and lease losses.
e. Loan sales that result in retained beneficial interests. Valuation of retained beneficial 
interests is based on estimates and assumptions and are susceptible to manipulation if not 
properly controlled.
f. Complex transactions that result in income or gains, such as sale and leasebacks, with 
arbitrarily short leaseback terms.
g. Deferred tax assets, arising from net operating loss carryforwards, without valuation 
allowances.
h. Deferral of loan origination costs that exceed the appropriate costs that may be deferred 
under Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 91, Accounting fo r  Nonrefundable Fees and Costs Associated with 
Originating or Acquiring Loans and Initial Direct Costs o f Leases.
2. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls over 
financial reporting, such as lack of oversight of critical processes in the following areas:
(1) Cash and correspondent banks—reconciliation and review.
(2) Intercompany or interbranch cash or suspense accounts and “internal” demand deposit 
account—monitoring of activity and resolution of aged items.
(3) Lending—lack of credit committee.
(4) Treasury—securities/derivatives valuation (selection of models, methodologies, and 
assumptions).
(5) Regulatory compliance—lack of knowledge of pertinent regulation.
(6) Deposits—lack of monitoring unusual and significant activity.
b. Ineffective internal audit function.
c. Lack of board-approved credit (underwriting and administration) or investment policies.
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d. Vacant staff positions remain unfilled for extended periods, thereby preventing proper 
segregation of duties.
e. Lack of appropriate system of authorization and approval of transactions in areas such as 
lending and investment, where policies and procedures for authorization of transactions 
are not established at the appropriate level.
f. Lack of independent processes for establishment and review of allowance for loan losses.
g. Lack of independent processes for evaluation of other than temporary impairments.
h. Inadequate controls over transaction recording including setup of loans on systems.
i. Lack of controls over perfection of interests in lending collateral.
j. Inadequate methods of identifying and communicating exceptions and variances from 
planned performance.
k. Inadequate accounting reconciliation policies and practices, including appropriate 
supervisory review, monitoring of stale items and out of balance conditions, and timeliness 
of write-offs.
l. Failure to establish adequate segregation of duties between approval transactions and 
disbursement of funds.
m. Lack of control over the regulatory reporting process, where key decision makers also 
have control over the process.
n. Lack of adequate reporting to the board of directors and executive management regarding 
credit, interest-rate, liquidity, and market risks.
o. Change from an internal audit function that has been outsourced to the external auditor or 
other provider to a new in-house internal audit department or another outsourcing provider.
Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees 
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to 
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such 
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from 
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following 
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations, or claims against 
the entity, its senior management, or board members alleging fraud or violations of laws and 
regulations.
a. Existence of a regulatory cease and desist order, memorandum of understanding, or other 
regulatory agreements (whether formal or informal), which concern management 
competence or internal control.
b. Repeat criticisms or apparent violations cited in regulatory examination reports, which 
management has ignored.
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2. Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in, or preoccupation with, the selection of 
accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates.
a. Consideration of “business issues” (for example, shareholder expectations) in determining 
significant estimates.
b. Adjustments to the allowance for loan losses by senior management or the board for which 
there is no written documentation.
c. Unusual propensity to enter into complex asset disposition agreements.
3. Control-related recommendations from internal and/or external auditors are ignored.
4. High level of customer complaints (especially when management does not fix the cause of 
them promptly).
5. Internal audit is not adequately staffed or trained, and does not have appropriate specialized 
skills given the environment.
6. Internal audit is not independent (authority and reporting relationships) and does not have 
adequate access to the audit committee (or equivalent).
7. The scope of internal audit’s activities is not appropriate (for example, balance between 
financial and operational audits, coverage, and rotation of decentralized operations).
8 .Internal audit has limited authority to examine all aspects of the client’s operations or fails to 
exercise its authority.
9. Internal audit does not adequately plan, perform risk assessments, or document the work 
performed or conclusions reached.
10. Internal audit does not adhere to professional standards.
11. Internal audit has operating responsibilities.
12. Inability to prepare accurate and timely financial reports, including interim reports.
13. Planning and reporting systems (such as business planning; budgeting, forecasting, and profit 
planning; and responsibility accounting) that do not adequately set forth management’s plans 
and the results of actual performance.
14. A low level of user satisfaction with information systems processing, including reliability and 
timeliness of reports.
15. Understaffed accounting or information technology department, inexperienced or ineffective 
accounting or information technology personnel, or high turnover.
16. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation for transactions.
17. Management or ownership frequently requires dividends at or near the maximum allowable by 
law. In closely held companies, executive management/ownership combines high dividends 
with frequently substantial increases in cash salary or bonus compensation. The bank has been 
cited for dividend violations by regulatory authorities.
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Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls 
may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess 
whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of 
material misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also 
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, 
opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements 
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and 
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent 
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exist. The following are examples of risk factors 
related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
Incentives/Pressures
SAS No. 99 does not require an auditor to plan the audit to discover information that is 
indicative of financial stress of employees or adverse relationships between the institution and 
its employees. If the auditor becomes aware of the existence of such information, he or she 
should consider it in addressing the risk of material misstatement arising from misappropriation 
of assets.
1. Adverse relationships between the institution and employees with access to cash or other 
assets susceptible to theft may motivate those employees to misappropriate those assets. For 
example, the following may create adverse relationships:
a. It is likely that the institution will be merged into or acquired by another institution and 
there is uncertainty regarding the employees’ future employment opportunities.
b. The institution has recently completed a merger or acquisition, employees are working 
long hours on integration projects, and morale is low.
c. The institution is under regulatory scrutiny and there is uncertainty surrounding the future 
of the institution.
2. Members of executive management evidence personal financial distress through indications 
such as frequent informal “loans” or “salary advances” to key executive officers or their 
family members.
151
Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit
Opportunities
1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to 
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are 
the following:
a. Large amounts of cash on hand and wire transfer capabilities.
b. Easily convertible assets, such as bearer bonds or diamonds, that may be in safekeeping.
c. Inadequate or ineffective physical security controls, for example, overliquid assets or 
information systems.
d. Access to customer accounts.
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of 
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the 
following:
a. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
(1) Vacant branch manager positions or manager away on leave without replacement for 
an inordinate amount of time, causing a considerable lack of management oversight.
(2) The independent risk management function does not have the appropriate level of 
sophistication or the capability to effectively monitor and measure the risks, such as 
capital markets trading activities.
b. Inadequate job applicant screening and/or monitoring of employees:
(1) Federal Bureau of Investigation background checks, credit reports, and bonding 
eligibility screening are not incorporated into the hiring process for employees with 
access to significant assets susceptible to misappropriation.
(2) A monitoring process does not identify employees with access to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation who are known to have financial difficulties.
c. Inadequate segregation of duties and independent checks:
(1) Lack of independent monitoring of activity in internal demand deposit accounts and 
correspondent bank accounts.
(2) No independent monitoring and resolution of customer exceptions/inquiries related to 
electronic-funds-transfer (EFT) transactions, loan disbursements/payments, customer 
deposit accounts, securities/derivatives transactions, and trust/fiduciary accounts.
(3) Lack of key periodic independent reconciliations (in addition to reconciliations of 
subledgers to the general ledger) for wire transfer, Treasury, trust, suspense accounts, 
automated teller machines, and cash.
(4) Lack of segregation of duties in the following areas:
— EFT—origination, processing, confirmation, and recordkeeping.
— Lending—relationship management, underwriting (including approval), processing,
cash collection/disbursement, and recordkeeping. No periodic confirmation of
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customer loan information or indebtedness by personnel independent of the 
relationship officer.
— Treasury—trading, processing, settlement, and recordkeeping. The derivatives 
positions on the Treasury system are not priced by an independent operations 
area. The capital markets risk management process is not independent from the 
trading function. There is no independent confirmation of individual trades.
— Trust—relationship management, transaction authorization, transaction execution, 
settlement, custody, and account recordkeeping. There is no annual review of the 
activity in trust accounts by an investment committee to ensure compliance with 
the terms of the trust agreement and bank investment guidelines.
— Fiduciary—issuance, registration, transfer, cancellation, and recordkeeping.
— Charged-off loan accounts and recoveries.
— Dormant and inactive demand deposit accounts (DDA) and the escheatment 
process.
d. No independent mailing of customer statements.
e. Lack of control over new accounts.
f. “Due from” bank accounts are not reconciled on a regular basis, and open items are not 
reviewed.
g. Loans are purchased from loan brokers, but the loans are not reunderwritten before 
purchase.
h. The institution is small and has limited staff, which does not allow for adequate 
segregation of duties.
i. There is a lack of appropriate system of authorization and approval of transactions.
(1) No verification of EFT initiation and authorization, including those instances when 
bank employees initiate a transaction on a customer’s behalf.
(2) Frequent underwriting exceptions to board-established credit authorization limits.
(3) Frequent instances of cash disbursements on loans that have not yet received all 
approvals or met all preconditions for funding.
(4) Lack of board approval for significant loans or unusually high loan-officer approval 
limits. (Be alert to the existence of multiple loans being funded just below a loan 
officer’s limit.)
j. Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, customer information, or fixed assets.
(1) Lack of adequate physical security over the EFT operations area and customer 
records.
(2) Access to the vault is not appropriately limited to authorized employees acting within 
the scope of their job.
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(3) Lack of dual control over the vault, negotiable instruments (including travelers’ 
checks and money orders), and blank check stock.
(4) Lack of accountability over negotiable instruments.
k. Inadequate training of tellers and operations personnel regarding:
(1) “Knowing your customer.”
(2) Recognizing check fraud and kiting activities.
(3) Controls over cash, negotiable instruments, and EFT.
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Brokers and Dealers in Securities
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover 
a broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to 
consider additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors 
provided is not intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls 
may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess 
whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of 
material misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures
1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
(1) High-degree of competition relating to bank-owned broker-dealers that have been 
granted expanded powers to engage in securities activities or registered investment 
companies/mutual funds, accompanied by declining margins.
b. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence, 
or interest rates.
(1) A failure or inability to keep pace with the rapid growth in electronic trading, if the 
financial stability or profitability of the particular entity is placed at risk, due to that 
failure or inability.
c. Unusually high level of “soft dollar” brokerage activities.
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third 
parties due to the following:
a. The pressure on management to meet the expectations of analysts and rating agencies.
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3. Management or the board of directors’ personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s 
financial performance arising from the following:
a. The structure of incentive plans induces traders to take unusually greater risks.
b. There is unusually high level of internal competition for capital allocation among product 
types/trading desks.
4. Research analysts are not independent. Their compensation is controlled by investment 
banking or other areas for which the firm receives fees from covered companies.
5. Extensive benefits are provided to money managers that may drive fraudulent behavior. The 
value of such benefits is included in the commissions generated by customers on trades 
directed by money managers.
6. There are certain arrangements between the broker who directs the trade and the market maker 
who executes the trade that are not in the best interest of the customer.
Opportunities
1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. A failure by management to have an adequate understanding of the entity’s trading and 
investment strategies as conducted by the entity’s traders, including the types, 
characteristics, and risks associated with the financial products purchased and sold by the 
entity.
b. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year end 
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
(1) Unusually significant increase in unsettled trades at year end.
(2) A high degree of complex accounting standards relating to, for example, financial 
instruments and off-balance sheet transactions.
2. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls over interim 
financial reporting.
(1) A failure by management and the board of directors to set parameters (for example, 
trading limits, credit limits, and aggregate market risk limits) and to continuously 
monitor trading activities against those parameters.
(2) Lack of sufficient access controls for front-office and back-office systems.
(3) Lack of adequate “Chinese Wall” between investment banking and trading (that is, 
potential for insider trading).
(4) Failure to monitor the filling of customer orders from the firm’s inventory (for 
example, front-running and excessive mark-up).
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(5) Lack of review of customer lists and insufficient controls surrounding the customer 
account approval and maintenance process for both cash and margin accounts.
(6) A lack of sufficient controls over the review process of new products, structured 
finance, and off-balance-sheet transactions.
(7) A lack of sufficient controls over the valuation process of less liquid securities, 
including controls over the changes of valuation pricing and the appropriate 
segregation of duties.
b. High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or 
information technology staff.
(1) A failure by management to ensure that the brokers are properly trained, appropriately 
licensed, and adequately supervised.
(2) Lack of policies and training over the range of product offerings.
(3) A failure by management to assess the quality and breadth of the company’s internal 
audit department, to ensure that the department receives adequate training and 
resources to match the sophistication and progression of the company.
c. Ineffective accounting and information systems, including situations involving reportable 
conditions.
(1) Lack of board approval and a specialist’s independent evaluation of in-house 
developed valuation models.
d. Use of error accounts to hide trading errors, made to meet commitments to clients, 
particularly for block trades in meeting a predetermined value-weighted average price 
(VWAP).
e. Use of valuation reserves for other purposes, such as to hide errors or expenses. 
Assumptions in valuation reserves may be changed without adequate approval.
f. Use of customer collateral for firm purposes. Tested by possession or control procedures.
g. Use of subsidiaries to manage earnings.
h. Transactions accounted for as sales as opposed to financing.
i. Use of different valuations of same product in two related companies.
j. No provisions to record stock-borrow transactions. Use of the security to cover a theft of 
customer-related security.
k. Poor controls over corporate actions in which the client fails to receive entire benefit.
l. Not properly valuing collateral or reflecting the extent of cross-collateralization on rate 
swaps.
m. Weak controls causing a failure to record trades on a timely basis and a lack of proper 
floor supervision, which may facilitate customers’ poor trading activity.
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Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees 
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to 
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such 
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from 
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following 
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or 
earnings trend.
a. Unusually aggressive interpretations of regulatory rules (for example, net capital rules and 
weekly reserve formula) when the company is reaching minimum net capital required by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Auditor Responses
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the 
following responses.
• Extend confirmation procedures concerning agreements with counterparties (for example, 
leases, clearing, custody, margin, and subordinated debt).
• Extend confirmation procedures concerning the terms of selected transactions (for example, 
swaps, financing transactions, and fails) with counterparties.
• Review the results of valuation testing performed by departments of the company (for 
example, controllers, internal audit, and middle office).
• Review background information about the board of directors and management to determine if 
they have the capacity to understand trading and investment strategies. Conversations with 
appropriate people and review of the board’s and management’s experience and credentials 
may be necessary.
• Review management summary reports on performance and meet with management to discuss 
trading and business direction.
• Perform periodic reviews of valuation methodologies by independent specialists throughout 
the year.
• Meet with middle office personnel to gain an understanding of the company’s policies 
concerning managing risk (for example, stress testing and valuations).
• Extend testing on regulatory com putations for com panies barely m eeting the m inim um  net 
capital requirements.
• Extend testing of the entity’s “soft dollar” arrangements to ensure compliance with the SEC 
rules and regulations.
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Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also classified 
along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, opportunity, and 
attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements arising from fraudulent 
financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets 
occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and weakness in internal control may be 
present when misstatements due to either fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets 
exists. The following are examples of risk factors related to misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities
1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to 
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are 
the following:
a. Large amounts of securities (for example, bearer instruments) held in the company’s vault.
b. Commingling of customer securities with the entity’s securities at a custodian bank.
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility to misappropriation of 
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the 
following:
a. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
(1) Lack of management oversight of extensive retail branches, or overseas branches and 
subsidiaries.
(2) Inadequate supervision of traders’ trading practices and limits, especially for those 
generating a large proportion of the entity’s total revenue.
b. Inadequate segregation of duties or independent checks.
(1) Lack of segregation of duties between the front-office (that is, execution of trades) 
and the back-office (that is, settlement and accounting for trades).
(2) Lack of independent review of periodic reconciliations (for example, settlement 
accounts, cash accounts, and stock records).
(3) Failure to confirm failed transactions on a timely basis.
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(4) Failure to periodically review items in suspense accounts.
(5) Failure to review the aging of items, including failed transactions and receivables.
(6) Lack of or infrequent independent pricing of inventory performed by middle-office or 
back-office (that is, risk management and controller’s group).
c. Inadequate physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or fixed assets.
(1) Lack of safeguarding and insuring securities in transfer.
(2) Lack of sufficient access controls for cash wiring systems.
d. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions.
(1) Lack of documentation related to “soft dollar” brokerage activities.
(2) Lack of documentation related to derivative transactions with counter parties, such as 
ISDA master agreements.
e. Lack of controls relating to the rehypothecation of securities.
Auditor Responses
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the 
following responses.
• Review exception and break reports for settlement activities.
• Ensure that the compliance function reviews the personal account statements of the company’s 
brokers and traders.
• Review registration statements of individual traders, account representatives, and principals.
• Extend testing of access controls of online fund wiring system terminals.
• Review revenue trend of an individual trader over a period of time.
• Review level of errors and broker chargebacks of commissions.
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Employee Benefit Plans
Two types o f fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover 
a broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to 
consider additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors 
provided is not intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls 
may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess 
whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of 
material misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressure
1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures exist in either the 
industry or the economy in which the entity operates.
(1) The plan sponsor is in an industry that is declining in stability, which could lead to 
difficulties in meeting financial commitments to the plan, including contributions 
and/or debt repayments (leveraged employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)).
b. The plan holds employer securities and the employer is in an industry in which the value 
of the securities is subject to significant volatility or is not readily determinable.
c. Plan sponsor or plan restructuring (for example, layoffs, spin-offs, business combinations, 
and bankruptcy).
d. Severely deteriorating financial condition or the threat of regulatory intervention of the 
plan.
e. The plan has limited investment options or the plan has invested significantly in employer 
securities or other employer assets (for example, real estate).
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third 
parties due to the following:
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a. Senior management of the plan sponsor appoints itself trustee of the plan and uses that 
position to benefit the plan sponsor, for example, uses the plan’s money to do speculative 
investing or to support the company through buying employer assets.
Opportunities
1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related 
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
(1) Indications of significant or unusual parties-in-interest transactions not in the ordinary 
course of operations.
(2) Excessive or unusual transaction or prohibited party in interest transactions with the 
plan sponsor/administrator.
2. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls over interim 
financial reporting.
(1) Failure by management to have adequate valuations performed, including actuarial 
valuations and valuations of real estate partnerships and other hard-to-value plan 
assets.
(2) The plan administrator lacks an understanding of the major regulations that govern 
the plans (that is, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and 
the Internal Revenue Code).
b. Unusually high levels of participant complaints and corrections to account balances or 
plan records.
c. Lack of qualified service provider organization or change in service provider.
Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or 
employees that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting may not be 
susceptible to observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the 
existence of such information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement 
arising from fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the 
following information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities.
a. Management displaying a significant disregard toward compliance with ERISA and
Internal Revenue Code and Department of Labor (DOL) regulations.
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b. The plan administrator or trustees have been investigated by the DOL or IRS for fiduciary 
violations in operating the plan.
2. Lack of management candor in dealing with plan participants, claimants, actuaries, and 
auditors regarding decisions that could have an impact on plan assets, including restructuring 
or downsizing arrangements.
3. The plan has participated in a voluntary compliance program in conjunction with the IRS or 
DOL (such participation could be an indication of ineffective management of the plan or 
controls over the plan).
4. Named fiduciary not actively involved in the plan’s activities.
5. High level of plan participant complaints.
Auditor Responses
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor in an employee benefit plan 
audit engagement may want to consider the following responses.
• Investment results. Obtain the requisite investment information directly from the plan trustee, 
and obtain the same information from the party named as having discretion to make 
investment decisions, such as the plan administrator, the plan’s investment committee, or the 
plan’s investment adviser ( the directing party), and review and reconcile the directing party’s 
reports (investment position and activity) with those of the trustee.
• Claim reserves. Confirm, with third parties, the historical and statistical information that is 
being used to prepare the reserves. Review the qualifications of the individuals preparing the 
reserves.
• Procedures. Apply the following procedures to fully understand a party in interest transaction:1
— Confirm transaction amount and terms, including guarantees and other significant data, 
with the other party or parties to the transaction.
— Inspect evidence in possession of the other party or parties to the transaction.
— Confirm or discuss significant information with intermediaries, such as banks, guarantors, 
agents, or attorneys, to obtain a better understanding of the transaction.
— Refer to financial publications, trade journals, credit agencies, and other information 
sources when there is reason to believe that unfamiliar customers, suppliers, or other 
business enterprises with which material amounts of business have been transacted may 
lack substance.
— With respect to material uncollected balances, guarantees, and other obligations, obtain 
information about the financial capability of the other party or parties to the transaction. 
Such information may be obtained from audited financial statements, unaudited financial
See Chapter 11 of the AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide Audits o f Employee Benefit Plans for further audit guidance.
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statements, income tax returns, and reports issued by regulatory agencies, taxing authorities, 
financial publications, or credit agencies. The auditor should decide on the degree of 
assurance required and the extent to which available information provides such assurance.
• For single employer plans, obtain the most recent financial statements of the plan sponsor and 
review for indicators of financial difficulties. For multiemployer plans, obtain an 
understanding of the industry.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also 
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, 
opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements 
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and 
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent 
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exists. The following are examples of risk 
factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities
1. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of 
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the 
following:
a. Inadequate segregation of duties related to benefit payments, contributions, investment 
transactions, and loans or independent checks.
(1) No independent records of the plan are maintained to enable the plan administrator to 
periodically check the information to the custodian.
b. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
(1) Lack of review of investment transactions by trustees, sponsors, or investment 
committees.
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(2) Lack of independent preparation and review of reconciliations of trust assets to 
participant accounts or accounting records of the plan.
c. Inadequate system of authorization and approval of transactions.
(1) Insufficient approval over transactions with parties-in-interest that could lead to 
prohibited transactions.
d. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions, for example, credits for 
merchandise returns.
(1) Trustee does not prepare required supplemental information (for example, historical 
cost records not maintained).
e. Lack of controls surrounding benefit payments, including the termination of payments in 
accordance with plan provisions.
f. Lack of appropriate segregation of plan assets from the sponsor’s assets or inappropriate 
access to plan assets by plan sponsor.
g. SAS No. 70, Service Organizations (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 
324), as amended, report indicates a lack of controls at an outside service provider.
h. Use of service provider that does not provide a SAS No. 70 report.
i. Unreconciled differences between net assets available for benefits per the trustee/custodian 
records and the recordkeeping amounts for a defined contribution plan (unallocated assets 
or liabilities).
Auditor Responses
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor in an employee benefit plan 
engagement may want to consider the following responses.
• Review reconciliations of the assets held by the trust with participant records throughout the 
year. Review any reconciling adjustments for propriety.
• Review the account activity for participants who have access to plan assets or assist in 
administering the plan.
• The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material misstatement exists with regard to a 
lack of a qualified outside service provider acting as trustee and/or custodian for plan assets. 
In these instances, the auditor should physically inspect assets and examine other evidence 
relating to ownership. In addition, the fair value of investments should be tested by reference 
to market quotations or other evidence of fair value in accordance with SAS No. 57, Auditing 
Accounting Estimates (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol.l, AU sec. 342).
• The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material misstatement exists with regard to 
unreconciled differences between net assets available for benefits per the trustee/custodian 
records and the recordkeeping amounts for a defined contribution plan. If the trustee/custodian
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records are higher than the recordkeeping totals (excluding accrual adjustments), an 
unallocated asset exists that should be allocated to participant accounts. If the 
trustee/custodian records are lower than the recordkeeping totals (excluding accrual 
adjustments), plan assets may have been misappropriated requiring further investigation by the 
auditor (for example, reconciliation of monthly trustee/custodian activity to the recordkeeper).
• The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material misstatement exists with regard to 
remittance of employee contributions for a defined contribution plan with a sponsor 
experiencing cash flow problems. In this instance, the auditor may perform a reconciliation of 
the total employee contributions per the payroll register to the recordkeeping report for the 
year. In addition, the auditor may select certain months to test for the timely remittance of 
employee contributions in accordance with regulations.
• The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material misstatement exists with regard to 
expenses being paid by an overfunded defined benefit plan on behalf of an underfunded plan. 
In this instance, the auditor might select expense amounts paid by the overfunded plan and 
trace them to specific invoices noting that the expense pertained to the proper plan. 
Alternatively, the auditors could also ask to review expense invoices pertaining to the 
underfunded plan paid by the company to make sure the overfunded plan did not pay them.
• Review the timeliness of contributions from the plan sponsor throughout the year.
• Compare cancelled checks to disbursement records. Where benefits are paid by check 
disbursements, compare the signature on the canceled check to participant signatures on other 
employee documents.
• Confirm benefit payments with participants or beneficiaries.
• Confirm medical bills directly with service providers.
• Review plan expenses to ensure that the plan is not paying for expenses that the employer 
should be paying for.
Fraud Examples
Listed below are actual instances of fraudulent activity on employee benefit plan engagements. They 
are presented to help auditors become better acquainted with fraudulent activities. Although none of 
these particular examples resulted in a material misstatement of the financial statements, similar 
fraudulent activity at other benefit plans may cause a material misstatement of the financial 
statements, depending on the circumstances.
• A pension plan notifies participants who have reached the age of 70/2 that they must under law 
take their distributions from the plan. An employee of the company is responsible for 
notifying the participants and providing distribution forms. The completed forms are provided 
to a supervisor for approval and submitted to the insurance company (custodian) for payment. 
For all participants reaching the age of 701/2, the employee decides to forge the distribution 
forms and not notify the participants of the distributions. The forged forms are provided to the
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supervisor, who approves them and the insurance company is directed to make lump sum 
distributions via wire transfers into an account set up with the employee’s name as a relative 
for the beneficiary. The fraud continues for several months until a participant notifies the 
supervisor that he would like to receive his distribution, and the supervisor notices that a lump 
sum was already distributed.
A long-time employee at a company is responsible for reporting loan repayments (for loans 
not paid off by automatic payroll deduction) to the recordkeeper by providing copies of the 
face of the repayment checks to the recordkeeper. The employee is also a participant in the 
plan and currently has a $20,000 loan from her account. The employee decides to take a 
second loan but under plan provisions cannot do it until her first loan is paid off. The 
employee makes out a check to pay off the $20,000 loan from her personal account and 
provides a copy of the check to the recordkeeper. A second loan of $25,000 is taken out for 
the employee. However, the first loan is never paid off because the employee never deposits 
the $20,000 check into the plan. Cash reconciliations continually show immaterial 
unreconciled items that are not followed up timely and the fraud is not discovered for months. 
A company has two defined benefit plans; one is overfunded and one is underfunded. In past 
years, administrative expenses were paid from each plan’s assets; however, this year the 
company decides it will pay the expenses for the underfunded plan. The overfunded plan 
continues to pay its own expenses. Due to an administrative error, the overfunded plan ends 
up paying the expenses for both plans. When management discovers this fact, a decision was 
made to reimburse the plan that paid the expenses because it is fully funded.
Continuation of pension benefits to a deceased participant. A participant dies but his relatives 
or other persons do not report his death in order to continue receiving his pension checks.
A health and welfare supervisor submits phony claims using the names of the plan participants 
who have the same last name as he or she does. The checks are diverted to the supervisor 
before they can be mailed to the plan participant in question.
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State and Local Government Entities: Basic Financial Statements2
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a 
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider 
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not 
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures
1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
(1) Imminent or anticipated adverse changes in program legislation or regulations could 
impair the financial stability and profitability of the entity.
(2) Under Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 34, Basic 
Financial Statements— and Management’s Discussion and Analysis—fo r State and 
Local Governments, some governments’ net assets may be in deficit positions, while 
the fund balances are positive. This may result in significant pressure for management 
to misstate financial statements.
b. Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the 
industry or the economy in which the entity operates.
(1) Major taxpayers in declining industries or tenuous financial condition.
(2) Declining property values or tax base or other restrictions on revenue recognition or 
realization.
Auditors may also refer to the “State and Local Governmental Entities and Not-for-Profit Organizations: Recipients of 
Federal Awards” section of this Practice Aid for additional guidance.
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(3) A stagnant tax base or revenue base, declining enrollments, or declining demand or 
use.
c. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence, 
or interest rates.
(1) Rapid changes in major taxpayers’ industries, such as significant technology changes, 
customer bases, or product obsolescence.
(2) Decreases in interest rates when the government owns significant amounts of 
investments that are highly sensitive to interest rate changes.
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third 
parties due to the following:
a. Substantial political pressure on management creating an undue concern about reporting 
positive financial accomplishments.
b. Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive, including financing 
of major research and development or capital expenditures.
(1) Significant pressure to obtain additional funding necessary to stay viable and maintain 
levels of service considering the financial or budgetary position of the entity or of a 
specific fund or program, including need for funds to finance major infrastructure 
improvements or other capital expenditures.
c. Marginal ability to meet debt repayment or other debt covenant requirements.
(1) Threat of imminent third-party funding termination or significant reduction in third- 
party funding levels, the effect of which would be financially material to the entity.
d. A mix of fixed price and cost reimbursable program types funded by third parties that 
create incentives to shift costs or otherwise manipulate accounting transactions.
e. Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant pending 
transactions.
f. Significant investments in high risk financial instruments or high risk ventures.
g. An individual or individuals with no apparent executive position(s) with the entity 
apparently exercising substantial influence over its affairs or over individual departments 
or funds (for example, a major political donor or fundraiser, or major employer in the 
community).
h. A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent financial reporting.
(1) Substantial political pressure on management creates an undue concern about federal 
program accomplishments.
3. Management or the board of directors’ personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s 
financial performance arising from the following:
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a. Significant portions of their compensation (for example, bonuses, stock options, or other 
incentives), being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for operating results, 
financial position, or cash flow.
(1) A significant portion of entity-wide, department, or fund management compensation 
or performance appraisals linked to budgetary or program accomplishments or other 
incentives, the value or results of which are contingent upon the entity achieving 
unduly aggressive targets for budgetary or operating results.
4. There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet financial targets set 
by the owner, including sales or profitability incentive goals,
a. Unrealistically aggressive budget or program goals.
Opportunities
1. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
a. A governing body that lacks appropriate background knowledge or experience regarding 
the function and responsibilities of government.
b. A vendor, such as a management company, who provides turnkey services of a 
department, exercises substantial influence over the affairs of the entity.
2. There is a complex or unstable organizational structure as evidenced by the following:
a. Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial 
lines of authority, or contractual arrangements without apparent programmatic or 
government purpose.
(1) Significant subrecipient or subcontract relationships for which there appears to be no 
clear programmatic or business justification (for example, a subrecipient providing 
services it does not appear qualified to provide, or a vendor geographically distant 
from the entity when nearby vendors are available).
3. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls.
(1) Lack of established policies or controls related to investment risk levels.
(2) Inadequate controls over process to prepare offering documents related to initial 
offerings of municipal securities.
(3) Inadequate controls over process to prepare required continuing disclosures related to 
those municipal securities.
b. An increased perception of opportunity by employees/management to perpetuate a fraud 
when a fraud has occurred in the past at that entity and there were no negative
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ramifications to the perpetrators(s), for example, no substantive investigations, no criminal 
charges, and no terminations.
Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees, 
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to 
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such 
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from 
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following 
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1.Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or 
earnings trend.
a. An excessive interest in meeting or exceeding the entity’s budgetary targets or maintaining 
fund balance or debt coverage requirement through the use of unusually aggressive 
accounting practices.
2 .Ineffective communication and support of the entity’s values or ethical standards by 
management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards, 
a. An ineffective or nonexistent means of communicating and supporting the entity’s
accountability for public resources and ethics, especially regarding such matters as 
acceptable business practices, conflicts of interests, and code of conduct.
Auditor Responses
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the 
following responses to fraud risk factors.
• Additional or more focused analytical procedures concerning actual to expectation variances 
and their underlying causes.
• Testing of larger samples of transactions of expenditures for conformity with allowable cost 
principles.
• Consultation with the funding agency’s inspector general or other oversight organization 
regarding specific risks and responses for particular programs.
• More focused testing of programs or cost categories for which the entity has a history of prior 
findings and questioned costs.
• More detailed testing of transactions made by or potentially affected by entity or program 
managers who have motives to produce particular budgetary, programmatic, or financial results.
• Confirmation of transaction details with other governments (for example, grants, tax 
collections, receivable/payable balances), pertaining to year-end cut-offs.
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• Additional inquiry and tests on collectibility of interfund receivables, particularly those 
reporting large continuing balances.
• More focused review of documentation of write-offs of uncollectible taxes and other 
receivables.
• Confirmation with revenue sources to determine if revenue recognized was for services 
performed prior to year end, and vouching revenue to bank statements to ensure that the 
revenue was received in the availability period.
• A more rigorous search for unrecorded liabilities by more closely examining disbursements 
made after year end. (Consider looking at wire transfers, debit memos, and other EFTs, not 
just checks.)
• More detailed analysis of investment portfolios and investments policies; and use of 
investment risk specialists to better assess the risk levels of the entity’s investments.
• Review of “top-level” adjustments made by management.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls 
may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess 
whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of 
material misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also 
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, 
opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements 
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and 
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent 
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exists. The following are examples of risk 
factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities
1. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of 
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the 
following:
a. Inadequate segregation of duties or independent checks, especially in areas such as 
purchasing, accounts payable, cash handling, and force account labor supervision.
b. Lack of appropriate management oversight.
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c. Lack of job applicant screening procedures relating to employees with access to assets 
susceptible to misappropriation.
d. Inadequate recordkeeping with respect to assets susceptible to misappropriation.
e. Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or fixed assets.
Auditor Responses
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the 
following responses to fraud risk factors.
• Additional participant eligibility testing, including unannounced visits to intake centers, work 
sites, and other sites where the existence and the identity of participants can be verified.
• Observation of benefit payment distribution to identify “ghost” program participants (another 
option: reconciling terminated employees per the human resources system with active 
employee lists per the payroll system).
• Use of confirmation letters to ensure the existence of program participants.
• Review of governmental entity’s purchasing practices to make sure that prices are reasonable 
for the products purchased. (Inflated prices could indicate and disclose purchasing agent 
acceptance of bribes, gratuities, or kickbacks.)
• Examination of outstanding encumbrances and encumbrances that were released in the first 
part of the next year to determine if the encumbering of the funds was appropriate and legal.
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State and Local Governmental Entitles and Not-for-Profit Organizations: 
Recipients of Federal Awards
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a 
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider 
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not 
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Auditors should note that since SAS No. 99 applies only to an audit of financial 
statements, its requirements do not apply to an audit of an auditee’s compliance with specified 
requirements applicable to its major programs. However, as part of assessing audit risk in a single or 
program-specific audit, the auditor should specifically assess the risk of material noncompliance with 
a major program’s compliance requirements occurring due to fraud. The auditor should consider that 
assessment in designing the audit procedures to be performed. Some of the following factors and 
conditions are present in entities where specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material 
misstatement. Also, specific controls may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud, even though risk factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other 
conditions, you should assess whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures
1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
(1) Imminent or anticipated adverse changes in program legislation or regulations that 
could impair the financial stability and profitability of the entity.
b. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
(1) High degree of competition for federal funding, especially when accompanied by 
declining availability of federal funding nation-wide or region-wide.
c. Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the 
industry or the economy in which the entity operates.
(1) A stagnant tax base, revenue base, or declining enrollments, or eligible participants.
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(2) Declining federal program funding, declining program participant populations, or 
declining benefit amounts.
d. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence, 
or interest rates.
(1) Rapid changes in federal programs, such as significant centralization or 
decentralization initiatives, funding shifts from federal to state or local levels, 
increases or decreases in participant populations, higher vulnerability to significant 
changes in compliance requirements, or pending program elimination.
e. Threat of imminent program terminations or significant reduction in scope, the effect of 
which could have a material financial impact on the entity.
f. A mix of fixed-price and cost-reimbursable program types that create incentives to shift 
costs or otherwise manipulate accounting transactions.
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third 
parties due to the following:
a. A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent financial reporting.
(1) Substantial political pressure on management creates an undue concern about federal 
program accomplishments.
b. Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive, including the need 
for funds to finance major research and development or capital expenditures.
(1) Significant pressure to obtain additional funding necessary to stay viable and maintain 
levels of service considering the financial or budgetary position of the entity or of a 
specific federal program, including need for funds to finance major research and 
development or capital expenditures.
c. An individual or individuals with no apparent executive position(s) with the entity appear 
to exercise substantial influence over its affairs or over other individual federal programs 
(for example, a major donor or fundraiser, or a politician).
3. Management or the board of directors’ personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s 
financial performance arising from the following:
a. Significant portions of their compensation (for example, bonuses, stock options, or other 
incentives) being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for operating results, 
financial position, or cash flow.
(1) A significant portion of entity-wide or program management’s compensation or 
performance appraisals linked to budgetary or program accomplishments or other
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incentives, the value or results of which are contingent upon the entity achieving 
unduly aggressive targets for budgetary or operating results.
4. There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet financial targets set 
by the owner, including sales or profitability incentive goals, 
a. Unrealistically aggressive budget or program goals.
Opportunities
1. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
a. A vendor, such as a management company, that provides turnkey services o f a department, 
exercises substantial influence over the affairs of the entity.
2. There is a complex or unstable organizational structure as evidenced by the following:
a. Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial 
lines of authority, or contractual arrangements without apparent programmatic or 
government purpose.
(1) Significant subrecipient or subcontract relationships for which there appears to be no 
clear programmatic or business justification (for example, a subrecipient providing 
services it does not appear qualified to provide, or a vendor geographically distant 
from the entity when nearby vendors are available).
Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees, 
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to 
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such 
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from 
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following 
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or 
earnings trend.
a. An excessive interest by management or employees in meeting or exceeding the entity’s 
budgetary targets through the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices.
2. Ineffective communication and support of the entity’s values or ethical standards by 
management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards.
a. An ineffective or nonexistent means of communicating and supporting the entity’s values 
or ethics, especially regarding such matters as acceptable business practices, conflicts of 
interests, and code of conduct.
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3. Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities.
a. Management displaying or conveying an attitude of disinterest regarding strict adherence
to federal rules and regulations, such as those related to participant eligibility, benefit 
determinations, or eligibility.
Auditor Responses
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the 
following responses to fraud risk factors.
• Additional or more focused analytical procedures concerning actual to expectation variances 
and their underlying causes.
• Testing of larger samples of transactions of expenditures for conformity with allowable cost 
principles.
• Consultation with the funding agency’s inspector general or other oversight organization 
regarding specific risks and responses for particular programs.
• More focused testing of programs or cost categories for which the entity has a history of prior 
findings and questioned costs.
• More detailed testing of transactions made by or potentially affected by entity or program 
managers who have motives to produce particular budgetary, programmatic, or financial results.
• Confirm transaction details with other governments (for example, grants, tax collections, or 
receivable/payable balances) pertaining to year-end cut-offs.
• Additional inquiry and tests on collectibility of interfund receivables, particularly those 
reporting large continuing balances.
• More focused review of documentation of write-offs of uncollectible taxes and other 
receivables.
• Confirm with revenue sources to determine if revenue recognized was for services performed 
before year end, and vouch revenue to bank statements to ensure that the revenue was received 
in the availability period.
• Conduct a more rigorous search for unrecorded liabilities by more closely examining 
disbursements made after year end. (Consider looking at wire transfers, debit memos, and 
other EFTs, not just checks.)
• More detailed analysis of investment portfolios and investments policies; and use of 
investment risk specialists to better assess the level of risk of the entity’s investments.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Auditors should note that since SAS No. 99 applies only to an audit of 
financial statements, its requirements do not apply to an audit of an auditee’s compliance with
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specified requirements applicable to its major programs. However, as part of assessing audit risk 
in a single or program-specific audit, the auditor should specifically assess the risk of material 
noncompliance with a major program’s compliance requirements occurring due to fraud. The 
auditor should consider that assessment in designing the audit procedures to be performed. Some 
of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where specific circumstances do 
not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may exist that mitigate the 
risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or conditions are present. 
When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether those risk factors 
and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material misstatement of the 
financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also 
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, 
opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements 
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and 
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent 
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exists. The following are examples of risk 
factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities
1. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of 
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the 
following:
a. Inadequate segregation of duties or independent checks, especially in areas such as 
outreach, intake, eligibility determination, and benefits awards.
b. Inadequate system of authorization and approval of transactions, such as purchasing, 
benefit determinations, and eligibility.
c. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions, such as eligibility and 
benefit determinations.
Auditor Responses
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the 
following responses to fraud risk factors.
• Additional participant eligibility testing, including unannounced visits to intake centers, work 
sites, and other sites where the existence and the identity of participants can be verified.
• Observation of benefit payment distribution to identify “ghost” program participants (another 
option: reconciling terminated employees per the human resources system with active 
employee lists per the payroll system).
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Use of confirmation letters to ensure the existence of program participants.
Review of governmental entity’s purchasing practices to make sure that prices are reasonable 
for the products purchased (inflated prices a possible indication or disclosure of purchasing 
agent acceptance of bribes, gratuities, or kickbacks).
Examination of outstanding encumbrances and encumbrances that were released in the first 
part of the next year to determine if the encumbering of the funds was appropriate and legal.
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Health Care Organizations
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a 
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider 
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not 
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures
1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence, 
or interest rates.
(1) A failure or inability to keep pace with the rapid growth on medical technology, if the 
financial stability or profitability of the particular entity is placed at risk due to that 
failure or inability.
b. Intense scrutiny by governmental bodies, watchdog groups, and other interested parties of 
the organization, placing unusual pressure on management. Situations targeted for 
investigation might include:
(1) Improper billing of services performed by residents.
(2) Inappropriate transfers or discharges.
(3) Illegal arrangements involving physicians.
(4) Improper referrals.
(5) Billing for nonapproved medical devices.
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(You should be aware of the existence of these types of situations in the health care 
industry. If these situations are identified on an engagement, they should be considered in 
the auditor’s assessment of material misstatement due to fraud.)
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third 
parties due to the following:
a. Intense pressure from governmental bodies and health maintenance organizations to 
embrace cost containment and efficiency enhancement programs.
3. Management or the board of directors’ personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s 
financial performance arising from the following:
a. Bonuses or incentive compensation are tied to operating results.
Opportunities
1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. The existence of many complex third-party payor contracts.
2. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
a. A board of directors mainly composed of local business people and doctors. A board 
composed of such people, combined with large available financial resources, creates the 
potential for insider business deals.
b. A board of directors composed of people who lack the necessary experience and skills to 
properly oversee a health care organization.
3. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of significant controls, including automated controls.
(1) Lack of oversight or control of various affiliations in an integrated health delivery 
system.
(2) Lack of management review of dispersed locations.
(3) Insufficient board or senior management oversight of critical processes, such as:
— Establishment of allowance for uncollectible accounts and contractual 
adjustments, build-up of unallocated reserve.
— Incident monitoring, follow-up, and settlement.
— Business affiliations and combinations.
— Regulatory compliance.
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Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees 
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to 
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such 
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from 
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following 
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1.Ineffective communication and support of the entity’s values or ethical standards by 
management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards,
a. Lack of an effective corporate compliance program.
2. Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities, 
a. Failure to respond to recent regulatory reviews.
3. Attitude that generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) is not as strict for nonpublic 
entities (for example, often seen in setting up “cookie-jar” reserves or ignoring other than 
temporary impairments).
4. Attitude that materiality can be stretched further for not-for-profits.
Auditor Response
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99. An auditor may want to consider the 
following response.
Allowance for uncollectible accounts and contractual adjustments. If there is the risk of material 
misstatement concerning the allowance for uncollectible accounts and contractual adjustments, the 
auditor should consider taking a more substantive approach to testing the factors used to determine 
such allowances. Such steps might include more detailed analytical procedures, such as analyses of 
historical contractual adjustments and accounts receivable runoff (actual cash) by specific payors to 
the recorded allowance or the testing and analysis of the collectibility of a sufficient number of 
accounts to arrive at an independent conclusion about the adequacy of the allowance.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
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Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also classified 
along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, opportunity, and 
attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements arising from fraudulent 
financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets 
occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and weakness in internal control may be 
present when misstatements due to either fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets 
exists. The following are examples of risk factors related to misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities
1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to 
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are 
the following:
a. Large amounts of cash payments received for medical care.
b. Pharmaceutical inventory with high street value, or in high demand.
Auditor Responses
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor may want to consider the 
following responses.
Cash receipts. The auditor may have identified a risk of material misstatement relating to the 
potential embezzlement of cash receipts. The lack of internal accounting controls provides the 
opportunity for the embezzlement to be covered up through bad debt, contractual, or other write-offs. 
In this situation, the auditor might expand the review of cash receipts to compare remittance advises 
to accounts posted as received or might review specific accounts which have been written off for 
appropriateness.
Kickbacks from suppliers. The auditor may have identified a risk of material misstatement relating to 
potential kickbacks from suppliers. Such kickbacks might result in the entity paying excessive 
amounts for goods. The auditor might have concluded that the lack of adequate internal accounting 
control over the purchasing process provides the opportunity for this to occur. The auditor might 
consider, in these circumstances, a more detailed analytical review of expenses and a review of a 
sample of invoices to compare amounts paid for specific items to amounts per purchase contracts or 
with independent prices obtained from other vendors.
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Insurance Companies
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a 
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider 
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not 
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures
1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
(1) New criteria used by rating agencies to assign ratings to insurers.
(2) Impact of codification of statutory accounting principles.
(3) Demutualization.
(4) Changes in risk-based capital requirements.
(5) Changes in consolidation criteria (for example, SPEs)
(6) Changes in liability recognition for GMDBs and other proposed GAAP changes 
affecting the insurance business.
b. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence, 
or interest rates.
(1) Rapidly changing distribution network results in different sales vehicles without 
adequate controls (for example, possible use of the Internet).
(2) Changes in interest rates may have a significant impact on the financial results of 
many life insurance companies.
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c. Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other companies in 
the same industry.
(1) Unusual and considerable increases in the number of policyholders over a short 
period of time.
(2) Loss ratios significantly different from companies offering similar insurance 
coverages.
(3) Unusual or significant increases in fee income (for variable products where fees are a 
direct result of assets under management) in a period of market decline, as compared 
to other companies in the same industry.
(4) Unusual increases in the number of policies in mature lines of business, potentially 
indicating inadequate pricing to gain business from competitors.
d. Emerging trends in claims settlement and litigation, including:
(1) Identification of emerging new classes of claims.
(2) Plaintiffs’ expanded theory of liability.
(3) Court coverage decisions and judicial interpretations.
(4) Expanded liability due to changes in legislation.
e. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
(1) Rapid development of new products reacting to the market environment without 
adequate review of long-term strategies.
(2) Volatility of earnings due to market environment that could cause a company to 
manipulate earnings.
f. Volatility of earnings due to catastrophic losses could cause the company to manipulate 
earnings in other areas.
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third 
parties due to the following:
a. Profitability or trend expectations of investment analysts.
b. Pressure to maintain or improve ratings from rating agencies.
c. Close to tripping risk-based capital (RBC) requirements.
Opportunities
l.T he nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related 
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
(1) Unusual or complex intercompany reinsurance transactions.
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(2) Transactions entered into with affiliates, the impact of which are to increase statutory 
surplus.
(3) Complex and/or inconsistent expense allocation agreements.
b. Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve 
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.
(1) Estimates for loss and loss adjustment expenses, reinsurance recoverables, deferred 
acquisition costs (DAC), reserves, and others based on unusually subjective judgments.
(2) Significant purchases and sales of securities that do not have an active market, which 
could indicate “parking losses.”
(3) Aggressive policies related to revenue recognition for administrative-service type 
contracts.
(4) Improper classification of normal operating losses as “catastrophe-related” in 
financial reporting (for example, management discussion and analysis, footnote 
disclosure). Also, the diversion of an insurer’s resources in dealing with a catastrophe 
could put a strain on internal controls.
c. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to period end, 
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
(1) High yields on investments that appear to be low risk.
(2) Transactions that “convert” nonadmitted assets to admitted assets.
(3) Numerous and complex off-balance-sheet financing transactions.
(4) Reinsurance transactions that embody loss assumptions that are very different from 
industry or historical trends in order to pass the “transfer of risk” rules.
(5) Transactions that “convert” realized capital gains/losses to ordinary income or vise versa.
(6) Significant closing journal entries for insurers that maintain their books on a statutory 
basis of accounting, which requires the need to post several statutory-to-GAAP 
adjusting entries.
(7) Significant or unusual amount of quarter-end or year-end manual entries posted after 
consolidation.
(8) Estimates of the value of closely held securities.
— Agreements accounted for as reinsurance transactions that do not transfer risk.
2. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
a. Domination of the board of directors because it is composed primarily of a company’s 
close business partners (for example, agents, bankers, and lawyers)
3. There is a complex organizational structure as evidenced by the following:
a. Significant transactions included in noninsurance affiliates with the sole purpose of excluding 
such activity from the statutory-basis financial statements filed with the insurance regulators.
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4. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Information systems cannot account for the complex features of insurance policies issued.
(for example, policies with complex deductible features).
Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees, 
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to 
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such 
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from 
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following 
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or 
earnings trend or statutory capital position.
a. Risk transfer criteria for reinsurance transactions rarely met.
b. Use of discretionary reserves to manipulate earnings.
2. A failure by management to display and communicate an appropriate attitude regarding 
internal control and the financial reporting process.
a. Lack of board or management oversight of critical processes:
(1) Underwriting—control risk, price risk.
(2) IT systems or resources to effectively administer complex insurance or reinsurance 
contract provisions.
(3) Monitoring of creditworthiness of reinsurers.
(4) Suspense account clearance.
(5) Treasury—securities/derivatives valuation (selection of models, methodologies, and 
assumptions).
(6) Establishment of loss and loss adjustment expense reserves.
(7) Investment decisions.
(8) Understanding of critical accounting policies and significant estimates.
b. No business risk management responsibility or function.
c. No accounting policy responsibility or function.
d. Management’s inattention to establishing independent reporting lines for key assurance 
functions (for example, internal audit and quality control reviews of claims and 
underwriting).
e. Lack of insurance-industry or finance experience on the audit committee.
3. Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities, 
a. Existence of a regulatory enforcement action.
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b. Prior examination findings not addressed or inadequately addressed.
c. Mandated restatements of regulatory financial reports due to inappropriate accounting 
treatment.
d. Assessments of market conduct fines.
4. A strained relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor, as 
exhibited by the following:
a. Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or 
reporting matters such as the reasonableness of sensitive estimates (for example, loss and 
loss adjustment expense reserves, allowances for uncollectible reinsurance, DAC, and 
other amounts).
b. Issuance of reportable condition or material weakness letters.
c. Failure of management to address reportable condition or material weakness issues on a 
timely basis.
5. Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in or preoccupation with the selection of 
the accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates.
a. Lack of management to establish controls over accounting policy issues.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also 
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, 
opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements 
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and 
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent 
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exists. The following are examples of risk 
factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
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Incentives/Pressures
1. Adverse relationships between the entity and employees with authority over cash and assets 
could motivate employees to misappropriate those assets.
a. History of workforce reductions (for example, combining regional claims offices).
Opportunities
1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to 
misappropriation, for example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are 
the following:
a. Significant activity and/or balances present in suspense accounts.
b. Large volume premium checks received by the insurance company rather than being sent 
to a lockbox.
c. Premiums are not directly remitted to the insurer but are instead collected by the agent.
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of 
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the 
following:
a. Inadequate segregation of duties or independent checks.
(1) Lack of rotation or review of claim adjusters on long-term claims.
(2) Custodial reconciliations performed by an individual who records the amount to the 
ledger.
b. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
(1) Lack of adequate monitoring of underwriting policies and procedures.
(2) Lack of management review or control processes over year-end or month-end 
transactions.
(3) Extensive use of managing general agents (MGAs) with little or no supervision by 
management.
(4) Lack of internal audit and/or claim quality review functions.
(5) Inadequate payment approval process.
(6) Lack of review or inadequate controls over system overrides (for example, claim 
payments and commissions)
(7) Lack of strong custodial controls over cash/investments.
c. Loans requested on life policies occurring soon after large deposits on the policy are made. 
The loan could be issued before the deposit check clears, and then the check is returned for 
insufficient funds.
d. Large volume of duplicate claims processed.
e. Large volume of claims paid to post office boxes.
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f. Large volume of claims paid to the same claimant.
g. Large volume of claims paid to employees.
Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of employee attitudes/rationalizations that allow them to justify 
misappropriations of assets, are not susceptible to observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the 
auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such information should consider it in identifying the 
risks of material misstatement arising from fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may 
become aware of the following information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Failure to report all instances of fraud to the audit committee.
2. Failure to properly staff internal audit and other (claims/underwriting) quality control functions.
3. Poor relationships between management, employees, and agents that may appear to justify 
misappropriations of assets.
4. Disregard for internal control over misappropriation of assets by overriding existing controls 
or by failing to correct known internal control deficiencies.
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Investment Companies
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a 
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider 
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not 
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls 
may exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess 
whether those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of 
material misstatement of the financial statements.
Opportunities
1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related 
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
(1) Significant transactions with affiliates that are not approved by the board of directors 
in accordance with Section 17 of the Investment Company Act.
(2) Transactions involving affiliates that are not readily apparent in the circumstances, or 
apparent but not properly disclosed.
b. Significant investments for which readily available market quotes are not available and 
inadequate procedures for estimating these values.
c. Significant investments in derivative financial instruments for which value is very difficult 
to estimate.
2. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. A failure by management to display and communicate an appropriate attitude regarding 
internal control and the financial reporting process.
b. Unusual and considerable influence of the portfolio manager over pricing sources and fair 
valuation methodology used to value securities.
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c. Lack of board’s involvement in the establishment of the fair valuation policies and 
procedures or lack of oversight over those policies and procedures.
d. Ability of management to unilaterally override internal control system, particularly 
security valuations.
e. Lack of adviser’s supervisory or oversight procedures over the subadviser.
f. Inadequate controls around the calculation of the net asset value.
g. Reconciliation of security holdings with the custodian that are infrequent and incomplete.
h. Inadequate monitoring of the fund’s tax status as a regulated investment company.
i. Inadequate monitoring of the fund’s compliance with its prospectus requirements.
j. Transfer agency controls are ineffective or implementation of user controls are ineffective.
k. Lack of an appropriate policy regarding corrections of net asset value errors, or failure to 
comply with policy.
l. Lack of board members’ understanding of how portfolio management intends to implement 
the fund’s investment objectives, thereby creating a situation in which management can 
aggressively interpret or disregard policies in place.
m. Lack of board members’ understanding of derivatives used by portfolio managers and 
involvement in approving or disapproving use of specific strategies such as embedded 
leverage, thereby creating a situation in which management can aggressively interpret or 
disregard policies in place.
n. Incomplete or insufficient description of portfolio positions in accounting records to 
permit adequate monitoring of prospectus requirements.
Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees 
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to 
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such 
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from 
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following 
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in, or preoccupation with, the selection of 
accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates.
a. An excessive focus on maintaining a high rate of dividend payments regardless of the 
fund’s actual earnings.
2. Known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations, or claims against the 
entity, its senior management, or board members alleging fraud or violations of laws and regulations,
a. Past suspensions of ability to act as an investment adviser or requirement that the adviser
be supervised by others.
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3. A practice by management of committing to creditors and other third parties to achieve 
aggressive or unrealistic forecasts.
a. Commitment to achieving a low-targeted expense ratio at or below competitors’ average.
4. Adviser’s fee revenues (including performance incentives) directly related to either the value 
of fund assets or performance, if the adviser has substantial discretion in valuing portfolio 
investments and changes in fee revenues may be significant to the adviser.
5. Undisclosed use of soft-dollar credits and other items to reduce a gross ratio below a cap so 
the adviser does not have to reimburse the fund for excess expenses.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also 
classified along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures; 
opportunity; and attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements 
arising from fraudulent financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and 
weakness in internal control may be present when misstatements due to either fraudulent 
financial reporting or misappropriation of assets exists. The following are examples of risk 
factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities
1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to 
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are 
the following:
a. Use of soft dollar arrangements for the benefit of the adviser without client consent 
(including existence of undocumented or ill-defined arrangements).
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of 
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the 
following:
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a. Access to funds and securities and accounting for them directly controlled by adviser, with 
inadequate segregation of duties (or no direct communication between custodian and 
accounting personnel).
b. Lack of any periodic review of a transfer agency’s control design and operation by an 
independent auditor knowledgeable in the area (such as a SAS No. 70 report).
c. Infrequent and incomplete reconciliation of security holdings with the custodian.
d. Lack of clearly defined policy with respect to personal investing activities (for example, 
front-running fund trades or taking investment opportunities for personal use).
e. Ineffective transfer agency controls or ineffective implementation of user controls in a 
service center environment.
f. Lack of segregation of duties between portfolio management and trading, or absence of 
independent review of trading executions (for example, unexpected concentrations of 
trading with counterparties, poor trade executions, or higher-than-normal commissions 
that may indicate existence of collusion between portfolio personnel and counterparties).
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Not-for-Profit Organizations
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a 
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider 
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not 
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Incentives/Pressures
1. Financial stability or the ability to generate excess revenues over expenses is threatened by 
economic, industry, or entity operating conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
(1) Unusually intense competition for the limited pool of resources, such as contributions 
and grants, exists, thereby pressuring management to present a particular financial 
picture in the hope of attracting those contributions and grants.
(2) An increase in not-for-profits (NPOs) trying to serve the same niche, thereby causing 
market saturation.
(3) Pressure to decrease costs because of market competition, such as privatization.
(4) Increased costs due to changes in market conditions or other factors.
b. The threat of imminent third-party funding termination or significant reductions in third- 
party funding.
(1) Political and economic events, causing dramatic decreases in resources, such as grants 
and contributions.
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2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third 
parties due to the following:
a. An intense focus by external financial statement users, such as rating agencies and the 
media, on the amounts reported as program, management and general, and fund-raising 
expenses.
b. A mix of fixed price, units of service, and cost-reimbursement program types funded by 
third parties that creates incentives to shift costs or manipulate the manner in which certain 
transactions are reported.
c. Funders or others pay undue attention to certain ratios, such as program expense to total 
expense, or fundraising costs to contributions.
d. An entity embroiled in a scandal or bad publicity that threatens its charitable base or, for 
regulatory or other economic reasons, its very existence.
e. Resource providers who set up restrictions or conditions based on amounts reported in the 
financial statements.
f. NPOs involved in certain activities which, if disclosed to the public, may affect 
contributions.
3. Management personal net worth is threatened by the entity’s financial performance arising 
from the following:
a. Significant portions of their compensation represented by bonuses, or other incentives, 
being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for operating results, financial 
position, or cash flow.
(1) A significant portion of management’s compensation linked to aggressive program 
accomplishments or aggressive fund-raising targets.
Opportunities
l.T he nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year end 
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
(1) The existence of numerous split-interest agreements containing complex provisions.
b. Diverse programs funded by multiple sources involving many complex requirements that 
must be complied with.
c. Complex and changing administrative or programmatic requirements imposed by resource 
providers.
d. Several restricted gifts and/or purchase of service contracts with terms, which may create 
incentives to improperly shift costs among them.
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2. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
a. Domination of management by a single person or small group without compensating 
controls.
(1) Executive director possesses significant power and latitude to manage programs, 
activities, and transactions and to override controls.
(2) Board member or group of board members possessing significant power or significant 
community influence, thereby potentially adversely affecting management and 
auditors’ decisions.
b. Ineffective board of directors or audit committee oversight over the financial reporting 
process and internal control.
c. Board members or management—paid or volunteer—charged with oversight 
responsibilities, lacking the necessary background experience in NPO management and 
NPO program activities or lacking a commitment to fulfilling their duties.
d. A major donor or fundraiser exercising substantial influence over the affairs of the 
organization.
3. There is a complex or unstable organizational structure as evidenced by the following:
a. Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial 
lines of authority.
(1) Significant subrecipient or subcontract relationships, without a clear program purpose 
or business justification.
(2) Unusual investment vehicles without appropriate board oversight.
(3) Multiple locations with inadequate management to properly oversee decentralized 
operations.
Auditor Responses
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 99, an auditor of a not-for-profit 
organization may want to consider the following responses.
• Send confirmations to donors not only to confirm the amount of promises to give in the future, 
but also to clarify the nature of any restrictions.
• Perform more focused analytical procedures related to program-specific budgets.
• Test larger samples of expenditures for conformity with allowable cost principles.
• Extend confirmation procedures with donors to attempt to determine that all contribution 
revenue was recorded.
• Thoroughly analyze and test the assumptions underlying allocation of costs to various 
programs.
• Review reports received from subrecipients.
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Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also classified 
along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, opportunity, and 
attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements arising from fraudulent 
financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets 
occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and weakness in internal control may be 
present when misstatements due to either fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets 
exists. The following are examples of risk factors related to misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities
1. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of 
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the following:
a. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
(1) Failure to develop adequate controls over contributions and grants, resulting from the 
assignment of scarce resources more to program activities and less to internal control.
b. Inadequate job applicant screening of employees and volunteers with access to assets.
(1) The presence of volunteers working in the organization, who have access to assets 
susceptible to misappropriation and who have not been adequately screened.
c. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions.
(1) Inadequately documented promises to give in the future.
d. Board members or management—paid or volunteer—charged with oversight 
responsibilities, lacking the necessary background experience in NPO management and 
NPO program activities or lacking a commitment to fulfilling their duties.
e. Fundraising, in general (due to inherent limitations on ability of management and auditor 
to perform full inclusion testing).
f. Fundraising from “anonymous donors.”
g. Fundraising involving currency.
h. Fundraising taking place outside of formal supervision.
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Public Utilities
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a 
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider 
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not 
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
Incentives/Pressures
1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. Proposed changes in the federal and state regulatory environment introducing a high level 
of competition into the market that may create pressure on profitability and potential 
losses related to “stranded investments.”
b. Considerable pressure to maintain or reduce rates that may create pressure on earnings.
Opportunities
1. Nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in fraudulent 
financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve 
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.
(1) Consideration should be given to:
— Significant regulatory deferrals.
— Embedded regulatory assets.
— The recognition of regulatory liabilities.
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Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees 
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to 
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such 
information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from 
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following 
information that may indicate a risk factor:
1. Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory authorities.
a. Failure to appropriately respond to findings from the latest commission-mandated 
management audit.
b. Significant disallowances of allowable cost in latest rate proceeding.
2. Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or 
earnings trend through the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices.
a. Inappropriate deferral of incurred cost or failure to write off previously deferred cost 
pursuant to the provisions of FASB Statement No. 71, Accounting fo r  the Effects o f 
Certain Types o f Regulation.
b. Failure to recognize a regulatory liability pursuant to the provisions of FASB Statement 
No. 71.
c. Unusually aggressive accrual of performance awards and incentives.
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Real Estate Entities
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a 
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider 
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not 
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Incentives/Pressures
1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
General:
a. There has been a loss or possible loss of a significant tenant or group of tenants.
b. There are major tenants experiencing financial difficulties that may affect their ability to 
meet lease obligations.
c. There have been events or changes in circumstances that indicate that the carrying value of 
real estate assets may not be recoverable.
d. Real estate assets are held for sale.
e. Rental collection problems have been noted.
f. The entity has sold real estate for which the collectibility of the sales price is not 
reasonably assured, the entity is obligated to perform significant activities after the date of 
sale, or the entity has a substantial continuing involvement in the property without transfer 
of substantially all risks and awards.
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g. There are real estate projects under development for which issues related to capitalization 
of expenses are evident.
h. The entity has entered into sales-leaseback transactions.
i. The entity’s construction activities are subject to an overbuilt market, abnormal 
construction delays, or other potentially detrimental occurrences.
Factors applicable to real estate investment trusts (REITs):
a. The REIT is in jeopardy of noncompliance with REIT tax requirements.
b. There have been significant changes in the number of shareholders of the entity, or in the 
amounts of stock owned by its largest shareholders.
c. There have been significant changes in the amount of real estate assets owned as a 
percentage of the entity’s total assets.
d. There have been significant changes in the nature of the investments that are the primary 
sources of the entity’s income.
e. There have been significant changes in the entity’s established policies or strategies for 
distributing its income.
Factors applicable to real estate companies involved in lending activities:
a. The entity has entered into transactions using futures, options, swaps, or other financial 
instruments for purposes other than to hedge against exposure to interest rate risk.
b. The entity has a significant volume of commercial real estate loans in any geographic area.
c. The entity has significant foreign loans.
d. The entity has a significant amount of real estate acquired through foreclosure at the end 
of the current period.
e. The entity has sold loans with recourse during the year.
Opportunities
l.T he nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
General:
a. Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related 
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
(1) Interdependent, multiple transactions between the same parties or their affiliates.
b. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year end 
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
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(1) Complicated criteria for recognizing sales transactions, making it difficult to assess 
the completeness of the earnings process.
(2) Significant “side agreements” or transaction terms not previously disclosed.
c. Key contracts awarded without a competitive bidding process.
d. Significant transactions for which documents are dated close to the last business day of 
the year.
e. Significant one-time fees or other payments (for example, easements and bill board).
f. Aggressive billing of expenses to tenants under expense recovery provisions of leases.
Factors applicable to real estate companies involved in lending activities:
a. The entity has engaged in transactions that are defined as “ADC Arrangements” in the 
AICPA Practice Bulletin 1, Exhibit I.
b. Several sales of foreclosed property or other troubled assets have been made to one 
individual or group, with financing by the entity.
2. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
Factors applicable to real estate companies involved in lending activities:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls.
(1) The entity has an underwriting policy that does not require appropriate approvals 
based on the size and complexity of the loan.
b. High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or 
information technology staff.
(1) The individual responsible for the entity’s interest-rate risk management program is 
inexperienced in that area.
Attitudes/ Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or 
employees, that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be 
susceptible to observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the 
existence of such information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement 
arising from fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the 
following information that may indicate a risk factor.
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General:
1. Revenue recognition in accordance with lease terms when there are significant receivables due 
from the tenant.
2. Excessive optimism with respect to uncollected rents from tenants.
3. Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or 
earnings trend.
a. An excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the reported amount of 
real estate assets though the use of unusually aggressive appraisal assumptions.
b. The use by management of unusually aggressive accounting practices in recognizing 
revenue from real estate sales.
c. The use by management of unusually aggressive accounting practices in recognizing 
revenues from the termination of leases with tenants.
4. Aggressive assumptions related to subleasing space assumed by the entity as a result of a lease 
with a tenant(s).
5. The existence of tax indemnities.
6. Loan agreements have significant up-front or back-end fees, which are atypical and are not 
amortized into interest expense over the life of the loan.
7. Excessive capitalization of general, administrative, and overhead expenses.
8. Capitalization of interest and other costs on land and developments with limited actual 
development activity.
9. Inadequate responses or an unwillingness to respond to inquiries about known regulatory 
or legal issues (for example, the presence of environmental contamination on an entity- 
owned site).
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of 
financial statements. Some of the following factors and conditions are present in entities where 
specific circumstances do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, specific controls may 
exist that mitigate the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk factors or 
conditions are present. When identifying risk factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in combination, present a risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements.
Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets are also classified 
along the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentives/pressures, opportunity, and 
attitudes/rationalizations. Some of the risk factors related to misstatements arising from fraudulent 
financial reporting also may be present when misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets 
occur. For example, ineffective monitoring of management and weakness in internal control may be
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present when misstatements due to either fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets 
exists. The following are examples of risk factors related to misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets.
Opportunities
1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to 
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are 
the following:
General:
a. Significant unencumbered real estate that could be used as collateral for an unauthorized 
loan, the proceeds of which are distributed to an individual or outside entity.
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of 
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the 
following:
General:
a. Real estate asset purchases or sales occur with related parties.
b. Lease agreements exist with related parties at below-market terms.
c. Debt of an individual or outside entity is guaranteed.
d. Transaction with related parties exist in which capital items are combined with expense 
items.
e. Capital items are expensed and billed to tenants as recoverable expenses.
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Small, Privately Owned Businesses
Two types of fraud are relevant to the auditor’s consideration: fraudulent financial reporting and 
misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: 
incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a 
broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider 
additional or different risk factors. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not 
intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.
The following list of example risk factors for small, privately owned businesses includes SAS No. 99 
example risk factors most relevant to these entities as well as additional example risk factors.
Part 1: Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Incentives/Pressures
1. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
a. High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
b. New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
c. Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the 
industry or the economy in which the entity operates.
d. High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence, 
or interest rates.
e. Operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy or foreclosure imminent.
f. Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows from 
operations while reporting earnings and earnings growth.
g. Rapid growth or unusual profitability especially compared to that of other companies in 
the same industry.
2. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third 
parties due to the following:
a. Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive, including financing 
of major research and development or capital expenditures.
b. Marginal ability to meet debt repayment or other debt covenant requirements.
3. Management’s personal net wealth is threatened by the entity’s financial performance arising 
from the following:
a. Heavy concentrations of their personal net worth in the entity.
b. Personal guarantees of debt of the entity that are significant to their personal net worth.
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c. Adverse consequences on significant matters if good financial results are reported. 
Specific examples include management’s motivation to inappropriately reduce income 
taxes, to defraud a divorced spouse or a partner of his or her share of the profits or assets 
of a business, or to convince a judge or arbitrator that the business in dispute is not capable 
of providing adequate cash flow. Keep in mind that you are not required to plan your audit 
to discover personal information (for example, marital status) of the owner-manager. 
However, if you become aware of such information, you should consider it in your 
assessment of risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
4. There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet financial targets 
set by the owner, including sales or profitability incentive goals.
Opportunities
1. The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
a. Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related 
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
b. Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve 
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.
c. Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year end 
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
2. There is a complex or unstable organizational structure as evidenced by the following:
a. Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in 
the entity.
b. Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial 
lines of authority.
c. High turnover of senior management or counsel.
3. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
a. Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls.
b. High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting staff.
c. Ineffective accounting and information systems, including situations involving reportable 
conditions.
Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees 
that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to 
observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such
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information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from 
fraudulent financial reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following 
information that may indicate a risk factor:
l .A  failure for management to display and communicate an appropriate attitude regarding 
internal control and the financial reporting process.
2 .Ineffective communication and support of the entity’s values or ethical standards by 
management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards.
3. Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in or preoccupation with the selection of 
accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates.
4. Known history of violations or claims against the entity, its owner, or senior management 
alleging fraud or violations of laws and regulations.
5. A practice by management of committing to creditors and other third parties to achieve 
aggressive or unrealistic forecasts.
6. Management failing to correct known reportable conditions on a timely basis.
7. An interest by management in employing inappropriate means to minimize reported earnings 
for tax motivated reasons.
8. Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting on the 
basis of materiality.
9. The relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor is strained, as 
exhibited by the following:
a. Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or 
reporting matters.
b. Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints regarding the 
completion of the audit or the issuance of the auditor’s report.
c. Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit access to people or 
information or the ability to communicate effectively with the board of directors or audit 
committee.
d. Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially involving 
attempts to influence the scope of the auditor’s work or the selection or continuance of 
audit personnel assigned to the engagement.
Part 2: Misappropriation of Assets
The following are examples of risk factors related to misstatements arising from misappropriations of 
assets.
Incentives/Pressures
1. Personal financial obligations may create pressure on management or employees with access 
to cash or other assets susceptible to theft to misappropriate those assets.
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2. Adverse relationships between the entity and employees with access to cash or other assets 
susceptible to theft may motivate those employees to misappropriate those assets. For 
example, adverse relationships may be created by the following:
a. Known or anticipated future layoffs.
b. Promotions, compensation, or other rewards inconsistent with expectations.
Opportunities
1. Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to 
misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are 
the following:
a. Large amounts of cash on hand or processed.
b. Company-issued credit cards.
c. Inventory items that are small in size, of high value, or in high demand.
d. Easily convertible assets.
e. Fixed assets that are small in size, marketable, or lacking observable identification of 
ownership.
2. Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of 
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the 
following:
a. Inadequate segregation of duties or independent checks. Inadequate segregation of duties 
is quite often understandable in a small business environment in that it is a function of the 
entity’s size. However, you should consider it in conjunction with other risk factors and 
with mitigating controls.
b. Inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets.
c. Inadequate job applicant screening of employees with access to assets.
d. Inadequate recordkeeping with respect to assets.
e. Inadequate system of authorization and approval of transactions (for example, in 
purchasing).
f. Inadequate physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or fixed assets.
g. Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions, for example, credits for 
merchandise returns.
h. Lack of mandatory vacations for employees performing key control functions.
i. Inadequate management understanding of information technology, which enables 
information technology employees to perpetrate a misappropriation.
j. Inadequate access controls over automated records.
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Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of employee attitudes/rationalizations that allow them to justify 
misappropriations of assets, are generally not susceptible to observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, 
the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such information should consider it in identifying 
the risks of material misstatement arising from misappropriations of assets. For example, auditors 
may become aware of the following attitudes or behavior of employees who have access to assets 
susceptible to misappropriation:
1. Disregard for the need for monitoring or reducing risks related to misappropriations of assets.
2. Disregard for internal control over misappropriation of assets by overriding existing controls 
or by failing to correct known internal control deficiencies.
3. Behavior indicating displeasure or dissatisfaction with the company or its treatment of the 
employee.
4. Changes in behavior or lifestyle that may indicate assets have been misappropriated.
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APPENDIX B: PITF 94-2, AUDITING INVENTORIES—  
PHYSICAL OBSERVATIONS
Date: July 1994 (Updated through July 1, 1999)
Notice to Readers
This Practice Alert is intended to provide auditors with information that may help them improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of their audits. This document has been prepared by the SEC 
Practice Section Professional Issues Task Force and is based on the experiences of the individual 
members of the task force and matters arising from litigation and peer reviews. It has not been 
approved, disapproved or otherwise acted upon by any committee of the AICPA.
Introduction
The inventories of most commercial entities, especially those of manufacturers or distributors, are 
material to their financial statements. By its nature, accounting for inventories is complex and 
generally involves a great deal of detail and is therefore susceptible to inadvertent errors. For similar 
reasons and the fact that auditors test only a portion of the inventories, there exists more than a low 
risk of manipulation when management is disposed toward financial statement fraud.
This Alert discusses some ways in which inventory frauds have been perpetrated and presents 
information that might help prevent such frauds from going undetected. This Alert deals primarily 
with issues related to the physical existence of inventories. This Alert does not cover matters 
pertaining to inventory obsolescence, pricing or costing.
Inventory Fraud Schemes/Techniques
Unfortunately, in many cases of inventory fraud, client personnel at various levels knowingly 
participated and assisted in the scheme. The following are examples of inventory frauds:
• Including inventory that is not what it is claimed to be or valuing nonexistent inventory. 
Examples are:
— Empty boxes or “hollow squares” in stacked goods.
— Mislabeled boxes containing scrap, obsolete items or lower value materials.
— Consigned inventory, inventory that is rented, or traded-in items for which credits have not
been issued.
— Diluted inventory so it is less valuable (e.g., adding water to liquid substances).
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• Increasing or otherwise altering the inventory counts for those items the auditor did not test count.
• Programming the computer to produce fraudulent physical quantity tabulations or priced 
inventory listings.
• Manipulating the inventory counts/compilations for locations not visited by the auditor.
• Double-counting inventory in transit between locations.
• Physically moving inventory and counting it at two locations.
• Including in inventory merchandise recorded as sold but not yet shipped to a customer (“bill 
and hold sales”).
• Arranging for false confirmations of inventory held by others.
• Including inventory receipts for which corresponding payables had not been recorded.
• Overstating the stage of completion of work-in-process.
• Reconciling physical inventory amounts to falsified amounts in the general ledger.
• Manipulating the “roll-forward” of an inventory taken before the financial statement date.
Planning Considerations
Even though there are numerous ways inventory frauds can be orchestrated, a well planned audit— 
appropriately executed with professional skepticism—can thwart many inventory falsification schemes. The 
audit procedures to be applied stem from and are responsive to the auditor’s assessment of risk (i.e., What 
could go wrong?). The use of analytical procedures (e.g., review of preliminary high-to-low inventory-value 
listings or comparison of year-to-year quantities) in planning the audit often helps identify inventory 
locations, areas or items for specific attention or greater scrutiny during and after the physical count.
To plan an appropriate and effective inventory observation, it is important for the engagement team 
leaders to have an understanding of the client’s business, its products, its computer processing 
applications and relevant controls before the physical count occurs, including knowledge of the 
physical inventory or cycle count procedures and the inventory summarization, pricing and 
cutoff procedures.
When a client plans to count inventories at various dates or at a date other than that of the financial 
statements, the early consideration of its business, internal controls and their effectiveness, and cutoff 
procedures are especially important. Heightened risks or the lack of adequate internal controls may 
suggest that the inventory should be taken and observed at year end.
An appropriate understanding of the client’s business systems, relevant computer processing 
applications and inventory procedures helps determine the experience needed by the personnel 
assigned to observe the physical count and their individual responsibilities. Assigning junior 
personnel to observe the count at a complex manufacturing operation may or may not be prudent, 
depending on the extent of on-site supervision provided. Similarly, work-in-process inventory 
presents completion/valuation issues that may call for a more experienced auditor.
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When the observation requires the use of personnel from another office or another CPA firm, 
adequate planning also enables the auditor to provide clear, comprehensive instructions about the 
scope of the engagement, the important risk factors, the relevant controls, cutoff procedures, and the 
expected level of reliance to be placed on internal controls.
The Actual Physical Count
• The risk of inclusion of duplicate or fictitious items is higher in areas and for items not test 
counted by the auditor. Testing some counts made by all count teams at locations visited and 
ensuring that hard-to-count items are test counted helps minimize the risk of misstatement.
• Applying analytical procedures to the final priced-out inventory detail can help identify 
inventory items that might require additional audit scrutiny.
• Although client personnel are often helpful to the auditor making test counts, making test 
counts of which client personnel are unaware provides added assurance. The auditor can also 
record the details of some quantities that the auditor did not actually count for comparison 
with the final inventory listing. Also, the auditor needs to maintain appropriate control over 
the audit work papers so the client is not aware of the details of the test counts.
• Because the description on a container may not always match the goods inside, it is a good 
idea to open some containers or packages. Checking for empty containers or “hollow squares” 
(i.e., spaces between stacks of boxes) and verifying the units of measure on tags or count 
sheets are meaningful procedures. When observing work-in-process inventory, the auditor also 
needs to consider the reasonableness of the recorded stage of completion.
• When incorrect counts are observed, the auditor considers the nature and significance of the 
errors and whether to increase the extent of test counts or expand other procedures. Recounts 
of particular areas or the work of particular count teams may be necessary.
• Scanning inventory tags or count sheets for unusual or unreasonable quantities and 
descriptions is a useful technique to verify their propriety. Subsequent to the physical count, it 
may be desirable to test large or unusual inventory quantities or items with large extended 
values that were not test counted during the observation.
• The need to monitor the client’s control over the physical count tags or sheets used should not 
be downplayed or overlooked. Paying close attention to tag/count sheet control procedures 
helps avoid the inclusion of improper items and ensures appropriate items are included in the 
final inventory listing.
Multiple Locations
Knowledge of all inventory locations is necessary to prevent the exclusion of any area(s) from audit 
consideration. Following are a few matters for auditors to consider related to multiple inventory 
locations.
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To help discourage the shifting of inventory from one location to another, the merits of taking the 
physical inventory at all significant locations at the same time should be considered. When the 
physical count at each significant location will not be observed, informing management that 
observations will be performed at some locations without advance notice might help discourage the 
manipulation of the quantity or quality of the inventory. For locations not visited, the auditor may 
perform alternative procedures to detect material misstatements. Comprehensive analytical 
procedures subsequently applied to priced-out inventory summarizations may be one such technique 
(e.g., the analysis of year-to-year inventories by location, the relationship of inventory to sales levels, 
etc.). However, the auditor needs to remember that analytical procedures may not always detect 
erroneous changes in inventory.
Inventories Held for or by Others
Ascertaining whether all inventory items on hand are the property of the client can be difficult in 
some situations. A client’s procedures for identifying, segregating and excluding from inventory 
goods held on consignment should be considered. Requesting information from selected suppliers 
about such goods helps in this regard. Once consignment goods have been identified, noting the 
descriptions, quantities, serial numbers and shipping advice numbers for some items will help the 
auditor determine whether those items were properly excluded from the client’s inventory.
When a client consigns inventory to others or stores merchandise at a third-party location, written 
confirmation of the goods held is ordinarily obtained directly from the custodian. If such goods are 
significant in amount, one or more of the procedures discussed in AU section 331.14, “Inventories 
Held in Public Warehouses,” which include visits to such locations and observation of physical 
counts, may be appropriate.
Use of Specialists
An auditor is not expected to possess the expertise of a specialist trained or qualified in another 
profession or occupation. Consequently, use of a specialist in certain situations to determine 
quantities (e.g., stockpiled materials, mineral reserves) or to value special-purpose inventory (e.g., 
high-technology materials or equipment, chemicals, works of art, precious gems) or to measure the 
stage of completion of long-term contracts may be appropriate. If the specialist used is affiliated or 
otherwise has a relationship with the client, the auditor will want to consider the need to perform 
procedures or otherwise test some or all of the specialist’s assumptions, methods and findings. This 
will provide information about the reasonableness of the findings. Alternatively, the auditor could 
engage another specialist for this purpose.
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Post-Observation Matters
The extent of audit procedures required normally increases when the inventory observation is 
performed at a date other than the balance sheet date. The extent and nature of the increase depends 
on the nature of the client’s business, the type of inventory, inventory turnover period, the records 
maintained, the strength of the related internal controls, and the time interval between the observation 
and the date of the balance sheet. Interim physical inventories or the client’s use of cycle count 
programs present different audit risks warranting careful assessment of controls, and by extension, 
different audit tests. This assessment of audit risks and key controls and the focused testing thereof, 
along with appropriate analytical procedures, are important audit procedures to consider in these 
circumstances. The guidance in AU section 313, “Substantive Tests Prior to the Balance-Sheet 
Date,” is relevant in these circumstances.
Testing significant items in the reconciliation of the physical inventory to the general ledger helps 
identify inadvertent errors along with intentional misstatements. Significant reconciling items for 
those locations where the physical counts were not observed by the auditor generally merit scrutiny. 
Goods in-transit and inventory transfers between affiliates, locations or departments are tested to 
ascertain their existence and to determine the propriety of their inclusion or exclusion.
Conclusion
Unfortunately, there are no foolproof methods for assuring that all inventory counts are free from 
inadvertent or intentional misstatement. No audit will necessarily detect all fraudulent activity, 
especially when collusion to mislead the auditors occurs among client personnel or with third parties. 
However, understanding the client’s business, its count procedures and controls and a resulting 
careful assessment of where and how quantity error might occur helps reduce the risk of inadvertent 
or intentional misstatement. Appropriate planning for the physical inventory observation together 
with healthy audit skepticism can effectively reduce the incidence of inventory misstatements.
This Practice Alert is not a complete list of all audit procedures, nor is every procedure discussed 
herein applicable in all circumstances. Additional information on this important subject is provided 
in the AICPA’s Auditing Procedures Study, Audits of Inventories (Product No. 021045MJ, $25).
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Notice to Readers
This Practice Alert is intended to provide auditors with information that may help them improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of their audits and is based on existing professional literature, the 
professional experience of the members of the Professional Issues Task Force (PITF) and 
information provided by SEC Practice Section member firms to their own professional staff. This 
information represents the views of the members of the PITF and is not an official position of the 
AICPA. Official positions are determined through certain specific committee procedures, due 
process and deliberation. The information provided herein should be used only with the 
understanding that it is to be read in conjunction with professional literature and that it is only a 
means of assisting auditors in meeting their professional responsibilities.
This Practice Alert is intended to provide auditors with information that will assist them in preparing 
for and participating in discussions with audit committees. In Dec. 1999, in response to 
Recommendation No. 8 of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate 
Audit Committees (BRC), the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) issued Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 90, Audit Committee Communications (SAS 90), that amended Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 61, Communications With Audit Committees (SAS 61) to require the independent 
auditor of an SEC client to discuss with a client’s audit committee the quality, not just acceptability, 
of the entity’s accounting principles. The BRC was formed in response to recommendations by SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt. The BRC published its final report in Feb. 1999. The report identifies its 
objectives as being “geared toward effecting pragmatic, progressive changes in the functions and 
expectations placed on corporate boards, audit committees, senior and financial management, the 
internal auditor, and the outside auditors regarding financial reporting and the oversight process.” 
The BRC Report includes 10 recommendations to promote those “pragmatic, progressive changes,” 
including Recommendation No. 8, which reads as follows:
The Committee recommends that Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) require that 
a company’s outside auditor discuss with the audit committee the auditor’s judgments about the 
quality, not just the acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles as applied in its 
financial reporting; the discussion should include such issues as the clarity of the company’s 
financial disclosures and degree of aggressiveness or conservatism of the company’s accounting 
principles and underlying estimates and other significant decisions made by management in 
preparing the financial disclosure and reviewed by the outside auditors. This requirement should 
be written in a way to encourage open, frank discussion and to avoid boilerplate.
217
Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit
As mentioned above, in response to Recommendation No. 8, in Dec. 1999 the ASB amended SAS 
61 to require additional communications with audit committees of SEC clients. This amendment 
adopted a modified form of Recommendation No. 8 requiring that the independent auditor discuss 
with the audit committee the quality, not just the acceptability, of the entity’s accounting principles as 
applied in its financial reporting. SAS 61, as amended, specifies that the discussion should involve 
management and include such matters as the consistency, clarity and completeness of accounting 
policies and disclosures.
The information in this Practice Alert was developed to assist firms in the identification of matters 
that may be relevant to a discussion with an entity’s audit committee of the quality of accounting 
principles used in the preparation of an entity’s financial statements.
The following discussion is in the context of communications between the auditor and the audit 
committee and/or board of directors. Discussions with the audit committee and/or board generally 
would include management because management prepares the financial statements and is most 
familiar with the transactions and environment in which the entity operates.
Auditing Standards Board Action and Objective of Recommendation No. 8
The PITF believes that the objective of Recommendation No. 8 is to educate and advise audit 
committee members so they may better carry out their oversight role on behalf of the board of 
directors and ultimately public shareholders. This objective becomes more critical and sensitive in 
fight of increasing expectations of the financial community with respect to audit committees.
The audit committee members benefit from the auditor’s views regarding the quality of the entity’s 
accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. At the same time, management must be 
regarded as a critical participant in that discussion. The intimate knowledge of management 
concerning the day-to-day as well as non-recurring matters that influence the operations and financial 
reporting is essential to an understanding of the financial information. To meet the objectives of the 
amendments to SAS 61, the PITF recommends the following:
• Manner of communications. Communications should be understandable to all members of the 
audit committee.
• Timeliness of communications. Discussions with the audit committee should be sufficiently 
frequent to ensure that audit committee members are advised of issues on a timely basis.
• Relevance of issues discussed. Periodic communications with the audit committee need not 
encompass all accounting principles, estimates and judgments. Rather, the communications 
could build on prior communications and address those accounting principles and unusual 
transactions that are more significant in any particular period’s financial statements. For 
example, an asset impairment policy might be discussed in greater detail in periods in which
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impairment charges are under consideration, including periods in which impairment charges 
were considered but determined not to be needed.
Following is a discussion of how management and the auditor may implement the three core 
communication considerations described above.
1. Manner of Communications
Management and the auditor should tailor communications with the audit committee to the 
professional and educational backgrounds of the committee members. Management and the auditor 
can enhance the accounting and financial literacy of the audit committee members by providing 
presentations on accounting issues, professional publications and financial press articles that will help 
the members understand critical and significant accounting and financial reporting issues.
2. Timeliness of Communications
Timely communication is inherently dependent upon management, the audit committee, and the 
independent auditor sharing a common understanding of the timetable and key milestones in the 
financial reporting continuum. The auditor should attempt to complete the quarterly reviews and 
annual audit procedures in sufficient time to provide for discussion of significant matters as required 
by SAS 61 with the audit committee on a timely basis and not later than the filing of the entity’s 
Form 10-Q or Form 10-K. The recently adopted SEC requirement for timely review of quarterly 
financial information is intended to provide greater assurance that accounting and financial reporting 
issues are identified and resolved timely.
3. Relevance of Issues Discussed
Topics that management and the auditor should consider discussing with the audit committee would 
include but not be limited to the following.
1. The accounting principles applied by the entity fo r  which acceptable alternative principles are 
available. The manner in which each significant alternative accounting principle would affect the 
transparency, understandability and usefulness of the financial information could be discussed. The 
discussion could include identification of the financial statement amounts that are affected by the 
choice of principles as well as information concerning accounting principles used by peer group 
companies.
2. Judgments and estimates that affect the financial statements. The discussion with the audit 
committee may include major items for which reserves and estimates are significant, including how 
such reserves and estimates are determined and subsequently monitored. Generally a discussion of 
judgments and estimates would cover the appropriate disposition of previously established reserves
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when the events that caused their creation are no longer applicable. To the extent that judgments and 
estimates involve a range of possible outcomes, the discussion could indicate how the recorded 
estimate relates to the range and how various selections within the range would affect the financial 
reporting. In particular, if the entity has significant contingencies for which no reserves or minimum 
reserves are provided, the discussion might consider the current and future financial statement impact 
of management’s decisions. If the enterprise has reserves that are “slow moving” in terms of 
resolution of the matters to which the reserves relate (e.g., litigation or environmental reserves), 
management and the auditor might address the continued need for the reserves as well as the impact 
of changes in the reserves and the balance of the reserves on the perception of the enterprise’s 
financial condition and performance. The adequacy of the disclosures of such contingencies, 
including the exposure to losses in excess of any recorded amounts, could also be discussed.
3. Consideration o f  factors affecting asset and liability carrying values. Management and the auditor 
could discuss factors including, but not limited to (a) the company’s bases for determining useful 
lives assigned to tangible and intangible assets and salvage values, (b) discount rates used to value 
pension and post-retirement obligations, and (c) the carrying value of other assets and liabilities. The 
discussion should include the type and quality of evidence supportive of such factors. The discussion 
also might include an explanation of the manner in which factors affecting carrying values were 
selected and how alternative selections would have affected the financial condition and earnings of 
the enterprise. The audit committee generally should be made aware of the effect such judgments 
have on the financial statements.
4. Use o f  special structures and timing o f actions that affect financial statements. Examples of 
special structures or timing decisions would include off balance sheet financing, research and 
development activities, and timing of transactions in order to recognize revenues or avoid recognition 
of expenses. Any special purpose financing structures or unusual transactions that affect ownership 
rights (such as leveraged recapitalizations, joint ventures, and preferred stock of subsidiaries) might 
be discussed with the audit committee. The discussion could include information about comparative 
structures used in practice and insight regarding the impact of these special structures on the risks and 
rewards of the entity and the timing and amounts of reported income and cash flow. The discussion 
also could address the impact of such structures on the transparency and understandability of the 
enterprise’s economic position as compared to its financial statements.
5. Evolving issues and choices that affect financial reporting. Examples of issues and choices 
affecting financial reporting would include revenue recognition practices such as “gross versus net 
presentation” or “upfront recognition,” outsourcing employee services, tax planning strategies, lease 
versus buy decisions, use of “restructuring plans,” and classification of investments as held-to- 
maturity versus available-for-sale versus trading. The discussion should address not only the issues 
and choices but a comparison of how such choices affect financial reporting as compared to effects 
that would have resulted from other available choices.
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6. The frequency and significance o f  transactions with related parties particularly those that are not 
in the ordinary course o f  business. Examples of these kinds of related party transactions include 
compensation arrangements, loans, related party leases, use of corporate assets, or employment of 
close relatives. The discussion could address such matters as whether the enterprise had similar 
transactions at similar prices with unrelated parties, whether transactions were undertaken on a best 
available price basis, and whether the transactions or pricing of the transactions impacted financial 
reporting in any significant manner that would not be obvious to a user of the financial statements. 
Management and the auditor could consider informing the audit committee of the financial statement 
impact and disclosures of these items, as well as how such transactions reflect the underlying 
economics. The discussion might also address the adequacy and clarity of the disclosure of related 
party transactions.
7. Unusual arrangements. Examples of unusual arrangements would include bill-and-hold 
transactions, self-insurance, multi-element arrangements contemporaneously negotiated, and sales of 
assets or licensing arrangements with continuing involvement by the enterprise. Such arrangements 
could be brought to the attention of the audit committee members to ensure that they understand how 
the business and financial reporting is being affected. The discussion could address the manner in 
which financial reporting was affected by the transactions, the transparency of the financial reporting 
and disclosures, and the impact of the unusual transactions on the comparability of financial 
condition and performance among past and future periods.
8. Clarity and transparency. Management and the auditor could discuss the clarity and transparency 
of the financial statements and disclosures. Examples of items to discuss would include details about 
restructuring activities, activity in reserve accounts, market risk and other risk disclosures, details and 
comparative data discussed in management’s discussion and analysis, disclosure of alternative 
measures of performance whether in financial statements or other materials filed with the SEC or 
otherwise publicly distributed, and segment disclosures.
9. Audit adjustments identified in the audit. The discussion should address adjustments recommended 
by the auditor whether or not recorded by management that, in the opinion of the auditor, have a 
significant effect on the entity’s financial reporting process. Further, because of the issuance of 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 89, Audit Adjustments (another amendment to SAS 61), the 
auditor also must inform the audit committee “about uncorrected misstatements aggregated by the 
auditor during the current engagement and pertaining to the latest period presented that were 
determined by management to be immaterial, both individually and in the aggregate, to the financial 
statements taken as a whole.” The discussions could also include the qualitative and quantitative 
bases considered in deciding to record certain proposed audit adjustments. The discussion of 
qualitative and quantitative bases could address each significant financial statement measure that was 
considered in arriving at a decision to record or to not record the proposed adjustments. For 
adjustments not made, there should be a consideration of how the decision not to record the
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adjustments affected the period-to-period comparability and the transparency of reported financial 
condition and results of operations.
10. Materiality thresholds and cost/benefit judgments. The discussion could address the qualitative 
and quantitative criteria used by management in making its materiality assessments. The discussion 
could also address the performance measures or other specific factors considered in making 
materiality judgments. For example, is materiality measured in relation to sales, gross margins, 
segment margin, specific financial statement lines items, before and after special non-recurring 
items? The discussion might address how the materiality criteria affect the period to period 
comparability of reported financial condition and results of operations.
Discussion of Quality, Not Acceptability or Preferability, of Accounting 
Principles and Judgments
Objective criteria have not been developed to aid in the consistent evaluation of an entity’s 
accounting principles as applied in its financial statements. SAS 61, as amended, directs the 
discussion with the audit committee to include items that have a significant impact on whether the 
financial statements are representationally faithful, verifiable, neutral and consistent. These 
characteristics can serve as a basis for a discussion of quality in the broadest sense of the word since 
these are among the desired qualitative characteristics of accounting information as set forth in 
Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics o f  
Accounting Information (CON 2). Appendix A to this Practice Alert provides an expanded lis t  of 
qualitative characteristics identified under three models of quality in financial reporting that were 
considered in developing this Practice Alert.
Discussion of Agressiveness vs. Conservatism in Financial Reporting
Recommendation No. 8 suggests that the auditor’s communication with the audit committee should 
address the degree of aggressiveness or conservatism of the accounting principles applied in the 
financial statements. The concept of aggressiveness or conservatism was viewed by many as too 
ambiguous to be dealt with effectively in response to the BRC recommendation. As a result, the 
amendment to SAS 61 that requires the auditor to discuss quality with the audit committee, as 
discussed above, addresses the BRC recommendation by requiring a discussion of items that have a 
significant impact on representational faithfulness, verifiability and neutrality of the accounting 
information included in the financial statements as those terms are defined in CON 2. Accordingly, a 
discussion of aggressiveness vs. conservatism is not required. If, however, either the auditor or the 
audit committee desire to discuss this concept, the following discussion may be helpful.
Conservatism may be defined as prudent reaction to try to ensure that uncertainty and risks inherent 
in business situations are adequately considered. The term today is often misunderstood and has
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sometimes been used to defend accounting judgments that may not be fully supportable. As a result, 
the crossover between what is conservative and what is aggressive is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish. In the current financial reporting environment, actions that are conservative to one 
person may be viewed as aggressive by another. An entity that provides reserves for losses based on 
an overly pessimistic view (and thus may have excess reserves that can be released into earnings in 
future periods) may be viewed as aggressive in the current reporting environment notwithstanding 
past experience of companies being viewed as aggressive for having failed to provide adequate 
reserves. Providing for losses on a “too-much, too-soon” basis is as erroneous as providing for losses 
“too-little, too-late.” Conservatism in financial reporting should not be used to justify understatement 
of income or assets.
Financial statements are useful in making investment and lending decisions when an entity’s 
accounting principles are applied in a manner that is reasonable in light of all known circumstances. 
Discussions with the audit committee of the degree of aggressiveness or conservatism in financial 
reporting may take into account the financial reporting effects of accounting principles on all of the 
financial statements and all periods presented as well as expected future financial statement effects. 
For example, the use of inappropriately low salvage values for depreciable assets will result in the 
understatement of current period assets and income. This will, however, overstate income in future 
periods as the company benefits from the continued use of fully depreciated operating assets.
Choices among accounting principles and their application involve judgment. Judgments frequently 
involve the determination of a range of reasonableness. In practice, the terms conservative and 
aggressive are meant to connote management judgments that are within the range of reasonableness 
but are on the safe side or on the cutting edge of the range of reasonableness. Any discussions with 
the audit committee about the aggressiveness or conservatism of accounting principles should 
address the manner in which a reasonable range is determined and how choices are made and applied 
within that range.
Summary
Under SAS 61 the auditor is required to communicate a number of matters, including the quality of 
an entity’s accounting principles, with the entity’s audit committee. The purpose of communication 
with the audit committee is to provide the audit committee with information that may assist it in 
overseeing the entity’s financial accounting, reporting and disclosure process. The auditor’s attention 
to the accounting and financial knowledge of audit committee members, the timing of 
communications, and the delivery of appropriate content in the proper context will enable auditors to 
provide significant insight and assistance to the audit committee to fulfill its oversight role while 
observing a high standard of professional practice.
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Introducing new AICPA practice tools to help 
you prevent, detect and investigate fraud.
A new audit standard, recently approved by the Auditing 
Standards Board, is the cornerstone of the AlCPA’s Anti-Fraud 
and Corporate Responsibility Program. This program is 
designed to rebuild investor confidence in the capital market 
system and re-establish the audited financial statement as a 
clear picture window into corporate America. From providing 
CPAs with expanded auditing guidance to establishing a new 
institute on fraud studies, the AICPA is determined to help 
reduce the incidents of financial statement fraud.
The Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration 
of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, is more far-reaching 
than its predecessor, SAS No. 82. To help members fully 
understand and comply with the standard — and see their 
responsibility in fraud prevention and detection — the AICPA is 
developing a variety of new programs and materials. The 
following continuing education courses and practice aids are 
now available:
NEW! Fraud Detection in 
a GAAS Audit — SAS No. 
99 Implementation Guide 
By Michael J. Ramos, CPA
A new practice aid for implementing 
the new auditing standard on fraud 
SAS No.99, issued to improve 
auditor performance and increase 
the likelihood that auditors will 
detect material misstatements 
caused by fraud, will change the 
way you prepare and perform an 
audit engagement. With your audit 
procedures changing, how do you 
ensure you are effectively planning 
and executing an audit 
engagement?
Fraud Detection in a GAAS Audit 
gives you detailed information, 
examples and best practices for 
implementing the fraud standard. 
Some of the areas where you can 
find expanded coverage are:
• Required discussions among 
engagement personnel — 
“brainstorming”
• More effective inquiries of 
management and others
• Evaluating the Entity’s response to 
identified fraud risks
• Linkage between identified risks 
and the auditor’s response
• Professional skepticism
This practice aid not only arms you 
with explanations, it gives you a 
clear understanding of how to 
implement the standard. In this 
publication you’ll also find:
• Understanding the new SAS
• How the new SAS changes your 
audit practice
• Characteristics of fraud
• Implementation Guidance
• And more!
AICPA December 2002,
Paperbound
No. 006613
AICPA Member $68.80 
Nonmember $86.00
NEW! Fraud and the 
Financial Statement Audit: 
Auditor Responsibilities 
Under New SAS 
Choose Text or Videocourse
The new fraud standard may not 
change your responsibilities for 
detecting fraud in a financial 
statement audit, but it will change 
how you meet that responsibility. 
Practitioners will benefit from a risk 
assessment approach to detecting 
fraud in a financial statement audit. 
You’ll learn the conceptual 
framework necessary to understand 
the characteristics of fraud.
Objectives
• Recognize how the new fraud 
standard differs from the existing 
standard and the effect on your 
audit experience
• Understand the auditor’s 
responsibilities for detecting fraud 
during the performance of a 
financial statement audit
• Apply a risk assessment approach 
to detecting fraud in a financial 
statement audit
Prerequisite: None
Estimated CPE Credit**: Text-8; 
Videocourse -9  
QAS C redit: Text-TBD; 
Videocourse -TBD 
Level: Intermediate
Format: Text
No. 731810
AICPA Member $119.20 
Nonmember $149.00
Format: 120-min.VHS Tape/Manual 
No. 181810
AICPA Member $148.80 
Nonmember $186.00
Additional Manual*
No. 351810
AICPA Member $60.00 
Nonmember $75.00
From the AICPA and the 
Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners
NEW! Fraud and the CPA
All CPAs have a responsibility to be 
diligent in preventing and detecting 
financial statement fraud. Whether 
you are a preparer of financial 
statements, an auditor, or just want 
to help your company or your 
clients, this course will help you be 
more effective in preventing and 
detecting such devastating frauds.
In today’s environment, this is 
knowledge you can’t afford not to 
have.
Objectives
• Gain insights from fraud 
specialists that will deepen your 
fraud knowledge enhance your 
professional skepticism and improve 
your decision processes
• Understand the different ways 
people “cook the books” and learn 
what to watch out for
• Go beyond the checklists and 
learn to think like a fraudster so you 
can catch them
Prerequisite: None
Estimated CPE Credit**: 8 
QAS C redit: TBD 
Level: Intermediate
Format: CD-ROM
No. 731730
AICPA Member $116.00 
Nonmember $145.00
* The videocourse additional manual is 
for group study training and does not 
include a self-study exam answer sheet. 
To earn self-study credit, you must 
purchase either the text format (731810) 
or the complete videocourse format 
(181810).
Order now at: www.cpa2biz.com/store 
888.777.7077
More AICPA Publications and CPE Self-Study Courses on 
Fraud Prevention, Detection and Investigation
The CPA’s Handbook of 
Fraud and Commercial Crime 
Prevention
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and 
Commercial Crime Prevention takes you 
through all the issues, both theoretical 
and practical.
The Handbook deals in detail with the 
controversial issues of write-offs, 
cookie-jar reserves, materiality and big- 
bath restructuring. All these issues are 
illustrated by a close analysis of cases 
that reveals how multimillion dollar 
frauds occur.
The world’s top experts prepare you 
to fight fraud
This is your chance to learn effective 
prevention policies and methods of 
dealing with specific types of fraud from 
a team of leading fraud prevention 
professionals and forensic accounting 
experts from the famed Kroll firm: Tedd 
Avey, CPA, CA, CFE, Kroll Lindquist 
Avey, Toronto & Atlanta; Ted 
Baskerville, CA, CFE, Kroll Lindquist 
Avey, London; Alan E. Brill, CISSP, Kroll 
Associates, New York; Hazel de Burgh, 
CA, CFE, Kroll Lindquist Avey, Toronto; 
and Bill Jennings, CPA, CFE, Kroll 
Lindquist Avey, Chicago.
You’ll get business sector-by-sector 
fraud prevention checklists and 
vulnerability grids
You’ll get a breakdown of fraud in the 
following business sectors, complete 
with prevention checklists and fraud 
vulnerability grids: construction, financial 
services, government, high technology, 
manufacturing, media and 
communications, nonprofits, 
professional services, real estate, 
recreation, natural resources, retail, 
small businesses, transportation and 
wholesale.
Bonus: A Checklist CD-ROM
containing ready-to-use checklists in 
critical areas of fraud prevention.
Extra Bonus: Report on Fraud 
Newsletter subscription with 6 issues 
per year.
Annual updates keep you current and 
are shipped upon approval.
No. 056504
AICPA Member $180.00
Nonmember $225.00
Auditing for Internal Fraud
Everybody’s talking about fraud. 
Auditing for Internal Fraud, this 
course provides an auditor with the 
tools to identify fraud schemes. It 
trains CPAs to focus their analytical 
and substantive tests on the fraud 
triangle when evaluating internal 
controls. It also illustrates the latest in 
fraud prevention and detection 
programs implemented by industry 
leaders.
Objectives
• Develop fraud audit program
• Evaluate gaps in internal controls
• Design fraud prevention and 
detection programs
• Understand the auditor’s 
professional responsibilities
• Identify critical indicators of fraud 
schemes
Prerequisite: None
Author: Michael Connelley, CFE, 
CPA
Recommended CPE Credit: 6 
Level: Intermediate 
QAS C redit: 12
Format: Text
No. 730237
AICPA Member $109.60 
Nonmember $137.00
Identifying Fraudulent 
Financial Transactions
Learn to identify the red flags of fraud in 
financial information and analyze a 
variety of fraud schemes.
You’ll develop a framework for detecting 
financial statement fraud and lean of 
fraud schemes in revenue, inventory, 
liabilities and assets.
Objectives
• Identify red flags of fraud in financial 
information
• Develop policies and procedures to 
prevent financial statement fraud
• Understand the nature of financial 
statement fraud
Prerequisite: Introduction to Fraud 
Examination and Criminal Behavior or 
equivalent knowledge and experience 
Author: W. Steve Albrecht, Ph.D., CPA, 
CIA, CFE
Recommended CPE Credit: 5 
Level: Intermediate 
QAS C red it: 10
Format: Text
No. 730243
AICPA Member $99.20
Nonmember $124.00
IRS Suspects Fraud — What 
Do You Do?
Learn to focus your analytical skills on 
the complex tax transactions included 
in corporate and individual tax filings. 
Learn to identify the red flags of tax 
fraud. Be prepared to respond if civil 
or criminal action is taken against 
your client.
Objectives
• Identify potential for fraud in tax 
transactions
• Protect yourself when preparing 
returns
• Respond appropriately to IRS audits
• Evaluate potential for practice 
growth
Prerequisite: None
Author: Dale Spradling, Ph.D., CPA 
Recommended CPE Credit: 5 
Level: Intermediate 
QAS C redit: 10
Format: Text
No. 730247
AICPA Member $99.20
Nonmember $124.00
Also Available from the AICPA 
Go to www.cpa2biz.com/store for 
more information and to order these 
CPE self-study courses:
• Legal Elements of Fraud
• Detecting Misappropriation 
Schemes
• Introduction to Fraud Examination 
and Criminal Behavior
• The Fraud Trial
• Finding the Truth: Effective 
Techniques for Interview and 
Communication
• Fraud Investigation Methods
• Computer Fraud and Information 
Security
• Corporate Espionage
 AICPA is registered with the National 
Association of State Boards of Accountancy 
as a Quality Assurance Service (QAS) 
sponsor of continuing professional education. 
Participating state boards of accountancy 
have final authority on the acceptance of 
individual courses for CPE credit. Complaints 
regarding QAS program sponsors may be 
addressed to NASBA, 150 Fourth Avenue 
North, Suite 700, Nashville, TN 37219-2417. 
Telephone: (615) 880-4200.
“ Estimated CPE Credits: CPE credit for this course is estimated and will be finalized when the course is published. Recommended CPE Credit is based on 
pilot testing. Order by phone and a Membership Satisfaction representative will confirm credit and price. You will be able to order this course online when 
recommended CPE Credit and price are final.
Order now at: www.cpa2biz.com/store
888.777.7077
For more information about SAS 99, visit the AlCPA’s new Antifraud and 
Corporate Responsibility Resource Center located at www.aicpa.org/ 
antifraud. Launching early 2003, the resource center will give you the 
tools and information you need to prevent, detect and investigate fraud -  
whatever your role in the business community.
006613
